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I. INTRODUCTION 
The equal protection clause, with its social and analytic complex-
ities, has stirred courts and commentators perhaps more than any 
other constitutional provision. Conventional wisdom now holds 
771 
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that the two-tiered equal protection test1 provides opaque analysis 
and mechanical results.2 Different remedies have been proposed. 
Some commentators attempt to supply a governing, substantive prin-
ciple for equal protection adjudication.3 Others, notably Professor 
Gunther,4 have advocated strengthening the rational basis test by re-
quiring substantial factual support for a classification and by sub-
jecting the classificatory means to greater scrutiny.5 However, this 
second approach has been profoundly shaken by the criticism, ex-
pressed in an influential student note, 6 that any means-end rational-
ity requirement can be tautologically satisfied.7 Consequently, in 
many eyes, equal protection lacks both a governing principle and a 
sound method of argument. 
This Note proposes to restore means-end analysis to legal re-
spectability through a comprehensive integrated approach to pur-
pose, misfit, and balancing. The search for a rational basis is 
meaningless if there are no constraints on the kind of purpose which 
may justify a classification.8 Therefore, this Note initially explores 
ways in which a court can more rigorously scrutinize statutory pur-
pose. The next significant question is how a court should evaluate 
the degree of coincidence between the class picked out by the law 
and the class which would be picked out if the law were to achieve 
its goals. Such "misfit" analysis is underdeveloped, largely because 
the liberality of the "purpose" requirement often renders it unneces-
sary. A major part of this Note analyzes misfit (or as it is commonly 
described, overinclusion and underinclusion). 
After a legitimate equal protection purpose has been identified 
and the misfit it creates analyzed, the classification must be subjected 
to a balancing test. This Note describes the dynamics of that bal-
ance, especially the role of misfit and the relevance of reasonable 
alternatives. The difference between the substantive due process 
and equal protection rationality tests is also explained. 
I. A helpful general exposition of the test can be found in .Developments in the Law-Equal 
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as .Developments]. 
2. See Gunther, 'I7re Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving .Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
3. See, e.g., Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review lintier the Equal Protection Guaran• 
tee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Class(lications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Wilkinson, 
'I7re Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional 
Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975); Karst, 'I7re Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship lintier the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
4. Gunther, supra note 2. 
5. See Nowak, supra note 3, at 1094; Simson, A Method far Analyzing .Discriminatory Ef-
fects lintier the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 665-66 (1977). 
6. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). 
7. For another expression of this view, see Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Educa-
tion: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 654-63 (1975). 
8. See Note, supra note 6. 
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No simple formula can resolve equal protection claims, and this 
Note does not suggest one. Nor is this Note, properly speaking, an 
apology for closer scrutiny. Rather, it attempts to describe a mode 
of argument which should be used in equal protection cases, a 
framework general enough9 to accommodate a broad range of sub-
stantive views about the material values which should guide equal 
protection analysis. 
The argument in this Note is long and complex, and by its nature 
impossible to summarize in a neat phrase such as "rational basis," 
"purpose capable of withstanding analysis," 10 or "means-focused 
scrutiny." 11 Nevertheless, a general exposition of the model may be 
helpful. Much of the following outline may be somewhat obscure at 
this stage, but it should serve as a useful point of reference whenever 
the reader is unsure of the argument's direction. 
Part I.A introduces the main themes of the equal protection 
clause. Equal protection proscribes both "hostile" and "unfair" dis-
criminations. A hostile discrimination is a law which is intended to 
burden or benefit a group because of an obviously irrelevant charac-
teristic and which produces stigma. This Note deals exclusively with 
unfair discriminations, namely, laws whose consequences are unjust 
in light of the characteristics of the classes created and of the pur-
poses of the law. These two different prohibitions respond to differ-
ent kinds of injustice and require separate analysis. Thus, the 
prohibition against "unfairness" does not require a court to examine 
legislative motive, but to evaluate the effect of a law on the interests 
of those classified. 
The fairness of a law can be judged, as a first approximation, by 
asking whether the class picked out adequately matches the class 
that should have been picked out, given the law's purpose (or, to use 
the current expression, by whether "misfit" is small enough). Some 
constraints on "purpose" are necessary, however, if the law's ration-
ality is to be judged. Otherwise the means-picking out class A-is 
always rationally (but tautologically) related to the "end"-picking 
out class A. 
Part Ill's discussion ~f purpose demonstrates that misfit analysis 
is feasible despite the tautology objection. To refute that objection, 
we must distinguish between goals which are legitimate, impermissi-
ble, or neither. A legitimate goal, as specially defined in this Note, 
is one which so clearly differs in kind from the most nearly compara-
ble goal that the legislature is entirely free to pursue it. That is, the 
9. The Note's analysis does not extend to the problems of unconstitutional motivation and 
the nature of the classifying trait (Le., the problem of "suspect" classes), for reasons suggested 
in Part I.A iefra. 
10. Nowak, supra note 3, at 1094. 
11. Gunther, supra note 2, at 20-24. 
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state need not justify such a goal in terms of its rational relationship 
to some further end. Every classification should be judged accord-
ing to a legitimate goal, and not simply a possibly legitimate goal. 
This constraint does much to avoid the tautology trap, for the state 
must ordinarily justify a law by a somewhat general purpose, not by 
a narrow, tautological interest in burdening those whom the law in 
fact burdens. In a few cases, however, which we may call "self-justi-
fying" classifications, the tautological justification suffices. 
Impermissible goals are those goals which cannot be invoked at 
all to justify a law, however "rationally" they are served in any given 
case. It is difficult to establish clear standards for "illegitimacy," but 
for several reasons later noted, this difficulty may not seriously jeop-
ardize equal protection review. The last, catch-all category comprises 
those goals which may be invoked only tentatively to justify a law. 
Even if they are quite "rationally" served in a given case, they do not 
conclusively establish the fairness of the law, since they might not be 
rationally related to any purpose which is clearly legitimate. 
Once a legitimate purpose has been isolated, we can meaning-
fully analyze the "misfit" (that is, overinclusion and underinclusion) 
created with respect to that purpose. Part IV describes in some detail 
the requirements of misfit analysis, since courts and commentators 
have badly neglected this topic. The most basic equal protection 
requirement is the minimum rationality constraint, namely, that the 
burdened ( or benefitted) class pose a higher social harm ( or need), be 
less costly to apply the burden ( or benefit) to, or have less of an inter-
est in avoiding the burden ( or obtaining the benefit) than a class not 
picked out for special treatment. These comparisons refer to the av-
erage (not the aggregate) harm or cost or interest for each class. In 
other words, this weakest rationality constraint prohibits the state 
from striking at a large part of the harm, unless, in that part, the 
harm is more acute. 
Properly understood, this constraint helps dispel several miscon-
ceptions about misfit analysis. By emphasizing differential harm, it 
avoids the popular illusion that the absolute amount of misfit is the 
measure of a law's irrationality. The constraint also illustrates that 
administrative convenience is a basic factor in the analysis of any 
law, not just another goal which the state may or may not be pursu-
ing. In the sex discrimination cases especially, the Court has im-
properly distinguished between presumptions whose "only" 
justification is administrative cost and those which are "rational." 
This distinction is false because an imperfect but reasonable general-
ization can be described either as "rationally" distinguishing classes 
of unequal average harm, or as distinguishing classes of unequal cost 
but equivalent harm, for it is simply more expensive to "find" the 
harmful individuals in the class posing a lower average 'harm. 
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The elements of the minimum rationality constraint merit further 
discussion, since they are also the factors ultimately balanced in a 
"closer scrutiny" test. Harm can be described as continuous, inter-
mediate or discrete. 12 However, the intermediate characterization, 
that only those meeting a threshold level of harm deserve a burden, 
can be an artificial device for evading misfit review. Cost can be 
separated into (1) the cost of identifying to whom the burden shall 
apply and (2) the cost of applying the burden. 13 The discussion will 
indicate that even the second type of cost has equal protection rele-
vance, despite initial appearances to the contrary; and that "individ-
ualized hearings" are not, again despite appearances, the costly but 
"perfectly rational" solution to classificatory inaccuracy. Finally, 
the burdened and the unburdened will sometimes have a different 
personal interest in avoiding the burden.14 Of course, the personal 
interest most often has equal protection significance simply because 
a law differentially infringes it, not because different classes value it 
differently. 
A major failing of contemporary misfit analysis is its inability to 
explain the difference between the rationality requirements of sub-
stantive due process and equal protection. Part IV.C.l demonstrates 
that due process analyzes the over breadth, i e., overinclusiveness, of 
a law, while equal protection analyzes the degree to which the bur-
dened and unburdened differ in posing a harm. The two methods 
are independent of each other-a due process overbreadth violation 
is not necessarily an equal protection violation, and vice versa-but 
they may sometimes be profitably read together to invalidate a law 
which does not quite violate either test. (Procedural due process also 
involves some "misfit" analysis of classificatory accuracy, and can be 
integrated with substantive due process/equal protection in a gener-
alized test.) 
The distinction between substantive due process and equal pro-
tection suggests an answer to the question whether overinclusion and 
underinclusion should be analyzed differently by a court. 15 That an-
swer is a complicated "yes." Neither overinclusion nor underinclu-
sion is directly relevant to equal protection. Each is indirectly rele-
vant insofar as it affects the size of the differential in harm that the 
classes of the burdened and the unburdened threaten. Overinclusion 
is, however, directly relevant to substantive due process analysis, and 
therefore we might say that courts should be somewhat more toler-
ant of underinclusion than of overinclusion. (This tolerance is a 
12. See Part IV.B.l infra. 
13. See Part IV.B.2 infra. 
14. See Part IV.B.3 infra. 
15. See Part IV.C.2 infra. 
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sounder formulation of the view that the state may attack "part of a 
harm.") 
The previous analysis is valid whether overinclusion and under-
inclusion are defined with respect to an affirmative burden or with 
respect to the "burden" of denying a benefit-with one important 
exception. Unlike equal protection, due process cannot treat bene-
fits and burdens uniformly, because denial of a state benefit in which 
the plaintiff does not yet have a property interest is not a "depriva-
tion of. . . property" under the due process clause. But this lack of 
uniformity is remedied somewhat by the irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine. That doctrine seems to be essentially a mild substantive 
due process (rather than equal protection) test and does not seem to 
require that the plaintiff have an actual property interest in the bene-
fit which an irrebuttable presumption has denied him. 
The last topic under misfit analysis asks how a court should eval-
uate laws with multiple goals. 16 When the state classifies persons 
who more acutely pose each of the multiple harms, the analysis is 
simple: a court compares the burdened class with the class which 
poses multiple harms and evaluates misfit in the usual way. But in 
other cases, a court must justify its decision to burden those posing 
multiple harms and not those threatening only one of the harms, 
since otherwise the law would violate the minimum rationality con-
straint. A court might reason that the possession of one harm im-
plies a higher degree of another; that pursuit of one goal inevitably 
aids or inhibits pursuit of a second; that a single legitimate purpose 
can be inferred from the several purposes; or that the classification is 
part of a general policy of attacking one of the harms. 
Misfit analysis is impossible when a court cannot reasonably as-
certain the rough dimensions of the "purpose" class, i.e., those whom 
the law should have picked out given its purpose. 17 Two broad cate-
gories of goals are inevitably arbitrary in this sense and thus are ex-
ceptions to misfit analysis. First, some goals have inherently 
imprecise standards (e.g., aesthetic and moral judgments). Second, 
some goals are "neutral," for they are indifferent to who is picked 
out; the only purpose is to burden or benefit a limited class of per-
sons indistinguishable from a larger class (e.g., lotteries, or attempts 
to reduce total program cost). Analysis of neutral goals is somewhat 
complex. Such goals are most sustainable if they further a substan-
tive purpose ( other than the mere numerical diminution of a larger 
class) which would not be served by rationally excluding some mem-
bers of the class. (An example is a bona fide social experiment.) 
Absent such a purpose, the state usually must employ a rational cri-
terion of exclusion and must proportionally diminish a benefit or 
16. See Part IV.D iefra. 
17. See Part V iefra. 
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burden which is not discrete. If the state may pursue a neutral goal, 
it should use as random a process as is practical to reduce the class, 
especially if the deprivation imposed is significant or the classifica-
tory trait would stigmatize those classified. 
Once a court has identified a legitimate purpose and evaluated 
the misfit it creates, it should subject the law to a balancing test. 18 
Unfortunately, the present tripartite equal protection test's charac-
terization of balancing is sketchy and possibly misleading. The 
court should initially ponder whether the differential in harm be-
tween the burdened and the unburdened is great enough to justify 
the differential treatment in light of the significance of the personal 
and governmental interests, the severity of the burden, and the ex-
tent to which the governmental interest is served. A court might be 
able to decide this question immediately if the law is obviously either 
prima facie fair or unfair. If the law is not at one of those extremes, 
then the court should proceed to examine "reasonable," less re-
. strictive alternatives, where reasonableness is judged according to 
the prima facie fairness of the I.aw, the social costs of the alternative, 
and how much less restrictive the alternative is. In some cases, even 
perfect or near-perfect means-end fit will not preserve a law, if the 
personal interest infringed is so important that only an unusually 
strong state interest can justify it. However, this more radical bal-
ancing approach should be used cautiously, for it often approximates 
the substantive due process test. 
Due process balancing is similar in some respects to equal protec-
tion balancing. It weighs the same elements as equal protection, but 
is seeking to justify overbreadth, a different kind of inequality than 
the differential harm which equal protection seeks to justify. Again, 
the court makes a prima facie judgment about overbreadth and ex-
amines less restrictive alternatives if the overbreadth is neither obvi-
ously fair nor obviously unfair. Due process more often entails the 
more radical form of balancing in which perfect fit is not enough, 
and misfit analysis is generally less important under due process 
than under equal protection. 
A. The Function of the Equal Protection Clause 
Any analysis of the equal protection clause makes assumptions 
' about that clause's proper function. This section reports several un-
controversial but not unimportant assumptions which underlie the 
Note's analysis. · 
One traditional view of the predominant theme of the equal pro-
tection clause is that it protects "discrete and insular minorities"19 
18. See Part VI infra. 
19. This phrase first appeared in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938). 
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from oppression in the political process.20 But this view fails to ex-
plain why some losers in that process deserve judicial protection and 
others do not. Logically the courts should intervene whenever an 
important relevant interest has not been voiced in the legislative 
process, whether or not that interest can be ascribed to an "insular 
minority." Surely courts cannot and should not fill all the lacunae 
of the legislative process. 
A court enforcing the equal protection guarantee is not a surro-
gate legislator. It should however shield people (usually, though not 
invariably, members of minority groups) from hostile discrimina-
tions and discriminations which treat them unfairly.21 This dual 
protection does not require the courts to re-evaluate the costs and 
benefits already evaluated by the legislature. It does require courts 
to decide whether hostility motivated discriminatory treatment of a 
group and whether a class has been treated unfairly in light of its 
characteristics and the purpos·es of the law. Judicial interest-balanc-
ing is legitimate only insofar as it helps answer these questions. 
While these questions are difficult, courts in equal protection analy-
sis need not balance as often or as thoroughly as is implied by the 
traditional argument that the judiciary should bolster the political 
strength of minorities. 
The notions of "hostility" and ''unfairness" deserve comment. 
"Hostile discrimination" describes a law which would not have been 
passed but for the legislature's desire to help or hurt a class of per-
sons because that class possesses an obviously irrelevant characteris-
tic. 22 For example, we "suspect" that racial classifications are 
hostile discriminations because our national experience teaches that 
they are probably motivated solely by a desire to penalize people on 
the basis of their skin color, a characteristic generally irrelevant to 
legitimate legislative purposes.23 
20. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial J)iscrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 
(1974). Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977), offers a 
sophisticated criticism of this traditional view. As Sandalow notes, the view that minorities 
merit special judicial solicitude is not confined to cases interpreting the equal protection 
clause. (United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), itself was a due process 
case.) 
21. "Hostile" discriminations are analyzed by the Court under the rubric of "suspect" 
traits. "Unfair'' discriminations include classifications burdening "fundamental interests" or 
lacking a "rational basis." The hostile/unfair distinction, while useful, does not precisely de-
scribe the Court's practice. See generally text at note 27 in.fro. 
22. This definition ignores several difficult questions. Does "obviously irrelevant" mean 
irrelevant to any legitimate purpose (in any context), or simply irrelevant to any conceivable 
purpose of the challenged law? Must the legislators know that the characteristic is obviously 
irrelevant (i.e., is it a defense that they believe blacks, women, or illegitimates are inferior or 
unqualified)? How obvious must the irrelevancy be? If a characteristic may be relevant, and if 
the legislators intend to burden those possessing it regardless of its relevance, is the discrimina-
tion "hostile''? Assume, for example, that a legislature requires women (but not men) to prove 
their fitness for physically taxing jobs simply to discourage women from unseemly, masculine 
tasks. Does the fact that the requirement is a barely rational generalization about relative 
fitness mean the discrimination is not hostile? 
23. Race may be a relevant characteristic but still be a forbidden legislative criterion sim-
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If the irrelevant characteristic appears on the face of the statute, 
the illicit motivation can perhaps be presumed, although the pre-
sumption can be rebutted, especially if the facial use of the charac-
teristic is not stigmatizing. A classification by race will almost 
invariably fail because of the stigma such classifications create and 
sustain.24 A classification by sex will more commonly be upheld, 
partly because sex is not so often "obviously irrelevant" as race, and 
partly because classification by gender is thought less stigmatic.25 
Where hostility cannot be read on the face of the law, an examina-
tion oflegislative motivation may be required. Stigma will again be 
relevant. Divining the legislative motive will, of course, be more 
difficult. 
"Unfair" discrimination need not result from hostile legislative 
motivation. It arises when the characteristics of a statutorily created 
class are insufficiently related to the purposes of the law. Such dis-
crimination constitutes the conceptually difficult portion of equal 
protection analysis. Determining whether discrimination is hostile 
requires proving legislative intent, to be sure, but once we identify 
classifications which are "suspect"-i.e., probably irrelevant to legit-
imate state ends-the legal standard is straightforward. Identifying 
unfair discrimination, on the other hand, necessitates a complex 
analysis of the legitimacy of state ends, the relevance of a classifica-
tion to those ends, and the significance of the amount of "misfit" 
ply because it stigmatizes. Consider Professor Brest's example of an employer who preferred 
whites to blacks because blacks had a higher absenteeism rate: even if all other rules for pre-
dicting absenteeism were less accurate than a racial criterion, such a criterion would certainly 
be invalidated. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword· In Defense of the An-
tidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I, 6 (1976); Posner, The Defunis Case and the 
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 21. 
The constitutionality of reverse discrimination in some circumstances, see Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2738, 2766 (1978) (opinions of Powell & Brennan, JJ.), 
may seem to contradict the statement in the text. However, upon analysis, the contradiction 
disappears. Race is "relevant" to compensating minorities for past discrimination; it is a sepa-
rate question whether this purpose is legitimate. Although the "rationality" of a statute is not 
conclusive, there may be reasons (including the significance of stigma) for being more "suspi-
cious" of a rational classification disadvantaging blacks than of a rational classification dis-
advantaging whites. See 98 S. Ct. at 2783-85 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
24. Affirmative action programs, as was remarked in note 23 supra, may be consistent with 
the stigmatic effects analysis. That analysis does, however, provide some support for a consti-
tutional preference for "goals" rather than "quotas," since whites might find goals less stigma-
tizing. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct 2733, 2751 n.34 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.). 
25. Significant stigmatic harm might be a prerequisite to a finding of "hostile" discrimina-
tion. Consider, for example, United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973), in which the Supreme Court conceded that the probable purpose of the statute (to deny 
food stamps to "hippies") was illegitimate, yet invalidated the law on a different ground. The 
Court may have believed the stigmatic harm was not great, since "hippies" are not a tradition-
ally disfavored minority. (Of course, one may dispute the correctness of such reasoning, 
which implies that if a class is only temporarily disfavored, it is not suspect.) 
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between the classification and the ends in light of the personal inter-
ests impaired and the governmental interests furthered by the stat-
ute. Most laws are at worst "unfair" -they classify people 
according to characteristics which are not obviously irrelevant to leg-
islative ends. This Note presents a framework for analyzing the fair-
ness of statutes; it addresses only indirectly the problem of hostile 
discrimination. 26 
To summarize, the equal protection clause performs two impor-
tant functions: it prohibits hostile discrimination and unfair discrimi-
nation. The former prohibition essentially concerns stigmatic 
effects, though it may also guarantee purity of motive for its own 
sake. 27 The prohibition against unfairness is less concerned with 
motive or stigma and more concerned with classificatory inaccuracy 
and with the law's impact on the interests of those it classifies. 
These two functions of equal protection are not, of course, mutu-
ally exclusive. Classifications by gender exemplify laws whose va-
lidity is judged under both standards. Indeed, most sex 
classifications which have been found unconstitutional would proba-
bly withstand scrutiny under either standard alone, but stigma and 
classificatory inaccuracy together justify their invalidation.28 In 
general, any classification which barely satisfies the fairness test de-
veloped in subsequent sections might nevertheless violate the equal 
protection clause if it contains enough indicia of hostile discrimina-
tion. Because the prohibitions against hostile and unfair discrimina-
tions serve distinct policies, however, one cannot simply add stigma 
or any other feature of hostile discrimination to the equal protection 
balance later described in this Note. 
B. Introduction to Mi.git Analysis 
Under one formulation of equal protection fairness, a legislative 
classification "must rest upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all 
26. For an illuminating discussion, see Brest, supra note 23. Useful general discussions of 
legislative motive include Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of llnconsti-
tutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; Eisenberg, J)isproportionate Impact and 
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36 (1977); Ely, Legisla• 
tive and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
21. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 
358 (1949). 
28. For an early analysis suggesting that the Supreme Court evaluates both (what I have 
called) hostility and unfairness, see Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitu-
tional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 95 (1966): "The 
(new equal protection] decisions appear to rest upon two largely subjective judgments . • • • 
One element is the relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation • . . • The second 
element is the relative importance of the subject with respect to which equality is sought •••• " 
J)evelopments, supra note l, at 1120-21, suggests that the Court's judgment is determined by 
the interaction of these two elements. 
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persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."29 As this 
suggests, equal protection requires courts to identify the criterion of 
similarity:30 with respect to what common feature must people be 
treated equally?31 In the context of the equal protection clause, the 
relevant feature is the purpose of the law.32 More precisely, two 
individuals must be treated equally if they share some quality and if 
the purpose33 of the law is to benefit or burden individuals who pos-
sess that quality.34 For example, a trespassing law which applied 
only to the left-handed would probably violate equal protection, for 
right-handed as well as left-handed trespassers violate owners' prop-
erty rights, and it is the law's apparent purpose to prevent that harm. 
Legislative classifications simplify the process of determining 
whether individuals possess this relevant quality or feature by stipu-
lating that an easily identifiable trait shall be the criterion for apply-
29. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). This formulation of the test 
is less deferential to the state than some other formulations. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (equal protection "is offended only if the classification rests on grounds 
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective"). This Note will argue, however, 
that if the rational basis test is to have any application, some analysis of the "substantiality" of 
the means-end relationship is necessary. The Royster test is employed in the text to anticipate 
this analysis. Concededly, that test begs the question at this early stage of the argument. 
30. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27. In addition, see Benn, Equality, Moral and 
Social, III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (1967); Sandalow, supra note 7, at 654-63. 
31. The requirement is usually stated as demanding similar treatment for the similarly 
situated, which implies that somewhat unequal treatment might suffice. This is misleading, 
for if we could determine easily which individuals are the same with respect to the attribute 
that the law is intended to burden or benefit, then those individuals should be treated equally. 
If, however, "similar treatment" means treatment in proportion to possession of the relevant 
trait, the "similar'' formulation states the requirement properly. 
Courts that use the "similar" formulation probably mean to suggest that the legislature 
need not create mathematically precise classifications. However, it would be more accurate to 
say that those who are in the same position with respect to the purpose of a law should be 
treated equally, but that the necessity of line-drawing and the impossibility of precisely identi-
fying the "purpose" class justify some imprecision. 
See Bedau, Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality, in EQUALITY 3 (Pennock & Chapman 
eds. 1967). 
32. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, 
at 346. JJut see text at and following notes 75-77 infra for discussion of the claim that the 
fundamental interest branch of active equal protection review substitutes "exercise of a funda-
mental interest" for "the purpose of the law'' as the criterion of similarity. 
33. This is not to say, however, that a simple desire to discriminate is a permissible pur-
pose. See Part III.A.2 infra. 
34. The principle that the similarly situated must be treated equally entails the corollary 
that the differently situated must be treated differently (unless, of course, they are similarly 
situated in some other respect that would justify the same treatment). If A and JJ are differ-
ently situated, then by definition A has some quality which JJ lacks by virtue of which he 
deserves to be benefitted (or burdened). But it is improper also to benefit JJ, who lacks the 
quality and thus does not deserve the benefit. Of course JJ might deserve the benefit by virtue 
of some other quality. 
This corollary is not merely of intellectual interest. If a statute applies to all persons but 
should only apply to a few, those unfairly included cannot point to another class, the "unclas-
sified," to whom they are similarly situated. The corollary principle is simply- the doctrine of 
due process overbreadth. A fuller discussion of the difference between the equal protection 
"principle" and its due process "corollary" is postponed until Part IV.C.l _infra. 
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ing the burden or benefit. In the classic formulation of Tussman and 
tenBroek,35 we may define class T as consisting of all individuals 
possessing the legislatively declared trait, and class M as consisting 
of all individuals possessing the mischief which the law seeks to 
eliminate.36 As thus defined, M is the class of those similarly situ-
ated with respect to the purpose of the law. Under this formulation, 
the essential question for analysis of equal protection rationality or 
"misfit" is whether the classes M and T sufficiently coincide. 
Assume, for example, that a statute conditions the privilege of 
driving upon passing a driving test. The mischief aimed at is dan-
gerous driving, and the trait identified is failure to pass the test. The 
"fit" between M and T is doubly imperfect. First, some dangerous 
drivers will pass the test-thus, the class T is "underinclusive," for it 
does not include all members of M. Second, some safe drivers will 
fail the test-thus, T is also "overinclusive," for it includes persons 
who are not members of M.37 
The Court has developed several measures of how much statu-
tory misfit will be tolerated. Under even the most tolerant standard, 
a classification must at least yield "some" fit. Thus, ifM and T have 
no members in common-i.e., if no one who fails the test is a dan-
gerous driver-then the classification must be rejected as completely 
irrational. On the other hand, the rational basis standard does not 
demand "perfect rationality"-i.e., that T and M be equivalent and 
thus that all and only dangerous drivers fail the test. Consequently, 
if the misfit is not too great, the classification created by the driving 
test statute would probably be sustained. 38 
Since misfit measures the extent to which M and T do not coin-
cide, misfit analysis is unnecessary when they coincide perfectly. Of 
course, M and T can be made to coincide by defining T in terms of 
M or defining M in terms of T. Neither device, however, is usually 
acceptable. If the legislature used the first device and simply pro-
vided that dangerous drivers be denied licenses, we would still be left 
35. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 346-48. 
36. "Mischief'' is used by Tussman and tenBroek. They did not coin an analogous term 
for the quality by virtue of which a person deserves a benefit rather than a burden, other than 
to note that the "purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public 'mischief' or the 
achievement of some positive public good." Id at 346. This Note uses the term "need" for 
this quality of deserving a benefit, even though the term is somewhat misleading insofar as it 
suggests that only deprivations, and not other personal "merits" such as excellence and impor-
tance to the economy, deserve benefits. 
37. The following terminology may be helpful. "Properly included" will refer to the class 
that should be burdened or benefitted and that in fact is burdened or benefitted- i.e., the 
intersection of M and T: (MOT). "Improperly included" means overincluded: ('vMOT). 
"Improperly excluded" means underincluded: (MO 'v T). "Properly excluded" means correctly 
excluded from the burden or benefit ( 'v MO 'v T). 
38. This statement is a gross oversimplification, as the remainder of this Note illustrates. 
But it is true that courts generally accept "small" amounts of misfit and that such misfit is often 
justifiable (though assuredly not simply because it is small). See text at notes 183-85 i'!fra. 
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to devise a method of determining who is dangerous. If the legisla-
ture granted an administrator the authority to identify dangerous 
drivers, we would have an ascertainable class T-the class of indi-
viduals adjudged dangerous by the administrator-but no assurance 
of a perfect fit. Of course, the more clearly the standards for the 
administrator's decision are specified, the more closely they resemble 
a legislative classification based simply on the possession of certain 
traits, and we are back where we started. In short, insofar as this 
device produces perfect fit, it entirely undercuts the purpose of legis-
lative classifications--=-namely, to simplify the process of identifying 
those who deserve the benefit or burden. 
Perfect fit may also be achieved by defining M in terms of T. A 
court might define the law's purpose as denying licenses to individu-
als who fail driving tests, not as keeping dangerous drivers off the 
road. One is inclined to ask why such a purpose should be given 
credence; the answer must be that such individuals are likely to be 
dangerous drivers. This method of eliminating misfit seems trans-
parently improper, but it does show that without an independent 
constraint on judicial definitions of statutory purpose, any standard 
for classificatory accuracy can be tautologically satisfied. Fortu-
nately, as we will see, such a constraint exists. 39 
The foregoing discussion of misfit is greatly simplified. For in-
stance, we shall see that it is fundamentally misconceived to treat 
misfit analysis as simply a question of the degree to which the "pur-
pose" and "trait" classes (M and T) coincide. Rather, the proper fo- ... 
cus is the difference in the degree to which classes T and"' T pose the 
harm, where "'T is the class of persons lacking the classificatory trait. 
Let us complete this introduction to misfit analysis by glancing at 
the typical mode of argument in equal protection cases. Ordinarily, 
the plaintiff complains that he is burdened even though his situation 
is similar to that of others who are not burdened.40 Instead of ask-
ing whether the asserted misfit is justifiable, courts usually respond 
by finding a respect in which plaintiff is differently situated from 
those allegedly similarly situated. Where the plaintiff claims to be-
long to a class with a low enough level of harm that the purpose of 
the law does not require imposition of the statutory burden, the court 
usually finds that the plaintiff belongs to another relevant class with 
respect to which it is proper to impose the burden. Of course, in 
finding "another relevant class," the court has simply interpreted the 
purpose of the classification in a manner unfavorable to the plaintiff. 
An example will illustrate this process. In McGinnis v. Royster,41 
39. See Part III.A.I iefra. 
40. Alternatively, the plaintiff may complain that he is not benefitted even though his situ-
ation is similar to that of others who are benefitted. 
41. 410 U.S. 263 (1973). 
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a state statute granted "good time" credit against prison sentences in 
proportion to the amount of time the prisoner had been incarcerated 
since sentencing. Although time served before sentencing was 
credited to the sentence imposed, it was not included in the computa-
tion of good time.42 Thus, a defendant unable to make bail ulti-
mately served longer than a bailed defendant (since the former could 
not receive good time credit for pretrial incarceration). The pretrial 
inmates who challenged the statute implicitly claimed that its pur-
pose was to award credit based on time served, that with respect to 
this purpose, they resembled inmates who had made bail, and that 
therefore they also deserved credit according to total time served.43 
The Supreme Court rejected this equal protection challenge by 
interpreting the statute's purpose44 as giving credit for incarceration 
time during which rehabilitative programs were offered.45 Since 
jails are less likely than prisons to offer such programs, the Court 
reasoned, it was rational to treat prisoners who had spent pretrial 
time in jail differently than persons incarcerated only in a prison. 
Note that the Court did not justify the original classification by 
adopting the plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute's purpose and ac-
cepting that misfit as tolerable. Rather, the Court defined the pur-
pose so as to explain the difference in treatment of which the 
plaintiffs had complained. 
The Court's analysis in McGinnis highlights a significant distinc-
tion between "specific" and "general" ways of justifying misfit. By a 
"specific justification" a court may explain away the misfit entirely 
as to the complaining party. Thus, if the party complains that he 
has been improperly overincluded (with respect to a burden) or un-
derincluded (with respect to a benefit), the court may identify a legit-
imate purpose as to which this specific party is properly classified. In 
McGinnis, for example, the Court "specifically" justified the differ-
42. The actual credit system was somewhat more complex. For example, the credit could 
be forfeited for "bad conduct" or for violation of prison rules, and in no case could the credit 
win release from prison before a year. "Good time" earned affected the minimum and maxi-
mum parole dates somewhat differently, and pretrial time was credited in computing the latter. 
410 U.S. at 264-68. 
The plaintiffs also complained that the statute's pretrial-time exclusion was not applied to 
county penitentiary inmates (nonfelons with less than one-year sentences). The Court rejected 
this equal protection complaint on the ground that these inmates might have required "quan-
titatively and qualitatively less rehabilitation" than felons. 410 U.S. at 274. 
43. More precisely, the plaintiffs complained that the classification discriminated against 
those unable to afford or to qualify for bail. 410 U.S. at 265,268. That is, since pretrial jail 
time was credited to the sentence imposed, a bailed defendant differed from a jailed defendant 
only in that he acquired more good-time credit. 
44. The Court was careful to note that this was only one of the purposes of the statute and 
that equal protection analysis does not require that the statute be rationally related only to a 
"primary" purpose. 410 U.S. at 275-77. 
45. The Court added that state prison officials could not observe and evaluate the perform-
ance of a jail inmate. 410 U.S. at 273. 
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ential treatment of the plaintiffs by identifying one purpose of the 
statute as crediting time served where rehabilitative programs were 
offered. 
The second alternative available to a court faced with misfit is to 
justify it "generally." In a "general" justification of misfit, the court 
concedes that the complaining party has been burdened without pos-
sessing the corresponding need, but the court finds grounds which 
justify the misfit. In McGinnis, for example, the plaintiffs might 
have responded to the Court by arguing that they did make rehabili-
tative progress in jail and therefore were improperly denied the ben-
efit of good time credit. The Court might have replied by generally 
justifying the misfit: jail inmates are less likely to achieve such pro-
gress than prison inmates (who are offered special programs), and it 
is unreasonable to require the state to evaluate each prisoner's pro-
gress, even if such an inquiry would show that the plaint!ffs had 
progressed. 
Unlike a general justification, which leaves misfit unexplained, a 
specific justification seems simply to eliminate misfit. This appear-
ance is deceiving, however. Although a specific justification asserts 
a purpose with respect to which the complainant is properly in-
cluded, it may create misfit as to other individuals. Specific justifi-
cations may off er an intuitively satisfying reason for burdening or 
not benefitting the complainant before the court, but the misfit they 
create still must be justified "generally." Otherwise the state could 
invariably justify its laws simply by finding any purpose rationally 
furthered by burdening the immediate plaintiff. For example, sup-
pose that all the plaintiffs in McGinnis had threatened witnesses. 
The statute surely could not have been justified by the state's interest 
in denying good time credit to those who have obstructed justice; the 
plaintiffs would have been almost the only pretrial inmates properly 
included with respect to that interest. The requirements for general 
justifications of misfit are discussed in detail later.46 Nevertheless, it 
should be emphasized here that a court's use of a specific rather than 
general justification should be irrelevant to the success of an equal 
protection claim.47 Whether misfit can be specifically justified, that 
is, whether the plaintiff" deserves the benefit or exemption, should be 
irrelevant because even if he does not, the plaintiff should have both 
standing to raise the equal protection claim and a right to a remedy 
if he succeeds on the merits. The following discussion will explain 
46. See Part N infra. 
47. The state may not justify its treatment of a class by reference to its "proper" treatment 
of only a part of that class; by the same token, however, the state need not "properly" treat all 
members of a class to justify distinguishing that class from another. In both the former case 
(special justification) and the latter case (general justification), a class differential must be ex-
plained. 
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why equal protection standing and remedy doctrines have this fortu-
nate consequence. 
Equal protection standing doctrine seems to produce some curi-
ous results. Why can a confessed thief complain of discriminatory 
enforcement of the criminal laws?48 Why can a widower who admit-
tedly cannot prove he was dependent on his deceased spouse success-
fully demand benefits when an obvious purpose of the law was to 
distribute benefits according to dependency?49 The answer, in each 
case, is that the plaintiff suffered legal injury simply in being treated 
differently than others who are similarly situated. Discrimination 
claims involve more than an individual's relationship to the govern-
ment; they involve the fairness of disparate treatment of classes of 
individuals.50 The essence of an equal protection claim is not that 
the plaintiff "deserves" a benefit, but rather that he belongs to a class 
that is situated similarly and therefore should be treated similarly to 
the benefitted class. 
This "relative desert" analysis allows plaintiffs to avoid issues of 
standing in equal protection cases. If, for example, the law benefits 
members of class B but not of class A, plaintiffs who belong to class 
A will allege that they are relevantly similar to the members of B.51 
Plaintiffs will then assert that whatever reasons the state had for ben-
efitting members of B must also logically require benefitting mem-
bers of A; all are, by hypothesis, equally deserving. Because 
plaintiffs need not argue that they should be benefitted though they 
are undeserving, courts invariably confront a claim which on its face 
confers standing. 52 
48. See generally Co=ent, The Right lo Nondiscriminatory Eeforcemenl of Stale Penal 
Laws, 61 CoLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961). 
49. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
50. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974): "'Due process' emphasizes fairness be-
tween the State and the individual dealing with the State, regardless of how other individuals 
in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal protection,' on the other hand, emphasizes dis-
parity in treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are arguably 
indistinguishable." 
51. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). Leon Goldfarb claimed that he should 
receive benefits because he was as deserving as women who could not prove dependency, not 
because he was as undeserving. 
52. In Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), the Supreme Court seemed to 
hold that an equal protection claimant has standing even where state law requires that the 
discrimination, if proved, be "equalized" by extending the burden to others rather than by 
exempting the plaintiff from the burden. The plaintiff, a resident taxpayer seeking reduction of 
a tax on his stored merchandise, argued that similar property of nonresidents was exempted in 
violation of the equal protection clause. The state court had held that only the legislature 
could extend the exemption to plaintiff and that it was unnecessary to consider the constitu-
tional claim, since plaintiff's property would be taxable regardless of the merits of his claim. 
The Supreme Court disagreed and reached the merits, reasoning that since the state court had 
not invalidated the exemption, it was i=aterial that plaintiff's claim would be fruitless if the 
exemption had been stricken. (On the merits, the Supreme Court denied the claim.) 
The Court's holding in Bowers is somewhat ambiguous. If indeed the state court had no 
power to remedy the alleged discrimination by extending the exemption to plaintiff, then why 
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Only when devising a remedy for an equal protection violation 
do courts directly confront the dilemma of protecting the "guilty" or 
benefitting the undeserving. Even here, courts may try to avoid the 
embarrassment of such a result by concluding that the legislature 
intended to benefit or excuse the class to which the plaintiff belongs, 
as well as the class actually benefitted. But such statutory interpre-
tation must often be dishonest. The Court awarded benefits to Leon 
Goldfarb not because Congress intended that all surviving spouses 
be benefitted, for it surely did not, but because automatically grant-
ing benefits to widows but not widowers was unfair.53 Although 
Congress intended to benefit dependent surviving spouses (and be-
lieved that widows are usually dependent while widowers are not), 
the Court properly granted benefits to Leon Goldfarb even though 
he was not dependent. Had it refused to do so, the Court could have 
avoided protecting the equal protection rights of the undeserving, 
but it would have denied Goldfarb adequate relief. 
Of course, the legislature ultimately can remedy the discrimina-
tion in either direction; the presumption in Goldfarb that only wid-
ows are dependent can either be eliminated or extended to both 
widows and widowers. But a stingy judicial remedy would thwart the 
purposes of the equal protection clause by removing the incentive for 
bringing claims and by effectively making some claims nonjusticia-
ble. Although the claimant must take his chances that the legisla-
ture will ultimately resolve the inequality to his detriment, he should 
not have to take that chance in court. 54 
should it have to address the merits? Perhaps the Court believed that the plaintiff would have 
been satisfied even with the "remedy" of eliminating the exemption for nonresidents. Read 
more broadly, Bowers may suggest that a state court must provide an effective remedy for 
equal protection violations and cannot simply leave the issue to the state legislature. See 
Iowa-Des Moines Natl. Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). In any event, Bowers does 
suggest a liberal approach to standing in equal protection cases. 
53. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
54. It should be noted that most courts and co=entators disagree with this position and 
argue instead for a case-by-case determination of the wisdom of extending rather than elimi-
nating a presumption. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 56 n.14 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 
421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942); Arp v. Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 407-11, 563 P.2d 849, 856-58, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293, 
300-02 (1977); Note, Extension versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial 
Alternative, 12 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 115 (1975); .Developments, supra note I, at I 136-37. 
The issue is admittedly complex: the decision to extend benefits may drastically affect state 
budgets (see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and companion cases); courts are 
naturally reluctant to "rewrite" legislation; and additional federalism concerns are implicated 
when a federal court devises a remedy for a state law equal protection violation. Nevertheless, 
it is important to preserve incentives for bringing equal protection challenges whether plaintiff 
is burdened or benefitted, deserving or undeserving. Courts might accomplish this by at least 
granting a prevailingplainttffthe relief he requests, even if wholesale extension of a benefit (or 
of an exemption from a burden) would require legislative action. This approach produces 
some unfairness itself, however, and seems unworkable for class actions. Alternatively, courts 
might delay relief until the legislature has had a reasonable time to react to the finding of an 
equal protection violation. 
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This introduction to misfit analysis has done little more than ex-
plain terms and describe how the misfit issue arises in equal protec-
tion litigation. This Note next examines existing techniques of 
evaluating misfit, that is, of determining when misfit violates equal 
protection. 
11. EXISTING APPROACHES TO MISFIT 
Before propounding a method of evaluating misfit, this Note will 
study the Supreme Court's current treatment of misfit. While that 
treatment has been doctrinally murky, generalizations can be de-
rived from it by scrutinizing the standards the Court purports to ap-
ply. The first part of this section discusses the traditional "rational 
basis" test. The remaining subsections investigate the relationship 
of misfit to two kinds of "closer scrutiny": fundamental interests and 
irrebuttable presumptions. Principles from these areas will be 
tapped for precedent for a more sensitive equal protection scrutiny 
than the traditional rational basis test provides. 
A. Rational Basis Test 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the rational basis test 
demands an analysis of misfit, but it has not enunciated clearly its 
standards for finding misfit justifiable. None of the three broad 
standards which the Court's decisions suggest is unqualifiedly ade-
quate. 
In a frequently cited passage, the Court reasoned that a classifica-
tion does not offend the equal protection guarantee "merely because 
it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it re-
sults in some inequality."55 To the extent that this first standard 
merely emphasizes the inevitable imprecision of legislative lines it is 
unobjectionable. However, it may also imply that a little inequality 
is always tolerable. Such an unqualified statement is inaccurate.56 
Slight inequalities should be allowed if it is too costly to remedy the 
misfit by identifying the members of the overincluded and underin-
cluded classes. However, better reasons for permitting the inequal-
ity must be given than the fiat assertion that the misfit is too slight to 
require judicial scrutiny. A complaint that it was unfair for the gov-
ernment to accept Spiro Agnew's nolo contendere plea is not suffi-
ciently answered by the response that since almost all other tax 
55. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See Metropolis Theatre 
Co. v. Chicago,.228 .U.S. 61, 69-70:(1913)'(''The problems of government are practical ones and 
may justify, if they do not require, rough acco=odations-illogical it may be, and unscien-
tific"); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 (1914) ("abstract sy=etry" not required); 
Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499,501 (1931) (''the machinery of government would not 
work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints"). 
56. See Part IV.A infra. 
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evaders are found guilty and punished, the government's policy is 
largely "accurate" in punishing the guilty. 
The Court frequently justifies misfit by a second standard, 
namely, that the legislature may strike where the harm is most 
acute.57 Unlike the first standard, the second purports tojust!fy mis-
fit, or at least underinclusiveness. For example, the state could rea-
sonably keep only the most dangerous drivers off the road. Thus, 
although a safe driver who fails the driving test may not be com-
forted to learn that legislative lines are inevitably imprecise, a very 
dangerous driver who fails the test might be convinced that the clas-
sificatory scheme is reasonable even though it does not screen out the 
marginally dangerous. However, the degree of harm standard is an 
incomplete test of classificatory inaccuracy; it is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of adequacy of fit. 
Thus, peifect fit is not achieved just because the average harm in 
the burdened class exceeds by the slightest degree that in the class 
not burdened. A classification that picks out all and only harmful 
individuals is surely more "rational"-that is, it produces less mis-
fit-than one that selects a class only marginally more "harmful" 
than the unburdened class and containing many harmless individu-
als. For example, a regulation requiring policemen to retire who in-
dividually have been found unable to perform their tasks causes less 
misfit than one requiring all policemen to retire at the age of fifty.58 
Some cases might satisfy the degree of harm standard yet still violate 
equal protection because of the ease with which the overincluded or 
underincluded could be properly treated. For example, no court 
would condone a criminal statute exempting redheaded persons on 
the ground that T ( criminals without red hair) has a higher average 
harm than 'vT (non-criminals plus criminals with red hair). Of 
course, a "degree of harm" justification can be helpful, for if it is not 
possible inexpensively to identify similarly situated subclasses, the 
level of misfit might be permissible. Nevertheless, it cannot be con-
clusively presumed that misfit is justifiable merely because the aver-
age harm in the burdened class exceeds the average in the 
nonburdened class. 
Under the Court's third misfit justification, the legislature may 
remedy parts of the mischief:59 it may address problems "one step 
57. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Minnesota v. Probate Court, 
309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915). 
58. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), which upheld 
mandatory retirement. Marshall's dissent correctly states that individualized review is more 
rational than a flat rule, but of course that fact alone should not invalidate the rule, for the cost 
of precision might justify a less precise rule. See Part IV.B.2 i,!fra. 
59. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 
486-87 (1970) ("the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between 
attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all"); Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (''The legislature may select one phase of one field and 
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at a time"60 and "need not run the risk of losing an entire remedial 
scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, 
to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."61 
This standard is by far the most troublesome of the three, since it 
appears to sanction completely irrational distinctions. A state which 
denied licenses to left-handed drivers to reduce auto pollution62 
would, after all, be proceeding "one step at a time." Almost any 
equal protection challenge would fail if this standard were adopted 
without qualification, 63 for any classification which confers a benefit 
or burden only on some of the similarly situated could be described 
as a legislature's partial remedy. As we shall see, the justification 
may be acceptable where the classification is inevitably arbi-
trary-for example, where genuine phase-in problems exist or where 
burdens or benefits are distributed as part of a bona-fide social ex-
periment.64 Nevertheless, by failing to distinguish these special 
cases the Court offers an analysis which, taken seriously, would evis-
cerate the rational basis test.65 
Despite the availability of these three putative misfit justifica-
tions, the Court has in some cases found that classifications failed to 
apply a remedy there, neglecting the others"); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 
157, 160-61 (1912) ("If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legisla-
ture seeks to prevent, the fourteenth amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise 
and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law"). 
60. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
61. McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). See Queenside 
Hills Realty Co. v. Sax!, 328 U.S. 80, 84 (1946) (a legislature "need not take account of new 
and hypothetical inequalities that may come into existence as time passes or as conditions 
change"). 
62. The example is from Posner, supra note 23, at 29 n.56. Posner cites it as one of the few 
nonracial classifications so "palpably inconsistent" with equal protection as to be invalid. But 
there is a disturbing similarity between his example and other arbitrary classifications which 
the Court has upheld. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Court upheld against an 
equal protection challenge California's exclusion of pregnancy from the definition of "disabil-
ity" in its mandatory employee-funded disability program. The Court reasoned that the state 
need not insure against all risks of employment disability and that women were not discrimi-
nated against because "[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not." 
417 U.S. at 495-97. But to say that all risks common to both groups are covered is not to say 
that a classification is rational which covers all gender-specific risks of men yet fails to cover all 
such risks for women. 
Of course, there might be other ways to explain Geduldig-for example, treating pregnancy 
as a special kind of disability meriting exclusion, or viewing the discrimination as serving the 
goal of having identifiable groups such as men and women receive benefits proportional to 
their contributions. (Apparently women are more "expensive" than men even without preg-
nancy coverage, 417 U.S. at 497 n.21.) 
63. A few classifications would not pass judicial review even under this standard, e.g., 
those drawn on explicit racial or ethnic lines or motivated by racial animus. No court would 
sustain a law denying licenses to blacks to reduce auto pollution. But any classification that is 
now judged under the rational basis test and not the compelling state interest test could be 
upheld under this "one step at a time" standard. 
64. See Part V infra. 
65. On a subtler interpretation, this test is valid. See text accompanying note 284 infra. 
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meet the rational basis test. Justice Marshall,66 Professor Gunther,67 
and several other commentators68 have recognized that a tacit bal-
ancing test has been used in these cases. But because the test is tacit, 
clear standards for gauging the significance of misfit cannot be di-
rectly derived from the cases. Consequently, these cases will not be 
separately examined, although many of them will be discussed by 
way of illustration throughout this Note. It is instructive, however, 
to investigate two doctrines by which the Court explicitly subjects 
classification to "closer scrutiny" than the rational basis test (as tra-
ditionally described) would warrant. 
B. Fundamental Interests 
In a series of cases, the Court has held that when certain "fun-
damental interests" (such as the right to vote or to travel)69 are 
d!fferential!y infringed by a classification, the classification must fall 
unless it is "necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est. "70 In effect, the Court decides that, absent such an overriding 
state interest, a statute which satisfactorily classifies people with re-
spect to a non-compelling interest must be invalidated if in some 
other, more important, respect it treats people unequally. 
Equal protection is often substantive due process in disguise, for 
in many cases the Court objects not so much to the differential in-
fringement of a fundamental interest as to the fact of the infringe-
ment itself.71 In Shapiro v. Thompson,72 for example, the Court 
invalidated a welfare residency statute because it penalized the right 
66. See Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317-27 (1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. I, 98-1 IO (1973); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970). 
61. See Gunther, supra note 2. 
68. See Perry, Constitutional "Fairness'~· Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 
VA. L. REV. 383, 402-03 (1977); Simson, supra note 5, at 668-81. 
69. The following interests have been denominated fundamental: the right to travel, Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right of privacy, Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 
431 U.S. 678 (1977); the right to vote, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); the right to 
marry, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); possibly the right to procreate, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and possibly the right of fair access to the criminal process, 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See 
People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976) (the right to liberty is 
an explicit equal protection fundamental interest). Among the "non-fundamental" interests 
are the right to an-education, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I 
(1973); and the right to housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). 
70. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis original). 
11. See Developments, supra note I, at 1131-32; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659-63 
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall has noted that the Court's limitation of funda-
mental interests in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973), to 
rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution is open to the objection that viola-
tions of such rights could be strictly scrutinized simply because of their constitutional status, 
thus rendering the fundamental interest doctrine superfluous. 411 U.S. at 100 n.59. 
72. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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of welfare recipients to travel. But a more equal infringement of 
that right, for instance, one which imposed qualitatively similar disa-
bilities (such as a general residency requirement for employment) on 
new residents other than welfare recipients, probably would also be 
harshly received by the Court. 
Nevertheless, there may well be interests which may be univer-
sally, but not differentially, infringed. In such cases the Court, in 
effect, heavily weights the individual's interest in not being bur-
dened, and any overinclusion is assigned more "disutility" than it 
would ordinarily receive. Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma73 the Court 
assumed that the state may sterilize all felons and that it may ordina-
rily draw somewhat arbitrary lines between offenses like larceny and 
embezzlement. A state may imprison embezzlers longer than larce-
nists or vice versa. Nonetheless, the Court found the arbitrariness of 
sterilizing larcenists but not embezzlers unacceptable because sterili-
zation implicates the fundamental interest in procreation.74 
Moreover, even a classification which produces perfect fit might 
be invalid if it infringes a fundamental interest. While this aspect of 
the fundament~l interest doctrine may also appear to be disguised 
substantive due process, closer analysis reveals that it is not. If a 
burden substantially impairs a valuable personal right, then even 
though only those who pose the social harm in question are bur-
dened, we are reluctant to burden them and not those who lack the 
harm. Therefore, a state may not condition the right to vote on pay-
ment of a poll tax,75 even though (1) there is no constitutional right 
to vote in state elections and therefore no substantive due process 
objection76 and (2) the tax may be rationally related to the state's 
interest in an informed electorate.77 A poll tax would be unconstitu-
tional even if it were perfectly rational, picking out all and only the 
best informed voters, since the state must produce a compelling 
justification for denying to some a fundamental right which is 
granted to others. In effect, the Court has stipulated that a state 
must, absent a compelling state interest, treat equally those who are 
similarly situated with respect to the exercise of a fundamental inter-
est. "Purpose" (the usually permissive criterion of similar situation) 
has been replaced by this mandatory criterion. 
Unlike the rational basis test, fundamental interest analysis may, 
as was suggested above, require even more than a perfect "fit." We 
shall see, however, that this surprising requirement can also be sensi-
bly applied under the rational basis test. Misfit should be evaluated 
73. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
74. 316 U.S. 540-41. 
75. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
76. 383 U.S. at 665. 
77. 383 U.S. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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with respect to state interests which are more than trivial compared 
to the burdened personal interests: perfect fit with respect to trivial 
state interests should not be enough.78 
The fundamental interest doctrine also implies a second principle 
that can strengthen the rational basis test. Not every infringement 
of a fundamental interest does or should invoke "strict scrutiny," 
only those which significantly penalize the exercise of the interest. 
Thus, the courts have found that very short residency requirements 
do not "penalize" the fundamental right to travel79 and that a state's 
refusal to provide counsel to indigents for discretionary state appeals 
does not "infringe" the fundamental right of access to the courts. 80 
These cases might be described as recognizing only a right to a 
"meaningful" appeal or only a conditional right to travel. Perhaps 
more realistically, they represent attempts by the judiciary to manip-
ulate the rigid fundamental interest categorization to avoid harsh re-
sults. Under either reading, the Court implicitly balances personal 
and governmental interests. A modified rational basis test should 
explicitly incorporate some of the balancing implicit in the funda-
mental interest doctrine-a trivial state interest should not justify se-
rious infringement of a nearly "fundamental" personal interest. 
Thus, more than a weak administrative convenience rationale would 
be required for a classification which, by rendering unrelated house-
holds ineligible for food stamps, impinges on the personal interest in 
free association.81 
Although the fundamental interest branch of the strict scrutiny 
test, as articulated by the Court, poses unresolved problems, 82 it is 
18. See Part VI.B.3 infra. 
19. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), qffd mem., 401 U.S. 985 
(1971). 
80. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
81. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
82. First, it is quite unclear how a fundamental interest is recognized. Although the Court 
has recently declared that only those interests "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution" are fundamental, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 
33-34 (1973), this declaration fails to explain the cases, see 411 U.S. at 99-100 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting), and is better viewed as an indication that the Court is disinclined to expand the list 
of fundamental interests. 
Second, this mode of analysis sometimes merely weighs misfit more heavily, as in Skinner, 
and sometimes demands that any infringement of the burdened class's interest be minimal 
regardless of the degree of fit. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), 
discussed in text at notes 75-77 supra. The fundamental interest test as now applied might 
imply both procedures in every case. But Skinner suggests otherwise; although it weighed 
misfit more heavily, the Court intimated that more rational classifications would be valid, for it 
approvingly cited Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), a case that sustained the compulsory 
sterilization of institutionalized mental defectives. For further discussion, see Part VI.B.3 
infra. 
Third, it is unclear how much the misfit (or burden) must be reduced to satisfy the "less 
restrictive alternative" test. Indeed, the dual requirement that a classification be "necessary" 
to achieve a "compelling" state interest has been criticized as impossibly strict; rational-rela-
tion-to-a-compelling-interest and less-restrictive-means-to-a-legitimate-interest tests have been 
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consistent with and in part a natural development of the rational 
basis test. More importantly, as was suggested above, two elements 
of the fundamental interest doctrine-"perfect fit is not enough" and 
"implicit balancing"-can be recruited to fortify the rational basis 
test, thereby creating a full continuum between the restrained and 
active levels of equal protection review.83 
C. Irrebuttab/e Presumptions 
A remarkable due process doctrine with equal protection impli-
cations has recently surfaced which applies a stricter scrutiny to cer-
tain classifications than does the rational basis test. Under the 
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, 84 courts implicitly assume that a 
legislative classification which grants a benefit to members of T is 
intended to benefit another identifiable class T*. 85 Courts then find 
it a denial of due process for the legislature to establish a "perma-
nent and irrebuttable presumption" that persons who are not within 
T are not within T*, when this presumption is "not necessarily or 
universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alterna-
tive means" of determining if a person is within T*.86 The remedy 
is not to invalidate the classification, but to allow the complainant to 
rebut the presumption and establish his membership in T*, typically 
through a hearing. For example, the Court in Stanley v. I//inois87 
held that due process was violated by a statute which presumed that 
all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their children and 
which therefore required the state to take care of such children upon 
the mother's death. Even if most unmarried fathers are unqualified, 
the Court reasoned, due process requires a hearing on that issue. 88 
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine can be viewed as an at-
tempt to remedy the misfit created by a statutory classification which 
is too underinclusive with respect to a benefit or too overinclusive 
proposed as substitutes. See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Singer, Sentencing Men lo 
Prison: Conslitulional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the .Doctrine of the Least .Drastic Alter-
native as Applied to Sentencing .Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 55-58 (1972). For 
further discussion, see Part VI infra. 
83. See Part VI.A infra. 
84. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dept. 
of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
85. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption .Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 81 HARV. L. REV, 
1534 (1974). 
86. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). 
87. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
88. In terms ofT and T*, the statute in Stanley defined T as the class consisting of married 
parents and unmarried mothers. The Court, apparently defining T* as the class of suitable 
parents, required the state to allow unmarried fathers, who, by definition, were not in T, to 
demonstrate that they were in fact suitable parents and thus in T*. 
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with respect to a burden. If this doctrine states that any overinclusive 
or underinclusive classification demands individual hearings despite 
administrative cost, its failing is obvious. Almost every classifica-
tion might be challenged, and without some constraint the doctrine 
represents "nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of law-
making itself."89 The Court has therefore evidently limit~d90 the 
doctrine to classifications in which "basic human liberties' are at 
stake,"91 such as the rights to conceive and raise92 one's children and 
to exercise freely personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
life.93 As one commentator has suggested, the doctrine offers an in-
termediate equal protection94 standard for "interests and classifica-
tions felt to be too significant or untrustworthy to be reviewed under 
the relaxed standard of equal protection scrutiny, but not significant 
or untrustworthy enough to qualify for fundamental or suspect status 
and the accompanying far more rigorous standard of review."95 
Another feature of these decisions indicates a further limitation 
on the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. The Court has applied it 
only when a statute clearly purports96 to distribute a benefit or bur-
den according to some identifiable characteristics and yet distributes 
the benefit or burden according to a more general characteristic in 
order to save costs. But not every classification is a surrogate for 
another easily ascertainable class. More commonly the purpose 
class is extremely difficult to identify, and membership often would 
not be more accurately determined even by individual hearings. 
The doctrine is sensible only where "it is possible to specify those 
factors which, if proven in a hearing, would disprove a rebuttable 
presumption."97 
89. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
90. Although the reasoning in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), seems implicitly 
critical of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, the doctrine may not be dead. One hint of its 
vitality is a per curiam decision endorsing the application of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
Another hint is the opinion of Justice Rehnquist (the most persistent critic of the doctrine) in 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1976), in which he apparently endorses the doctrine in 
some circumstances. See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 22-24 (1976), 
in which the Court evaluated the irrebuttable presumption claim, though it ultimately rejected 
it on the merits. Some commentators have argued that the doctrine is still alive or should be 
resurrected, e.g., Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Sh1!!fle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761 
(1977); Chase, The Premature Demise of Irrebuttable Presumptions, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 653 
(1976). 
91. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975). 
92. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
93. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974). 
94. Actually, the cases are better described as expressing an intermediate substantive due 
process overbreadth standard. See text at note 269 infra. 
95. Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal Protection 
Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 217, 228 (1975). 
96. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). 
97. Weinberger v. Salfi., 422 U.S. 749, 804 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis origi-
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It is often claimed98 that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is 
a disguised form of equal protection. Although this claim has some 
validity,99 equal protection will often be more satisfactory for plain-
tiffs than the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, since even if a plain-
tiff using the latter doctrine wins, he will only have won the chance 
to rebut the presumption.100 The irrebuttable presumption doctrine, 
then, is most useful to plaintiffs when the presumption would not 
have failed the rational basis test. But apparently the legislature can 
avoid such irrebuttable presumptions simply by deceit. That is, 
these classifications are invalidated not because they are not ration-
ally related to any legitimate state interest (for they are), but because 
they are not rationally related to the goal which the legislature was 
foolish enough to identify, more or less explicitly, in the statute. In 
Stanley, for example, the state could have argued that its purpose 
was to discourage unmarried fathers from raising children rather 
than to ensure the fitness of parents, the purpose apparently inferred 
by the Court. Although the new purpose might still fail to justify 
the classification, it would present a more difficult constitutional 
question than that which the Stanley Court addressed. 
nal). The Court in Sa!fi at least gives lip-service to this constraint: "Unlike the statutory 
scheme in Vlandis [v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973)), the Social Security Act does not purport to 
speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then make plainly relevant 
evidence of such bona fides inadmissible." 422 U.S. at 772. 
98. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFieur, 414 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring); Note, The Conclusive Presumption .Doctrine: Equal Process or .Due Protection?, 72 
MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974). 
99. But see note 94 supra. 
100. To be precise, plaintiffs will be worse off under an irrebuttable presumption analysis 
unless those who are siniilarly situated also have to prove, in an individualized hearing, that 
they deserve the benefit in question. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1095-
96 (1978); Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: '£he Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 
1532, 1545-47 (1974); Note, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 102 (1974). For example, in Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court invalidated the statutory presumption that an unmar-
ried father was unfit to raise his child after the death of the mother. The effect of the invalida-
tion was to require the state to prove unfitness at a hearing under the standards applicable to 
married or divorced parents and to unwed mothers. This result would have been reached 
under either the due process or the equal protection clause, and the Court held that the statute 
violated both clauses. By contrast, if the plaintiff had been successful under an irrebuttable 
presumption analysis in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), she would only have gained 
the opportunity to rebut the presumption that a marriage within six months of application for 
Social Security benefits was entered into collusively; the "presumption," if you will, of non-
collusiveness would be retained as to all who married more than six months before applying 
for benefits. On the other hand, had she been successful on an equal protection theory, plain-
tiff would have been entitled to the same reverse "presumption" as the longer-married and 
could have recovered benefits without any hearing. 
The Court in Sa!fi missed this distinction. It argued that the prophylactic six-month rule is 
desirable in part because it "protects large numbers of claimants who satisfy the rule from the 
uncertainties and delays of administrative inquiry into the circumstances of their marriages." 
422 U.S. at 782. This argument is fallacious, for if plaintiff were to prevail, the presumption of 
non-collusiveness could still be retained for persons married earlier than six months before 
their spouses' deaths. 
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In the typical irrebuttable presumption case, the Court argues as 
if it were simply effectuating actual legislative intent by correcting an 
inconsistent or obviously irrational classification. This reliance on 
actual intent, which also appears in some recent sex discrimination 
cases, suggests that the Court will invalidate some laws simply be-
cause the legislature did not fully and deliberately consider a goal, 
even though that goal would otherwise have justified the cla--ssifica-
tion. In a later section, 101 this intriguing development will be ex-
plored more fully. 
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is not without problems, 
the most serious of which is the difficulty of determining whether a 
particular statute "purports" to test for ascertainable characteristics 
or instead represents a "substantive policy determination that lim-
ited resources would not be well spent in making individual determi-
nations.''102 Nevertheless, the doctrine offers a brave new approach 
to equal protection problems, allowing the legislature to enact a 
loose classification with a provision for hearings through which to 
rebut the classificatory presumption or to enact a tighter classifica-
tion with no provision for hearings.103 
In a larger sense, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is a kind 
of less-restrictive-means requirement which strengthens the rational 
basis test. The state must explore reasonable alternatives, even if 
the alternatives add costs. But, like the fundamental interest ap-
proach, an implicit balancing of state and personal interests appears 
to explain this departure from the simple rational basis test. Thus, 
although a state may deny nonresidents in-state rates for a year sim-
ply because of their residence and domiciliary status at the time of 
application, 104 it may not do so for four years. 105 
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is a curious amalgam of 
equal protection rationality, substantive and procedural due process, 
and the least-restrictive-alternative test. At the least, the doctrine 
illustrates courts' occasional willingness to soften the rigid two-tiered 
equal protection standard through a creative balancing of interests. 
The fundamental interest doctrine, of course, evinces a similar will-
ingness. Later sections draw upon balancing notions from these two 
doctrines to develop a more comprehensive theory of equal protec-
tion balancing. Before analyzing misfit and balancing more closely, 
101. Part III.B i,!fra. 
102. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 784 (1975). 
103. Simson, supra note 95, at 232-33; see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
104. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), qffd mem., 401 U.S. 985 
(1971). 
105. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
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however, we must discuss how to characterize properly the purpose 
with respect to which the classificatory means creates misfit. 
Ill. ANALYZING PURPOSE 
Under the traditional rational basis test, the Court analyzes a 
classification flexibly: any classification rationally related to a con-
ceivable purpose will be sustained.106 The Court itself may "con-
ceive" a possible purpose107 and need not rely on the express 
language of the statute or the ingenuity of the state's attorney. And 
the purpose chosen by the Court need not be the "primary" pur-
pose, 108 though it must be "legitimate" or "permissible."109 
This flexibility poses the danger that every legislative classifica-
tion could be trivially justified.no As Justice Rehnquist has 
noted, ll t the "purpose" (in the ordinary sense of that word) of a leg-
islature in enacting a bill is to make its language part of the law. 112 
This is hyperbole, but it raises a serious point: any burden imposed 
on one group can be tautologically justified as furthering the state's 
interest in burdening that group. If the congressional purpose in 
United States .Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 113 was simply to 
deny food stamps to "hippie communes" (and other unrelated 
households), if the states in Shapiro v. Thompson 114 honestly desired 
to reserve their welfare funds for residents, then the means-end "fit" 
in each case is perfect. But these purposes do not persuade us that 
the classifications are permissible. Given the centrality of misfit 
analysis in the strengthened rational basis test developed in this 
Note, some limit must be placed on the purposes a state may invoke 
to justify its discriminations. This section describes two potential 
limiting devices: the requirements that a statute's purpose must be 
legitimate and that only actual purposes should be considered. 
While the propriety of the second constraint is not clear, the first is 
106. See l)evelopments, supra note I, at 1078. 
107. The Supreme Court has occasionally said that any "conceivable" circumstance or set 
of facts would support the reasonableness of the classification. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 191 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). If this expression suggests that a court or legislature 
may invent facts that would substantiate a purpose, it is surely objectionable. Probably the 
Court only meant to restate the argument that any conceivable purpose may be invoked if 
some actual set of facts supports it. But it is vital that the question of factual support be 
addressed, if only cursorily, by a court. See Perry, supra note 68; Tussman & tenBroek, supra 
note 27, at 367-68. 
108. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973). 
109. See l)evelopments, supra note I, at 1078; Part III.A.2 infra. 
I 10. See Note, supra note 6. 
111. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
112. See also Sandalow, supra note 20, at I 183 ("legislatures do not act irrationally"). 
113. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
I 14. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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consistent with the history and purpose of the equal protection 
clause and helps rescue the rational basis test from tautology. 
A. Legitimacy 
The requirement of a legitimate purpose is probably the single 
most important protection of misfit review. This constraint might be 
viewed (wrongly) as encapsulating all other equal protection con-
straints, if one believed that a statutory end necessarily described a 
statutory means. The "end" or purpose of our driving test would 
simply be "to put safe drivers, and only safe drivers, on the road, by 
means of a driving test, with the degree of precision that that driving 
test provides." The question whether the classification satisfies 
equal protection then collapses into the question whether the "end" 
is legitimate. 
However, this view clumsily displaces the crucial questions in-
stead of answering them. A more satisfactory analysis, and the one 
generally employed in this Note, distinguishes carefully between 
ends and means. The legitimacy of the end must still be investi-
gated, but that inquiry need ask only whether the end is on its face 
impermissible, without regard to the means. 115 Only if the end is 
not impermissible need the closeness of the fit be examined. 
There are three categories of equal protection goals: (1) goals 
which are legitimate, in the special sense that courts can simply ac-
cept them without further testing their rationality (that is, fit) in 
terms of a further goal; (2) goals which are obviously impermissible, 
in the sense that they can never justify a classification; and (3) all 
other goals, comprising those ends which must be tested both for 
rationality in terms of a further end and for the rationality of the 
classificatory means. 
It bears emphasis that "legitimate" goals, as defined in this Note, 
are only a subset of those goals which are not impermissible. Many 
goals are neither impermissible nor "legitimate" in this special sense; 
as we will see, such goals are only tentative equal protection justifi-
cations, unlike "legitimate" goals. 
The relationship between these three categories can be summa-
rized by briefly describing how a court should test the legitimacy of 
statutory ends preparatory to analyzing misfit. First, it should sum-
marily reject any impermissible goals. Second, it should examine the 
remaining goals to determine whether they are legitimate. If they 
are not, then the Court should seek a more general, legitimate end to 
which each end is closely related. Misfit should be evaluated only 
I 15. For reasons that will become apparent, the inquiry will also extend to the question 
whether the means-end "purpose" (the desire to achieve the end by those means) itself is obvi-
ously legitimate. If so, closeness of "fit" is irrelevant, for the law automatically passes equal 
protection review. 
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as to the obviously legitimate ends identified by this process. In the 
unusual case where the desire to achieve the narrow statutory end by 
the statutory means can itself be described as an obviously legitimate 
goal, misfit evaluation is unnecessary, for the fit will be perfect and 
the classification can be described as "self-justifying." 
The discussion of the three categories of goals that follows will 
clarify the procedure that courts should use in initiating misfit review 
and will explicate the relationship between the categories. The or-
der of presentation departs somewhat from the actual procedure 
courts should follow in that obviously illegitimate goals are dis-
cussed after obviously legitimate ones. 
I. Legitimate Goals 
Any means-end analysis of legislation risks two contrasting criti-
cisms. First, as we have seen, the "end" may always be tautologi-
cally defined so that the "fit" is perfect. Second, even if we do know 
how to start the analysis (if, that is, the first criticism is rejected), how 
do we know when to stop? Does a goal Gi, which does not tauto-
logically explain the classification and which the classification ade-
quately fits, satisfy equal protection requirements, or must goal G 1 
"fit" a more general goal 0 2? Must this process continue until "fit" 
is measured against the most general goal of all, the public welfare 
simpliciter? This kind of superrationality requirement is surely un-
acceptable, yet it is the logical consequence of the means-end ap-
proach. 
The concept of "legitimate" goals defuses this second criticism. 
Misfit analysis may stop at a legitimate goal; 116 the court should ex-
amine the adequacy of fit relative to it but to no further goals. Con-
sider, for example, the desire to subsidize farming. To say that this 
goal is legitimate is to reject as superfluous those justifications such 
as the need to encourage farming, or to stabilize farm prices, or to 
ameliorate the lot of farmers. 117 The state need not prove that its 
discrimination between farmers and others serves the general wel-
fare, for such a discrimination is legitimate-it is the kind of "dis-
116. For an excellent discussion of the level of generality at which statutory purpose 
should be defined in misfit review, see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION· 
MAK.ING 565-66 (1975). 
117. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,512 (1937), sustaining a 
state unemployment compensation law against the challenge, inter a/ia, that its exemption of 
agricultural employers, charities, and other groups violates equal protection. "A sufficient 
answer," the Court reasoned, is "that the state is free to select a particular class as a subject of 
taxation" (here, those employing labor in the processes of industrial production and distribu-
tion). Id The Court continued: "Reasons for the selections, if desired, readily suggest them• 
selves," such as the desire to promote one industry over another. Id But it is significant that 
the Court simply asserted these possible reasons, without analyzing their legitimacy or whether 
they were substantially served by the law in question. 
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criminatory" decision which the legislature is absolutely free to 
make. 
However, unless "legitimate" is properly defined, this category of 
goals threatens to swallow much of equal protection review. In re-
sponding to the second criticism of means-end analysis, care must be 
taken not to succumb to the first criticism. States might attempt to 
defend any challenged goals as legitimate and, by defining these 
ends in terms of the statutory means, create the tautology that we 
seek to avoid. If courts accepted_ these characterizations uncritically, 
no law would violate equal protection. A law disenfranchising 
blacks is perfectly tailored to keep blacks from voting, but far from 
being legitimate, that purpose is obviously impermissible. Most leg-
islative ends fall into a middle category, neither legitimate nor obvi-
ously illegitimate. Thus, the critical question for the courts is how to 
identify legitimate goals. Only if the bounds of that category are 
identifiable can the courts analyze misfit. 
One possible definition is that a discrimination is legitimate if it 
can reasonably be assumed to serve the public interest. We may 
properly favor farming over industry because plainly satisfactory 
justifications consistent with the public interest are so numerous that 
the court need not second-guess the legislature. But this definition is 
not convincing. Consider, for example, legislative classifications of 
crimes. Some "non-criminal" conduct threatens public security and 
some "crimes" do not; nevertheless, a court would accept the state's 
classifications of crimes within the broadest limits. 118 Had Gover-
nor Carey signed the proposed New York law imposing heavier pen-
alties for crimes against the elderly, 119 the law could not have been 
successfully challenged on equal protection grounds, yet the "public 
interest" served by such a law can be described only tautologically. 
Crimes against the elderly are offensive, and the legislature may ex-
press this moral judgment by law. No further justification-that the 
law promotes "human dignity" or protects the most helpless vic-
tims-need be adduced. Any justification for singling out crimes 
against the elderly on such grounds is subject to challenge: one might 
assert that crimes against small children aggrieve human dignity 
"more," or involve weaker victims. Yet we are more certain that the 
118. Apparently the only substantive constitutional constraints on defining behavior as 
criminal are the prohibition against punishment for mere status, see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); the eighth amendment ban on cruel 
and unusual punishments; and proscriptions against interfering with rights protected by the 
Bill of Rights (e.g., free speech, privacy). None of these constraints significantly narrows the 
extraordinary legislative discretion in defining crimes. 
119. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1977, at 1, col. 6. The bill would have set mandatory 
prison terms and would have limited plea bargaining for most serious crimes against the eld-
erly and physically disabled. Id at B4, col. 5. 
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original legislative judgment is valid than we are that justifcations 
are available. 120 
The proper definition of legitimate goals has a metaphysical ring: 
those legislative purposes that differ in kind, rather than degree, 
from any other. Thus, in determining whether a purpose is legiti-
mate, a court must decide that the judgment is permissible and suffi-
ciently different from potentially comparable judgments. Absent a 
clear societal consensus, courts must compare the burdened class to 
the class assertedly similarly situated. A law which grants drivers' 
licenses only to those who pass a driving test is sustainable if it is 
rationally related to keeping dangerous drivers off the road, an obvi-
ously legitimate purpose. Saying that keeping dangerous drivers off 
the road is obviously legitimate simply means that a dangerous 
driver cannot criticize the purpose on the ground that there are per-
sons (e.g., criminals) who endanger the public more than he. There 
is a difference in kind between pursuing criminals and excluding 
dangerous drivers from the highways; thus, differential treatment of 
these groups should not be judicially scrutinized. 
As a further example, reconsider the statute challenged in 
McGinnis. 121 The denial of good-time credit for presentence time 
was justified by the absence of rehabilitation programs in jails. 
Here, neither the immediate purpose (giving credit only for post-
sentence time) nor the second purpose (giving credit only when reha-
bilitation programs were offered) is legitimate. Yet the second 
purpose would not satisfactorily explain the distinction if we knew 
that rehabilitation programs do not work or that as much rehabilita-
tion actually takes place in the pretrial setting as in prison. 122 Our 
very need to ask these further questions suggests that the purpose is 
not legitimate. Thus, an even more general, third purpose must be 
invoked before misfit review is proper. That purpose, of course, is 
crediting incarceration time according to actual rehabilitation-a 
purpose, finally, which is legitimate, since it cannot be seriously sug-
gested that the state must justify using rehabilitative progress and 
120. q: L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 17e (1969): 
"I know that I have never been on the moon." That sounds quite different in the circum-
stances which actually hold, to the way it would sound if a good many men had been on 
the moon, and some perhaps without knowing it. In this case one could give grounds for 
this knowledge. . . . 
I want to say: my not having been on the moon is as sure a thing for me as any 
grounds I ~uld give for it. 
121. See text at notes 41-45 supra. 
122. But see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263,271 (1973): "We pass no judgment on the 
success or merits of the State's efforts, but note only that at state prisons a serious rehabilitative 
program exists." If the Court is simply stressing the difficulty of evaluating rehabilitative 
progress, then its unwillingness to pass judgment is reasonable, especially since the legislature 
needs freedom to test new schemes, the results of which cannot be predicted, see discussion at 
notes 256-61 i'!fra. But if the quoted passage means that the Court would ignore convincing 
proof that rehabilitation could not occur in prisons, then its reasoning is unconvincing. 
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not, say, blameworthiness or deterrent effect as the criterion for 
granting good-time credit. 
In sum, the "in kind" criterion requires a court to evaluate misfit 
only with respect to legitimate purposes.123 If a proffered purpose is 
not legitimate, another usually more general purpose which is legiti-
mate must be found. 
No extended search for a legitimate purpose is required in the 
case of the self-justifyll!-g discrimination ( one in which granting the 
burden or benefit to the statutorily defined class is itself an obviously 
legitimate goal). This is simply the tautological justification for mis-
fit rejected earlier. The tautology is acceptable in a limited context, 
however, because it sometimes is not possible to explain a distinction 
more convincingly than simply to describe the distinction itself. 
Where this is the case, and where the purpose of distinguishing be-
tween recipients and nonrecipients of a benefit or burden precisely as 
indicated on the face of the law is obviously legitimate, the classifica-
tion is self-justifying. For example, a law imposing the death pen-
alty for murder is self-justifying. The distinctions on the face of the 
law between murder and other crimes, and between capital punish-
ment and other penalties, are distinctions in kind. A court would 
not be perturbed if rape were punishable only by a life sentence, if 
assault only by a suspended sentence, or if heroin sales were not 
punishable at all. 124 Other constitutional constraints aside, the fa-
cial purpose of the law, punishing a murderer with death, is legiti-
mate. 
The role legitimate goals play in misfit analysis should now be 
clear. But we still have no simple explanation of when a statutory 
purpose is "in kind" and thus reflects a distinction which a court 
should not review. 125 Professor Brest has vividly delineated the 
123. Evaluations of misfit must often cumulatively evaluate misfit as to several levels of 
purpose. That is, if means Tis used to achieve end M, which itself is a means to end M1, and 
only M 1 is legitimate, then we should make a rough estimate of the extent to which T serves M, 
discounted to the extent that M fails to serve M 1• In practice, a court need rarely engage in 
such subtleties; it will often be enough to judge the extent to which M 1 is served by means T. 
124. Courts addressing the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions of the use of mari-
juana and cocaine often must decide whether the distinction is in kind or in degree. Of 
course, they do not describe the issue in these terms. But the success of an equal protection or 
due process challenge often depends on whether the court is convinced that marijuana and 
cocaine are no more harmful than alcohol. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d I (Alaska 
1978) (cocaine more harmful than marijuana; prohibition of use is constitutional); State v. 
Leigh, 46 U.S.L.W. 2425 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978) (marijuana less harmful than alcohol or tobacco; 
prohibition of use is unconstitutional). If a court does not even accept the comparison be-
tween marijuana and alcohol as a matter of degree, however, the constitutional claim would 
probably fail. There are other minor criminal offenses, such as loitering or disturbing the 
peace, which clearly are not comparable to alcohol abuse. The difference is in kind, and 
therefore such offenses cannot as easily be challenged on equal protection grounds. 
125. Useful discussions other than Professor Brest's (see note I 16 supra) include Ely, supra 
note 26, at 1235-49; Note, supra note 6, at 139-51; Sandalow, supra note 7, at 656-61; .Develop-
ments, supra note I, at 1081; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 356-61. Most of these 
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problem with a hypothetical regulation requiring the installation of 
exhaust emission devices on cars: 
[A]s one moves to higher levels of generality, the likelihood of finding 
rational grounds for distinction increases. But where to stop? How 
does one know that cars are to be compared with trucks and buses, and 
perhaps with airplanes and factories, but not with cigars, jackhammers, 
and pomography?126 
As Brest's example illustrates, somehow we often do know when to 
stop. 127 Despite its metaphysical ring, the "in kind/in degree" dis-
tinction is one which courts naturally, albeit unconsciously, do em-
ploy. However, there may not be objective standards for when to 
stop requiringjustifications,128 and a court probably can only express 
intuitive, 129 informed and considered judgment.130 
That this standard is amorphous is not critical, however, for a 
purpose which is not legitimate is not necessarily illegitimate. In 
simply pose the problem, however. For example, one commentator notes that courts presume 
that favoritism toward an industry ultimately benefits the public and reasons that "denominat-
ing one industry as more worthy than another does no great violence to egalitarian ideals. . . . 
By contrast, a similar judgment made about the worth of individuals would require clear 
justification." .Developments, supra note 1, at 1081. But the crucial questions are why our 
egalitarian ideals endorse different treatments of these two forms of favoritism, how different 
that treatment should be, and even how to decide what kind of favoritism a given classification 
embodies (e.g., whether a subsidy to farmers promotes agriculture or is a judgment that certain 
individuals, i.e., farmers, are worthier). 
126. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 566. 
121. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 722-23 (1969), where the allegedly dis-
criminatory distinction seemed so clearly legitimate that the Court was unable even to fit the 
problem into an equal protection framework. The defendants had complained that a judge's 
imposition of a harsher sentence on retrial created an invidious classification: since convicts 
who do not seek new trials cannot have their sentences increased, that risk is imposed only 
upon those who succeed in having their original convictions set aside. 
128. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 566. 
129. Resort to intuition does not necessarily mean that a principle is weak. Professor 
Rawls has persuasively said that moral argument should seek a reflective equilibrium between 
principles and considered intuitive judgments. Thus, in determining the principles of justice, 
we should 
see if the principles ... match our considered convictions of justice or extend them in an 
acceptable way. We can note wb,ether applying these principles would lead us to make 
the same judgments about the basic structure of society which we now make intuitively 
and in which we have the greatest confidence; or whether, in cases where our present 
judgments are in doubt and given with hesitation, these principles offer a resolution which 
we can affirm on reflection. 
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971). 
130. The intuitive approach, however, is occasionally unconvincing. For example, in a 
concurring opinion famous for its spirited defense of equal protection, Justice Jackson dis-
posed of the merits of the claim with disturbing ease. He agreed with the majority that 
merchants could be permitted to advertise on their own trucks but not on the trucks of others, 
but he did not accept the majority's rationale that the first class posed a slighter traffic hazard 
than the second. According to Justice Jackson, the discrimination was fair "because there is a 
real difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to 
tolerate action from those who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same 
action to be promoted for a price." Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 
I 16 (1949). Unfortunately, Justice Jackson did not further define this "real difference," and a 
more obviously "real" (i.e., legitimate) explanation would have been more persuasive. 
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finding that a purpose is not legitimate, a court is not invalidating 
the classification but only requiring that it be subject to misfit review 
with respect to some obviously acceptable purpose. Where a further 
justification would be instructive the court should therefore hesitate 
to conclude that a purpose is legitimate. While a driving test may 
serve the laudable purpose of giving licenses to those who pass driv-
ing tests, a court should rest its decision in favor of a more obviously 
legitimate purpose. 
2. Impermissible Goals 
What goal~ may not be pursued at all, whatever the means-end 
fit? In addressing this question, the Supreme Court has found im-
permissible not only objectives forbidden by other clauses of the 
Constitution, 131 but also the objectives of disadvantaging any suspect 
class132 as well as those asserting "fundamental interests."133 The 
unadorned desire to discriminate against women, 134 aliens, 135 illegit-
imates, 136 or "politically unpopular" groups137 is also unlawful. 
However, the Court has not clarified the standard for determining 
"impermissibility." The Court's suggestion that discrimination for 
its own sake is never legitimate138 is put in doubt by our analysis of 
"legitimate" discriminations. No reasoned basis for defining illegiti-
mate purposes emerges from the Court's decisions. 
This Note does not attempt to define precisely "impermissible" 
purposes. For several reasons, we need not do so. First, although 
some unlawful purposes invalidate the laws which they motivated, 
131. See Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (first amendment); Develop-
ments, supra note 1, at 1081. 
132. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886). 
133. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
134. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (rejecting the state's interest in equipping 
boys, but not girls, to be family providers); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1.948) (stat-
ute denying bartenders' licenses to women other than relatives of a male owner might be inva-
lid if its real purpose were "an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the: 
calling"). 
135. See Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 605 (1976) (finding "unpersua-
sive on its face" the state's desire to prevent the uncontrolled influx of Spanish-speaking aliens 
into the practice of civil engineering in Puerto Rico-a justification that "amounts to little 
more than an assertion that discrimination may be justified by a desire to discriminate"). 
136. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 & n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
137. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973) (although 
legislative history suggested a regulation was designed to exclude "hippie communes" from the 
food stamp program, equal protection "at the very least mean[s] that a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est"). Bui see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Texas 
may bar members of the military who moved to the state from voting in state election as long 
as they remain in the military, for it "could rationally decide to protect state and local politics 
against the influences of military voting strength"). 
138. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.8 (1973). 
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all such purposes should probably not have this effect.139 Impermis-
sible purposes in the context of misfit analysis have a limited conse-
quence-they are simply not accepted as justifications by the 
reviewing court, and the classification must be justified in terms of 
another (legitimate) purpose. Thus, a "liberal" interpretation of im-
permissible goals will not severely restrict legislative freedom. Cur-
rently both the courts and counsel for the state attempt to justify 
laws in terms of appealing legitimate goals. 140 The Court defended 
a Social Security formula benefitting women more than men as com-
pensating women for past job discrimination 141-a tentatively legiti-
mate, if not "legitimate," goal-and not simply as increasing the 
material welfare of women more than the welfare of similarly situ-
ated men. 
The imprecision of "impermissible" is not crucial for a second, 
contrasting reason. Even if impermissibility is conservatively inter-
preted, that is, if few goals are found impermissible, important con-
straints remain. A goal which is not unlawful might not be 
"legitimate" either, in which case the rationality of the means must 
still be tested against a more general legitimate goal. 
Finally, insofar as a law stigmatizes, heavily burdens personal 
interests, or does not substantially further valuable state interests, it 
may not matter whether its purpose is unlawful, for the statute may 
fail under the equal protection balancing that follows misfit analy-
sis.142 The relationship of near illegitimacy to this balancing can be 
illustrated by examining one element of the balance, the significance 
of the state interest. An impermissible interest can be described as 
having no significance and thus can be ignored by the court. But a 
court more anxious to defer to a legislature can, more palatably, dis-
count the significance of dubiously permissible interests in weighing 
the state's side of the equal protection balance. 
Although equal protection analysis as described here and as 
practiced by the courts allows flexibility in assessing legitimacy, an 
impermissible goal should be dispositive of the equal protection 
claim in some cases. The courts dislike telling a state that its goal is 
unlawful, and they often purport to invalidate a law either because 
its purpose was not rationally served or because the state could not 
have intended so dubious a purpose. However, the most honest re-
sponse would often be either to find the purpose impermissible or to 
139. See the suggested approach in Eisen~rg, supra note 26, at 134-46. 
140. But see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1976), in which the state court had upheld a 
gender discrimination as rationally furthering the co=only held notion that it is "the man's 
primary responsibility to provide a home." 421 U.S. at 10 (quoting 30 Utah 2d 315,318, 517 
P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974)). 
141. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). 
142. See Part VI, especially VI.B.3, infra. For a discussion of the requirement that courts 
review only actual purposes, see Part 111.B infra. 
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find its validity so slight that it is weighed lightly in an equal protec-
tion balance. 
A good illustration of the Supreme Court's reluctance to grapple 
with the problem of impermissible purposes is Carey v. Population 
Services International, 143 which held certain restrictions144 on access 
to contraceptives violative of the first amendment and the due proc-
ess clause.145 The state argued that its ban on the sale of contracep-
tives to minors rationally furthered its goal of discouraging sexual 
promiscuity among minors. Members of the Court offered several 
responses to this argument. The first response, that the state could 
not have meant to "punish" fornication with pregnancy, 146 is a 
loaded characterization of the question.147 The second response, 
that the regulation did not actually discourage promiscuity, seems 
more plausible.148 However, as Justice Stevens noted in the third 
response, this only suggests that the statute was meant to have a sym-
bolic impact.149 Stevens summarily dismissed this "propaganda" 
interest, yet the value of symbolic impact might be more significant 
than he indicated.1so 
These responses notably avoid the most obvious and straightfor-
ward argument for invalidating the law-that discouraging fornica-
tion by the young is an impermissible purpose.151 This avoidance 
technique may be properly conservative jurisprudence, but as ap-
143. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
144. New York law prohibited any person from selling or distributing contraceptives to 
minors under the age of 16, prohibited anyone other than a licensed pharmacist from distribut-
ing contraceptives to persons over the age of 16, and prohibited any person from advertising or 
displaying contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 681. 
145. Although Carey is a due process and not an equal protection case, its discussion of the 
legitimacy of state purposes is also applicable to equal protection cases. The Court freely 
quoted Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), an equal protection case, in analyzing the 
scope of the privacy interest. 
146. 431 U.S. at 695. 
147. The state's effort to encourage juveniles to be chaste is not necessarily "punitive" 
simply because minors may circumvent the regulation with consequent harm to themselves. 
One could just as well describe a prohibition on sales of alcohol as punitive because people 
will avoid the prohibition by illegally manufacturing impure and dangerous alcohol. 
148. 431 U.S. at 695, 702 (White, J., concurring); 431 U.S. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
149. 431 U.S. at 715-16 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
150. Many of our criminal laws are ineffectual, and many actually encourage other forms 
of criminal behavior which "objectively" are as menacing as the prohibited activity. (The 
most obvious example is the probable effect of narcotics and gambling laws on the growth and 
power of organized crime.) Yet we feel it important that the criminal law express our moral 
judgments, however difficult it is to enforce them. True, New York might have contented 
itself with a criminal prohibition against sex between minors. But the improbability of a 
criminal prosecution for such an offense suggests the utility of the regulation on contraceptive 
sales-the unavailability of contraceptives to minors may be a better reminder to the young 
that the state condemns their sexual activity. 
151. The plurality declined to reach this issue, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17. Two concurring Jus-
tices reached it and decided in favor of the end's legitimacy, 431 U.S. at 702-03 (White, J., 
concurring); 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).· 
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plied here it has produced a holding supported by awkward and un-
convincing reasoning. 
Nevertheless, the Court was correct in invalidating the ban on 
sale of contraceptives to minors. As suggested, a better rationale 
would have been to deny the legitimacy of the end. Alternatively, 
the Court could simply have discounted the state's interest in dis-
couraging promiscuity among the young to the extent that that inter-
est is dubiously legitimate. Under this rationale, all of the 
arguments earlier criticized gain force. The plaintiffs' interests in 
avoiding pregnancy and disease demand a sounder justification than 
a questionably legitimate interest in discouraging their sexual con-
duct. 
A final and fundamental objection can be raised to the underly-
ing premise of legitimacy analysis. Professor Linde has argued that 
any "rational basis" test (and a fortiori the approach suggested in 
this Note) is premised on "a thoroughly instrumentalist view oflaw. 
It not only assumes that a law is always a means to an end, but it also 
asserts that law is constitutionally required to be a means to an end, 
and a rational means at that." 152 Linde believes that the instrumen-
talist view is fundamentally misconceived and misleading. 
In part, Linde's objection is that lawmakers do not and cannot 
act rationally-an instrumentalist approach to legislation is just too 
complex and time-consuming. 153 This objection, however, is not 
dispositive. Even if the instrumentalist view is not a correct 
description of the political process, it does not follow that that view is 
an improper method of just!ftcation. If legislative decisions could be 
predicted perfectly by analyzing what the legislators had for break-
fast, a court would nevertheless uphold those decisions if their 
content transgressed no constitutional limitation. 154 Judicial review 
under the equal protection clause does not assume that the legisla-
ture acts instrumentally, just as judicial review of first amendment 
claims does not assume that the legislature intends only to establish 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive con-
duct. The assumption is only that the legislature can pass laws satis-
fying the rationality standard. Rationality depends not on whether 
the legislature was "rationally" motivated, 155 but on the content of 
the law. Thus, the court should freely accept even justifications for 
the law which do not appear in the legislative record. 
152. Linde, ./Jue Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 204 (1976). In addition, see 
the similar argument in Posner, supra note 23, at 27-28. 
153. Linde, supra note 152, at 222-29. 
154. Of course, the equal protection guarantee does prohibit laws passed from certain il-
licit motives. But the present discussion concerns not "hostile" discriminations, only discrimi-
nations that are simply "unfair." See discussion accompanying notes 19-27 supra. 
155. Linde, supra note 152, at 229-32, would agree with this point. 
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Linde's main concern is really more basic. "The duty to defend 
the rationality of a decision," he writes, "depends very simply on 
whether the policy makers ~re limited to prescribed aims, or whether 
they are free to pursue any aim of their own choice."156 This con-
cern over limiting legislative aims is understandable, but the alterna-
tives are less stark than Linde implies. He would admit that policy 
makers cannot pursue any aim they choose, e.g., discrimination 
against blacks for its own sake. That courts forbid some aims does 
not mean, however, that they "prescribe" the rest, unless that term is 
given an unreasonably expansive meaning. 
Linde's general point, that equal protection limits legislative 
choice, is valid, but we must not lose sight of the nature of those 
limitations. The legislature is absolutely free to choose between dif-
ferent goals if they are legitimate, 157 and it is absolutely free to em-
ploy any means of achieving a legitimate goal if the means is tailored 
closely enough to the end. That is, if the means chosen does not 
create too much "misfit" under the balancing test later described, 
then the law is valid, even if a more "rational," closer-fitting means 
might have been chosen. In short, no equal protection goals are 
ever "prescribed" by a court in the usual sense of that term. 158 
Equal protection merely proscribes certain goals-those that are ille-
gitimate and those that seek to achieve an end by an inadequately 
precise means. 159 
This is not to say that the effect of equal protection rationality 
requirements on legislative freedom is never a matter of concern. 
Indeed, the ultimate choice of the substantive values that are the 
referents of equal protection balancing will depend significantly on 
one's conception of the institutional relationship between courts and 
legislatures. The Supreme Court has ceded the legislature freedom to 
pursue economic ends, and it has thus formulated a weak "rational-
ity" requirement for that field. 160 By contrast, the Court has disfa-
vored legislative fle~ibility to experiment with important personal 
interests. Insofar as Linde is simply saying that courts should main-
tain a strong presumption that legislative decisions are rational, his 
position is defensible. More radically, however, Linde is also saying 
that any rationality requirement unacceptably interferes with the 
legislative branch, and this Note disputes that assertion. 
156. Id. at 229. 
157. See Part III.A.I supra. 
158. The fundamental interest approach can come rather close to prescribing certain goals, 
however. See Part VI.B.3 infra. 
159. We would not want to describe "goals" in this way, for as this Note has already 
suggested, it is a clumsy way to analyze equal protection issues. See text at notes 110-15 
supra. 
160. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). 
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This discussion of legitimacy of purpose has attacked the conten-
tion that equal protection analysis can only ask whether an end is 
legitimate. Of course, equal protection misfit analysis and balancing 
involve value choices as fundamental as the judgment of an end's 
legitimacy. But the choices in misfit analysis and balancing are 
more constrained, and more easily adaptable to any particular view 
of judicial responsibility in this field. 161 Rescued from tautology, 
the rational basis test can be a convincing analytic tool. Following a 
discussion of the "actual" purpose problem, that rescue will con-
tinue. 
B. Finding the Actual Pupose 
A second possible constraint on purpose may be emerging in re-
cent cases in which the Supreme Court has declined to consider pur-
poses not actually contemplated by the legislature. The rational 
basis test has traditionally not required, and possibly even forbidden, 
inquiry into the legislature's "actual" purpose. 162 The Court has ac-
cepted any legitimate goal which might sustain the statutory classifi-
cation. However, traditions change quickly in the equal protection 
field, and the Court has become more willing to examine actual leg-
islative purposes, especially in sex discrimination cases. 163 As the 
Court declared in Weinberger v. Weise,!feld, "This Court need not in 
equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative 
purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its his-
tory demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a 
goal of the legislation."164 
The examination of actual legislative purpose is a significant de-
velopment in equal protection jurisprudence, 165 although its implica-
tions are still hazy. 166 Where the actual purpose would not have 
justified the classification, but the discarded purpose would have, the 
law would be valid if reenacted after an explicit consideration of the 
purpose which was originally ignored.167 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 168 for instance, strikingly illustrates this new 
161. See text at note 431 infra. 
162. See text at notes 106-07 supra. 
163. This willingness to examine actual purposes is also evident in irrebuttable presump-
tion cases. See text preceding note IOI supra. 
164. 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975). 
165. Of course, this approach has no interesting consequences when a purpose which is 
discarded as non-actual was not rationally furthered by the classification, see, e.g., Carey v. 
Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (plurality opinion); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628, 634-35 (1974). Even if such a classification had been analyzed according to the 
discarded purpose, that purpose would not have justified it. 
166. One helpful analysis is L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 1085-88 (1978). 
167. See id at 1086 n.29. 
168. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
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"activism,"169 for both Justice Brennan's plurality opinion 170 and 
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion171 plainly intimate that the stat-
ute might have been upheld had its actual purpose been diff erent. 172 
(Indeed, the dissenters and the plurality essentially divided over 
what this purpose was.) 173 
This way of handling legislative motive is not entirely new, for it 
resembles the treatment which numerous scholars174 have advocated 
for racially motivated laws. However, the usual "improper pur-
pose" discussion concerns motives which are rationally furthered by 
the law but which are illegitimate (e.g., the intention to disadvantage 
blacks), while cases here involve legitimate motives which are not 
substantially furthered by the legislative means. The arguments 
which would favor a judicial "remand" to the legislature of racially 
motivated laws might not apply as forcefully to laws motivated (but 
insufficiently justified) by a permissible purpose. Laws in the latter 
category are not invalid because of judicial concern about stigma; 
they are invalid only because they are unfair. Since the analogy to 
impermissibly motivated statutes is imprecise, some other rationale 
must explain why a law which would have been fair if designed to 
achieve one goal must be invalidated because it was actually 
designed to serve another permissible goal which it served "imper-
fectly." 
The rationale might be as follows. Judicial deference to legisla-
tive classifications producing unequal treatment rests on the belief 
that the populace may validly consent to any adequately general dis-
169. This might seem less activist than the traditional approach, since it allows a court to 
avoid the hard decision to invalidate a law as unfair with respect to any conceivable purpose. 
However, if an unconsidered purpose would have justified the law, this approach has a more 
severe consequence than traditional equal protection doctrine (which would permit the classifi-
cation). If an unconsidered purpose would not have justified the law, the two approaches 
produce the same result. 
This approach is only more conservative if it has the broader effect of validating any law 
once it has been reconsidered by the legislature, if its purpose, considered abstractly, seems 
insufficient as a justification. In Goldfarb, for example, a frank congressional declaration that 
widows should be treated differently than widowers because their "need" for benefits is quali-
tatively different (the "unconsidered" purpose), and not because of "administrative conven-
ience" (the actual purpose), would automatically validate the law, whatever the misfit. But 
under this approach, it is not lack of misfit, but the very process of reconsidering the statute's 
fairness, that justifies judicial abstinence. Thus, the original "actual" purpose would also jus-
tify the law, regardless of misfit, so long as its fairness had actually been considered. See 
Sandalow, supra note 20, at 1185-90. The Court's treatment of purpose in Goldfarb, however, 
indicates that the Court is not willing to employ this broader and more conservative approach. 
170. 430 U.S. at 214. 
171. 430 U.S. at 222 & n.9, 223. 
172. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court upheld 
a Social Security benefit scheme that gave favored treatment to women, reasoning that (unlike 
the scheme in Goldfarb) the different treatment was a deliberate congressional attempt to com-
pensate women for economic disabilities. 
173. 430 U.S. at 229-35. 
174. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 26; Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 116. 
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tribution of benefits and burdens.175 If, however, a court identifies 
as the purpose of a statute a goal which the legislature did not con-
sider, the usual reasons for deference are lacking, since that goal 
could not have been consented to. The argument is not that such a 
goal was not the primary end sought by the legislature, but rather 
that it did not enter into the general calculus of interests at all, and 
hence does not deserve the usual judicial respect. 
This activist rationale for confining a court's attention to actual 
legislative purposes invites the objection noted earlier176 that a court 
in an equal protection case should not be a surrogate legislature, pro-
tecting any loser in the legislative process. But when actual purpose 
review is considered in its context this objection can be overcome, 
for even if courts should not ensure that all relevant interests are 
considered when a law is passed, perhaps courts should intervene 
when none of the relevant interests have been considered. In 
Goldfarb, for example, if the Court is correct that Congress actually 
intended to benefit only persons who were dependent on their de-
ceased spouses, then Congress did not intend to favor widows over 
widowers to compensate for past discrimination against women. If 
this purpose had been considered, the statute might have been differ-
ent, for the affected interest groups could have advanced the argu-
ments relevant to this purpose. An explicit consideration of 
competing interests might have caused widows to be treated differ-
ently than widowers throughout the Social Security Act. Thus, a 
court's refusal to justify a law according to an unconsidered purpose 
might at least compel the legislature to take a pro forma look at the 
fairness of the law.177 
175. The notion that people consent to differential treatment is at best a legal fiction. It is, 
nonetheless, a useful fiction, for it explains why courts closely scrutinize classifications that 
burden "suspect" groups historically underrepresented in the political process and that in-
fringe certain "fundamental interests" in equal access to that process, such as the right to vote. 
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969). See generally IJeve/op-
ments, supra note l, at 1087-103, 1120-32. Of course, not all "fundamental interests" can be 
explained by this fiction, e.g., the right of privacy (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)), or 
the right to procreate (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). 
176. See text at notes 19-21 supra. 
177. Judicial deference to legislative decisions is often also predicated on the belief that the 
legislature is more competent to make judgments in most policy areas. See Carmichael v. 
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,510 (1937). But if this competence is not exercised 
because the legislature has not even considered the purpose, then this rationale for deference is 
inapposite. 
Another possible argument for this activist approach to "purpose" is that it discourages the 
perpetuation of "archaic and overbroad generalizations." For example, Justice Stevens inter-
preted the challenged statute in Gokffarb as follows: 
It is fair to infer that habit, rather than analysis or actual reflection, made it seem 
acceptable to equate the terms "widow" and "dependent surviving spouse." That kind of 
automatic reflex is far different from either a legislative decision to favor females in order 
to compensate for past wrongs, or a legislative decision that the administrative savings 
exceed the cost of extending benefits to nondependent widows. 
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This argument has some cogency, though the Court's aversion to 
facing the uncertain merits of some unconsidered purposes, more 
than any particular rationale, may have inspired this doctrine. 
Whatever the Court's reasons for selectively confining itself to actual 
purpose, the doctrine itself is subject to several fundamental criti-
cisms. First, most laws, especially state laws, have no recorded leg-
islative history; it would be anomalous to strike these laws down. 
Perhaps the doctrine only requires ignoring a purpose where the leg-
islative record clearly shows that the purpose was not considered, but 
it is unsafe to infer from a silent record that a purpose was not con-
sidered. 
Second, even if these evidentiary obstacles can be overcome, the 
doctrine is theoretically unsound. It assumes that equal protection 
guarantees a legislative process guided by rationality and fairness. 
But the actual decision-making process should not be the central 
subject of the equal protection clause. Even if legislators do not act 
rationally, the Court may impose a limited rationality "require-
ment"-not to ensure that the process is rational, but to ensure that 
the laws it produces are. 178 Ifwe agree that (aside from suspect cat-
egories) equal protection primarily ensures that laws operate fairly, it 
is difficult to justify the doctrine that a reviewing court should ignore 
unconsidered purposes. Thus, while actual purpose has been a limit-
ing principle in some equal protection cases under the Court's cur-
rent approach, the principal constraint on purpose should be the 
requirement, described above, 179 that misfit be evaluated with re-
spect to a "legitimate" goal. 
IV. MISFIT ANALYSIS 
The analysis of misfit has been remarkably scanted by courts and 
commentators. Its first serious treatment, Tussman and tenBroek's 
I am therefore persuaded that this discrimination against a group of males is merely 
the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females. 
430 U.S. 199, 222-23. 
This explanation of the activist approach is incomplete, however. It does not necessarily 
follow that simply because a generalization is "archaic," "traditional," or "based on habit" it is 
too broad to satisfy equal protection. Surely equal protection does not demand the invalidation 
of every statute that is not periodically reconsidered and reenacted. Nevertheless, Stevens' 
approach has some advantages, for determining whether a classification is overbroad involves 
sensitive and complex judgments that are simplified somewhat by the knowledge that the un-
derlying generalization is "archaic." The deference courts must accord legislatures (some-
times even described as a "presumption ofrationality") is less compelling when the legislative 
assumption is of the type that is often adopted without examination. It may then be reason-
able to conclude that the assumption was not examined in this particular case and that it is 
thus more likely to be overbroad. Nevertheless, the tenuousness of these inferences suggests 
that the "archaic generalization" argument should be used cautiously. 
178. See text at notes 152-55 supra. 
179. See Part Ill.A.I supra. 
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influential 1949 article,180 is almost the only one. 181 This section es-
says an examination of misfit which goes beyond the vague notion 
that a law is unfair which is "too" overinclusive or underinclusive. 
The discussion initially describes the minimum rationality con-
straint; the kinds of differences equal protection minimally demands 
to justify different treatment; and the three elements of misfit analy-
sis-harm, cost, and personal interest. This section next distin-
guishes between misfit in due process and equal protection and 
between overinclusion and underinclusion. It also investigates the 
special analytical problems posed by laws with multiple goals. The 
relationship between misfit analysis and equal protection balancing, 
alluded to throughout the following discussion, is considered in de-
tail in the section on balancing.1s2 
A. Minimum Rationality Constraint 
With some limited exceptions, 183 it is improper to burden one 
individual and not another unless the burdened individual is "rele-
vantly" different. An individual is relevantly different only if he be-
longs to a class which has (1) a greater index of the social harm or 
mischief which the burden is designed to control, (2) a lower index of 
the personal interest in not being burdened, or (3) a lower index of 
administrative cost in applying the burden.184 More succinctly, un-
less one class, on the average, is more dangerous than another class, 
less interested in avoiding the burden, or less costly to identify or to 
apply the law to, then burdening the first class and not the second is 
a denial of equal protection. 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical law which reduced air 
pollution by denying drivers' licenses to left-handed people. This 
classification would violate the minimum rationality constraint, ab-
sent evidence that the left-handed drive "dirtier'' cars, that they have 
a weaker interest in driving, or that the administrative cost of apply-
ing the law to the right-handed is much higher. If the individuals in 
each class posed the same average danger, it would violate the mini-
mum rationality constraint to burden one class simply because that 
class was responsible for a larger proportion of the total mischief 
than the other. This is why it violates the constraint to keep only 
left-handed drivers off the road to reduce pollution, even though 
180. See Tussman & tenBroek, note 27 supra. 
181. See also P. BREST, supra note 116, at 558-75. 
182. Part VI infra. 
183. See Part V infra. 
184. This Note singles out these three factors because each represents an element of "social 
utility'' (broadly conceived) which may vary among individuals and which thus may help ex-
plain and justify differential treatment. By contrast, social interests as to which all persons are 
equal, such as a total cost constraint in a program in which the cost per individual is constant, 
are not relevant in evaluating misfit. See Part V.B infra (discussion of "neutral goals"). 
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most drivers are right-handed. Minimum rationality prevents the 
state from attacking the larger part of a "mischievous" class unless 
the members of that part are also more mischievous. 
This constraint is both intuitively satisfying and rationally sound. 
If the state has decided that there is net social utility in denying 
licenses to left-handed drivers to reduce pollution, then it must have 
concluded that the benefit of the incremental reduction in pollution 
outweighs the dual costs of the expense of administering t:b.e law and 
the infringement of people's interest in driving. But since, by hy-
pothesis, the incremental harm, .administrative cost, and interest in 
driving are precisely the same for the right-handed and left-handed, 
the social utility in keeping each right-handed or left-handed person 
off the road is precisely the same. Burdening only one class is thus 
irrational on the legislature's own terms. 185 
The minimum rationality constraint, importantly, draws atten-
tion to the kind of misfit equal protection prohibits. As we shall 
see, 186 the simple overinclusion/underinclusion terminology can be 
seriously misleading. The crucial inquiry is not how much misfit is 
created in any absolute sense, but rather how d!fferent the groups are 
that the law treats differently. 
Of course, the minimum rationality constraint only begins misfit 
analysis, for satisfaction of the requirement is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to satisfy the equal protection guarantee. The constraint is 
not a necessary condition because it contains a number of excep-
tions, discussed subsequently.187 It is not a sufficient condition 
because after it is satisfied, t~e law still must be subjected to a bal-
ancing test. 188 The constraint does identify which elements-harm, 
administrative cost, and personal interest-are to be balanced. 
Although the minimum rationality constraint is not a radical 
concept, its role has often been overlooked because of the miscon-
ception that misfit analysis need evaluate only the absolute amount 
of overinclusion and underinclusion. Tussman and tenBroek's 
graphic representation of misfit is probably a principal source of the 
misconception. After criticizing that representation, this Note pro-
poses a different model, one which illuminates the role of the mini-
mum rationality constraint and which allows due process and equal 
protection misfit to be easily distinguished. 
185. There are complications, of course. Diminishing returns, a total cost constraint, or a 
"satisficing" approach in which the government is content with a certain level of mischief-
reduction ( or need-alleviation), all indicate that it may be rational to go only "part of the 
way." Nevertheless, such a partial solution, since it violates the minimum rationality con-
straint, is only justifiable as an exception to misfit analysis. See Part V in.fro. 
186. Part VI.B.l in.fro. 
187. Part V in.fro. 
188. See Part VI in.fro. 
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Tussman and tenBroek represented the relationship between 
classes M and T by a Venn diagram: 
M 
Overinclusion* Underinclusion * 
*Overinclusion is represented by solid shading and underinclusion by the dotted area. 
For example, Tussman and tenBroek would represent the driving-
test hypothetical as follows: 
Their model helpfully stresses the following basic relationships: 
No intersection of the classes: 00 
Complete congruence: 8 







However, their model is deficient and misleading since it fails to 
identify the more rational cases of partial intersection short of com-
plete congruence and to account for the properly excluded ('\,Mn'\,T) 
(represented by the field surrounding the circles). That is, the model 
suggests that misfit simply measures the absolute amount of overin-
clusion and underinclusion. It fails to emphasize that a classification 
is at least minimally rational, regardless of the absolute amount of 
misfit, if the burdened (T) are likelier than the nonburdened ('vT) to 
pose the relevant harm (to intersect with M). In the above example, 
there is no clear way to deduce from the graph whether those who 
fail the driving test are more likely to be dangerous drivers than 
those who pass. Any representation which fails to provide that in-
formation is seriously incomplete. 
This Note proposes a somewhat different model: 
T "'T 
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This model contains all the elements of the Venn diagram, but dis-
plays them more meaningfully. 189 The lower trapezoid (C plus D) is 
M; the rest of the rectangle is l\.,M. The left rectangle (A plus C) is T; 
the right rectangle is l\.,T. The relative size of each region (A, B, C, 
and D) is significant, which is not true of the Venn diagram. The 
key equal protection inquiry190 concerns the slope of the dividing 
line between Mand l\.,M. The steeper this line (assuming a negative 
slope), the greater the difference in the harm posed by members of T 
(those burdened or benefitted) than by members of "'T (those not 
burdened or not benefitted)-and the more "rational" the classifica-
tion. 
The minimum rationality constraint simply requires that this di-
viding line have some negative slope, that is, some "downhill" tilt: 
T 
189. Tussman and tenBroek's model, with analogously labeled regions, is as follows: 
M 
B 
190. This model only describes the state interest (M) and does not include personal interest 
or administrative cost. A more complete (four-dimensional!) model could be constructed, but 
as a practical matter, it would not greatly aid the analysis: the state interest is often the most 
important element of analysis, and it tends to vary more between classes T and"' T than do the 
other two elements. 
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Thus, the negative tilt in the driving test example graphed above in-
dicates that the classification is minimally rational. If the line has a 
slope of zero, then the law is not rational, for those not burdened 
("'T) deserve to be burdened just as much as those who are burdened 
(T): 
T "' T 
I\, M 
M, 
For example, the hypothetical pollution control law which precluded 













If the line has a positive slope, then the law is actually irrational, for 
those not burdened deserve to be burdened even more than those 
who are burdened: 
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T "'T 
The model indicates overinclusion and underinclusion as follows: 
T "'T 





A classification which barely satisfies the ,minimum rationality con-
straint will have a large amount of absolute misfit. But as the nega-
tive slope of the dividing line between M and "'M increases, the 
amount of misfit decreases: 
'\,T 
M 
Perfect fit is achieved when the dividing line becomes perfectly verti-
cal, coinciding with the dividing line between T and"' T. 
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These diagrams illustrate why the part-of-a-harm rationale, with-
out more, does not justify misfit. Even if a classification attacks the 
larger part of the harm, e.g.: 
T I\, T 
M 
the classification might not be minimally rational, since ( as in the 
diagram above) the group burdened might not pose the harm more 
acutely. 
Of course, although this model represents the important equal 
protection relationships more clearly than the older model, it is 
mainly a theoretical tool. Courts will rarely have clear proof of the 
precise areas of each region or of the exact slope of the dividing line. 
But if the model demonstrates the proper focus of misfit analysis, it 
will have more than served its purpose. 
The remainder of this section describes the three central but 
often loosely analyzed elements of misfit analysis-the harm the 
state seeks to eliminate, the administrative costs of imposing the bur-
den, and the personal interest in avoiding the burden. Some conse-
quences of the minimum rationality constraint for different kinds of 
misfit will also be discussed. The substantive question how misfit is 
weighed in the equal protection balance once the minimum rational-
ity constraint is satisfied is deferred. 191 
B. Elements of MiJjit Analysis 
I. Harm 
The harm which the state seeks to eliminate was extensively dis-
cussed in the section on purpose, 192 where criteria were proposed for 
gauging the minimal level of generality at which the purpose, and 
thus the harm, must be expressed if judicial review is to be effective. 
A few additional comments may clarify the relationship of harm to 
misfit review. A harm may be a discrete quality, such as having 
191. See Part VI infra. 
192. See Part III.A.I supra. 
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committed a crime ( one either has committed the crime or has not), 
or a continuous one, such as being a dangerous driver ( one can be 
more or less likely to cause accidents193 or to terrorize other motor-
ists). In the latter case, we ask not simply how many individuals in 
each class threaten the harm, but also how much each threatens. 
Thus, the conclusion that one class has a higher average index of 
harm than another can mean either that the first contains a greater 
proportion of ( discretely) harmful individuals or that the mean 
harm, obtained by averaging each individual's (continuous) harm, is 
greater.194 
An intermediate characterization of harm is also possible: the 
legislature may believe that only individuals who pose a threshold 
level of harm should be burdened, even though there may be some 
utility in burdening the less mischievous. In our driving example, 
for instance, an "intermediate" characterization was implicit: only 
those persons reaching a threshold of "dangerousness" need be for-
bidden to drive. This intermediate characterization can, however, 
193. Even though an accident is a discrete event, and though a given person either will or 
will not cause one, at the time a law is passed persons are only more or less likely to cause 
accidents; we are not omniscient. 
194. Self-justifying classifications are analytically related to the distinctions between dis-
crete and continuous harm. Although it is possible to classify "discretely" harmful persons 
with perfect rationality by burdening all and only the harmful, it is not possible so to burden 
the "continuously" harmful, for the very notion of precisely identifying the "harmful" makes 
no sense in this context. Thus, we can always ask whether a classification by continuous 
harms is rational; the classification will never be self-justifying. 
Line-drawing problems present an interesting analogy to the point that "continuous" clas-
sifications are never self-justifying. The legislature must decide "where to draw the line" be-
tween the classified (T) from the unclassified (o,T) only when the trait by which members ofT 
are identified is a continuous rather than a discrete one. (The mischief itself may or may not be 
continuous.) For example, the problem arises when the state establishes a mandatory retire-
ment age, but not when it discriminates on the basis of sex. 
Whenever we have a trait which is continuously and positively correlated with a mischief, 
it will be "rational" to classify according to any degree of the trait, since the resulting classifi-
cation will always burden a class that more acutely poses the harm. (Imagine a round target 
so shaded that its color is more intense at the bull's-eye and gradually less intense in all direc-
tions toward the circumference. Every circle, regardless of size, whose center is the bull's-eye 
defines a "rational" classification according to most intense color.) The difficulty arises in 
determining when a quantitative difference becomes a qualitative one. Often a result is 
clearly permissible at one extreme and prohibited at the other, and it becomes difficult for a 
court to justify the point at which it imposes the prohibition. 
For example, the Supreme Court has forbidden one-year residency requirements for vot-
ing, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), but has permitted residency requirements of 50 
days, Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). Further litigation may fix the limit at, say, 60 
days, but the precise point at which the line is drawn cannot be justified by any test. The 
balance of interests would be only negligibly different were the limit 61 days, and the most we 
can say is that a line must be drawn somewhere. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 
277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
The continuity problem arises in similar fashion when we are evaluating the efficacy of a 
burden or benefit in reducing a mischief or need. A burden (or benefit), like a trait or mis-
chief, can be discrete or continuous. For example, deciding whether to send a convicted felon 
to prison or to a drug rehabilitation program is not a line-drawing problem, since the choices 
are not (in any apparent way) part of a single continuum. By contrast, deciding whether to 
sentence him to two or to five years is a line-drawing problem. 
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be misleading insofar as it suggests that any sub-threshold harm is 
nonexistent, for as we shall see, this sub-threshold harm can be im-
portant. Unfortunately, many courts do not see misfit in continuous 
terms, perhaps because the continuous interpretation is not easily 
captured by traditional overinclusion/underinclusion terminol-
ogy.19s 
Jefferson v. Hackney196 illustrates the tendency to interpret harm 
and need as intermediate rather than continuous in order to simplify 
equal protection review. The Texas Constitution limits the state's 
welfare budget. The Texas legislature, after constructing a need 
standard for various categories of welfare recipients, applied reduc-
tion factors to keep the total payments within the budget: the aged 
received 100 per cent of their "need," the disabled and blind 95 per 
cent, and recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) only 75 per cent.197 Members of the last class sued, alleg-
ing, inter alia, that imposing a different reduction factor upon differ-
ent recipient groups violated equal protection. The Supreme Court 
upheld the state's procedure, reasoning: 
[T]he State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least 
able of the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an in-
adequate standard of living ... [and] that the young are more adapta-
ble than the sick and elderly, especially because the latter have less 
hope of improving their situation in the years remaining to them.198 
In effect, the Court assumed that the state had in mind a "severe 
need" standard independent of the actual need standard upon which 
payment levels were determined. The state's unequal reduction 199 
factors belie any motive of maintaining a rough equality between 
groups with respect to the original actual need computations. 
Rather, the state's method suggests a weighting of the importance of 
needs within the original need computations, suggesting "severe 
need" thresholds. 
The result in Jefferson v. Hackney is probably correct, if only be-
cause the aged and disabled suffer such distinct hardships that their 
needs may be "discrete." Indeed, a welfare program which served 
only their needs (and excluded AFDC recipients entirely) would 
probably be constitutional, since determining "need" involves not 
just an objective computation of food and housing costs, but also a 
judgment about relative "worth," about how much sympathy is 
aroused and about which groups seem helpless. The case neverthe-
195. See Tussman & tenBroek, note 27 supra. 
196. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
197. At the time suit was filed, AFDC recipients were receiving only 50% of their standard 
of need. 406 U.S. at 537 n.3. 
198. 406 U.S. at 549. 
199. Notice, for example, that the aged's share is not reduced at all. 
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less shows how an "intermediate" characterization of the harm 
vitiates the difficulties of review posed by "continuous" characteriza-
tions. The Court essentially ends its analysis with the assertion that 
the old and disabled are less able to withstand hardship. It does not 
ask how much less able they are. 
. Since even a discrete characterization was possible in Jejferson v. 
Hackney, the intermediate approach is not greatly troubling. But if 
a discrete characterization were not possible, perhaps the intermedi-
ate approach should be unacceptable. Suppose, for example, that 
Texas applied different reduction factors based on the sex of the 
AFDC children. Since the discrete discrimination (welfare funds 
only for boys or only for girls) is not acceptable here, the intermedi-
ate approach may also be unacceptable. A general assertion that 
when the going gets rough, boys can be forced to make a greater 
sacrifice is simply impermissible. Slight differentials might be sus-
tainable if correlated with proved differences in need, but this would 
be a straightforward application of the "continuous" approach. In 
short, the intermediate approach should be used cautiously where 
the discrete is unavailable. 
2. Administrative Cost 
Administrative cost is the second major factor in evaluating misfit. 
This cost has two components: the costs of identifying to whom the 
burden shall apply, and the cost of applying the burden. Courts 
typically speak of administrative "convenience" (which is essentially 
the reduction of identification cost and administrative discretion) as 
merely one of several goals a legislature might or might not pursue. 
Despite the courts' usual analysis, administrative cost is central in 
equal protection analysis. 
Identification cost is a basic element of the minimum rationality 
constraint and of general equal protection balancing because almost 
any classification can be made more precise at some cost. In other 
words, harm and identification cost are closely interrelated,200 for if 
the state has satisfied the minimum rationality constraint, then the 
200. If class A has a greater average harm than class B and if the classes can be distin-
guished at little administrative cost, then we could describe a classification burdening A as 
rational either because A has a greater index ofhann than does B or because it costs more (per 
class member) to pick out harmful members of B than to pick out such members from A. 
Simply by burdening A and not B we have made a cheap and reasonably efficient selection, 
and it will be more expensive to find a subclass ofB which is as harmful (on the average) as the 
class A. 
The "higher cost of discriminating" explanation of a law's rationality refers, of course, to 
average, not aggregate, cost. For example, if X represents the class of jaywalkers and Y repre-
sents the class of jaywalkers minus redheads, then it is irrational to prosecute only class Y 
rather than the larger class X. Although prosecuting Y rather than X saves money in the 
aggregate, the average administrative cost of prosecuting a member of either group is presuma-
bly the same. Assuming there is no difference in "harm" or "personal interest" indices be-
tween X and Y, the prosecution violates the minimum rationality constraint. A law 
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unburdened will usually pose a lower average harm; to identify those 
underincluded from that class will generally cost more than it has 
already cost to separate the burdened from the unburdened.201 
For example, consider the lament of a dangerous driver who fails 
our driving test but complains that many who passed it were also 
dangerous. He claims that he is no more dangerous than many who 
are on the road and that therefore even minimum rationality has not 
been achieved. He is wrong, for to find the dangerous drivers who 
passed the first test, the state would have to pay for a second, better 
test. In terms of the constraint, the dangerous drivers who slipped 
through the first time have a higher "index" of administrative cost, 
and treating them differently than the plaintiff is minimally (though 
not conclusively) rationa1.202 
By misunderstanding this interrelationship between harm and 
cost, the Supreme Court has reasoned imprecisely in several sex dis-
crimination cases. The Court has held that discrimination by 
gender must fall if its "only" justification is administrative conven-
ience,203 but that it can stand if the differential treatment is "ra-
tional" in terms of the statutory purpose, that is, if the class selected 
by the statutory classification is more acutely harmful or needy than 
the class not selected.204 But the Court's distinction is illusory, since 
classifications in these cases are minimally rational in terms of both 
administrative cost and harm. 
In Schlesinger v. Ballard2°5 the Court upheld a sex-based classifi-
cation which set a longer period of service for female than male na-
val officers before mandatory discharge for want of promotion. The 
Court reasoned that the discrimination was rationally related to the 
goal of equitable career advancement since it compensated for lesser 
mandating such discriminatory prosecution should only stand if one of the misfit exceptions is 
applicable, see Part V infra. 
201. In the usual case, this relationship holds because the state will ordinarily try to get at 
the most harm at the least cosL But occasionally the state will have made an expensive and 
inaccurate "pick," and it may be both cheaper and more accurate to redraw the classification. 
Often, though not invariably, it will also be the case that the greater the class difference in 
average harm, the greater the difference in average identification cost. Of course, there is 
nothing necessary about these relationships. 
202. There is admittedly a certain awkwardness in characterizing our dangerous driver as 
"more costly" to identify. What is readily meant is that he is a member of a class more 
expensive to identify than the class now identified by the law. But the identification cost he 
creates is not as unique to him as the mischief he creates. 
There is a second kind of administrative cost besides identification cost-the cost of apply-
ing the benefit or burden. This kind of cost is analogous to mischief in that individuals create 
unique "amounts" of it. See text following note 223 infra. 
203. The Court has made similarly broad assertions in many irrebuttable presumption 
cases about the constitutional insignificance of administrative cost. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
204. See cases discussed in text at notes 205-11 infra. 
205. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
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opportunity for promotion. 206 Reed v. Reed2°7 and Frontiero v. 
Richardson,2°8 in which sex-based classifications had been invali-
dated, were distinguished by the Court as involving classifications 
based on administrative convenience "alone"209 and on "archaic and 
overbroad generalizations."210 By contrast, the Court characterized 
the classification in Schlesinger as one of "complete rationality."211 
In distinguishing the three cases, the Court failed to recognize 
that the classifications in Reed and Frontiero might be at least some-
what rational-women might be generally less competent adminis-
trators than men (Reed), 212 and wives of servicemen may be more 
likely to be dependent upon their spouses than are husbands of ser-
vicewomen (Frontiero).213 Furthermore, in all three cases the classifi-
cation was overbroad and could have been improved at some 
administrative expense-a case-by-case test of competence in Reed 
and of dependence in Frontiero214 would be more "precise," and in 
Schlesinger the Navy could evaluate each woman's opportunities for 
promotion.215 Yet the Court was not prepared to maintain that, by 
not evaluating opportunities individually, the Navy indefensibly re-
lied on "administrative convenience." 
This criticism of the Court's attempt to distinguish Schlesinger 
from Reed and Frontiero is not meant to suggest that all three 
classifications were equally justifiable. While these cases do not 
prove that a classification cannot stand if its only justification is "ad-
ministrative convenience," they do support a more qualified proposi-
tion: if the burdened pose only a slightly or questionably greater 
harm than those not burdened ( or if the benefitted are only slightly 
more _needy than the unbenefitted), then the classification might vio-
late equal protection, even though a more "rational" classification 
206. Apparently women could not compile records of seagoing service comparable to those 
of men because they were precluded by law from most sea duty. 419 U.S. at 508. 
207. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
208. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
209. 419 U.S. at 510. 
210. 419 U.S. at 507-08. 
211. 419 U.S. at 509. 
212. The opinion in the state court had so suggested. Reed v. Reed, 93 Idaho 511, 514, 
465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970). 
213. This observation is not, of course, meant to imply that this minimal rationality, even 
if factually established, should validate the classifications. 
214. That is, the test would require servicemen to prove that their spouses were dependent. 
The inequality could also be rectified by requiring neither sex to prove dependency, but this 
would decrease the overall classificatory accuracy (assuming the purpose is to aid all and only 
dependents). 
215. However, if a plausible argument can be made that all women in the Navy deserve 
compensation for past discrimination, then this redefined purpose clearly does not require a 
case-by-case evaluation. 
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would be more costly.216 Thus, the Court may have described the 
classification in Schlesinger as "completely rational" because it was 
much more accurate than the classifications in Frontiero and 
Reed-virtually all servicewomen lacked career opportunities avail-
able to servicemen, but a significant percentage of women are not 
dependent on their husbands in the service or are competent admin-
istrators. And the Court may have scoffed at the "cost" rationale in 
Reed and Frontiero because there was such a slight gender-based 
differential in "harm" that the administrative savings were illusory 
(e.g., the cost saved by waiving proof of wives' dependency might 
have been less than the cost of benefits paid to nondependent 
wives).217 In short, identification cost or "administrative conven-
ience" is just one factor to be balanced in an equal protection case; it 
cannot alone determine whether a classification satisfies the guaran-
tee. 
The relationship between identification cost and misfit is such 
that attempts to increase classificatory accuracy often increase 
identification costs. Identification cost will be lowest when a legisla-
tive rule alone defines class membership. When such a rule is facially 
overbroad, the overbreadth can be cured at essentially no cost.218 
For example, a law punishing both criminals and all redheads can 
simply be rewritten. But when greater accuracy requires more than 
rewriting a general rule-when, in other words, it is costly to deter-
mine who falls within the new rule-then identification cost can be a 
serious concem.219 
Consider, for example, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia,220 which tested a statute requiring that all uniformed state 
police officers retire at age fifty. The Court upheld the statute, find-
ing that the rule reasonably expressed the general relationship be-
tween advancing age and decreasing physical ability to be a good 
216. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976): "[P]resumptions in aid of adminis-
trative functions, though they may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that 
case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible ... so long as that lack of precise 
equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of 
scrutiny." 
217. The plurality in Frontiero noted that the government had offered no concrete evi-
dence that the differential treatment in fact saved money-a demonstration it said was re-
quired to satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny. 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973). See Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976), holding that such a strict demonstration is not necessary 
under the more relaxed standards of review. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 
219-20 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that because the presumption of dependency 
caused the payment of substantial additional benefits, administrative convenience could not 
have been the reason for the discrimination). 
218. See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 468-70 
(1969) (making an analogous point about first amendment overbreadth). 
219. See id at 470 n.31. 
220. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
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policeman. Although, as Justice Marshall noted in dissent,221 Mas-
sachusetts could easily have provided that officers be individually 
tested-indeed, it did annually test officers who were 40 to 50 years 
old-the majority sustained the rule as rational, apparently because 
the ease of improving accuracy was irrelevant in the absence of a 
fundamental interest or suspect class. The additional cost of tests 
may also have influenced the Court. 
Murgia illustrates that the crucial inquiry with respect to identifi-
cation cost is usually not the cost of redefining a general rule, but the 
cost of determining whether an individual falls within the terms of 
the redefined rule. In arguing for "individualized" testing, Justice 
Marshall is asking for a redefined rule-required retirement of those 
who fail a medical examination-and the real cost difference lies in 
the greater cost of proving a person's status under the new rule than 
under the old. It simply costs more to conduct a physical exam than 
to check birth dates. 
Moreover, attempts to increase the accuracy of a rule may, de-
pending on the rule's complexity and the discretion with which it is 
to be applied, decrease its predictability, thus frustrating the interest 
in predictability shared by the state and by persons subject to the 
rule.222 An age limit is simple to administer and permits few dis-
putes about proof. A medical test involves complex judgments 
about what constitutes good physical condition and is easily abused 
by doctors anxious to keep particular officers on ( or ofl) the force. 
This loss of predictability is part of a classification's identification 
cost. 
Finally, "individualized hearings" are not a costly but perfect so-
lution to classificatory inaccuracy. Often, "individualized hearings" 
are simply a sensible device for administering a rule which requires 
more complex determinations of fact than statutory presumptions 
can easily accommodate.223 Nothing about a hearing as such guaran-
221. 427 U.S. at 325-27. 
222. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 782-83 (1975). 
223. For example, the Court in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), struck down a gen-
eral presumption that certain broad categories of applicants for in-state tuition were not bona 
fide residents, since some such applicants did "possess many of the indicia of Connecticut 
residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers' licenses, car registra-
tions, voter registrations, etc .... " 412 U.S. at 448. The Court concluded that Connecticut 
should have granted every individual applicant the chance to prove bona fide residence. But 
this conclusion only asserts that the rule should be made more precise (at least as to those 
disfavored by the presumption), not that every case should be evaluated equitably on its own 
facts. Presumably an applicant who lacked a year-round home in a state, a driver's license, or 
an automobile or voter registration could still be denied in-state rates, if these indicia are 
accurate enough. This would be true whether the proof is presented to an individual hearing 
officer or simply mailed to the registrar of the university. 
Of course, individualized hearings may serve important functions other than improving 
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tees perfect accuracy, for accuracy will often be limited either by the 
kinds of proof accepted or by the need to rely on the subjective opin-
ion of the hearing officer. Whet.a.er individualized hearings are re-
quired to improve the accuracy of a classification depends upon a 
number of factors, including tbe ~~se with which proof requirements 
can be satisfied and the desiraS~!ity of allowing hearing officers to 
exercise discretion. 
Administrative cost includes, in addition to identification cost, the 
cost of applying a benefit or burden. It is not obvious how the 
courts should deal with differential application cost. May prosecu-
tors refrain from enforcing laws against Orthodox Jews because of 
the high cost of providing Kosher diets in prison? May welfare de-
partments cut costs "rationally" by excluding recipients with the 
highest benefits? Surely not. Having defined a harm or a need, the 
state should save costs by proportional diminution of burdens or 
benefits; the actual cost of applying the benefit or burden seems to 
bear at best an accidental, and at worst an inverse, relationship to 
desert. To be sure, classifying those harmful individuals who can 
most easily be identified is also arbitrary in that two equally mischie-
vous individuals might be treated differently simply because one 
possessed, and the other lacked, the classificatory trait. But this ar-
bitrariness in identification costs is a necessary evil of legislation; ap-
plication cost does not seem so indispensable. 
Nevertheless, when a difference in application cost results in sig-
nificant differences in cost-effectiveness, application cost should be 
considered in deciding whether the minimum rationality constraint 
· has been satisfied. Professor Brest, in an informative discussion of 
the problem, maintains that either a difference in cost efficiency be-
tween individuals (which he calls criterion 1) or a difference in the 
harm posed by different individuals (which he calls criterion 2) will 
support a classification's rationality. 
Consider, for example, the decision to require the installation of ex-
haust emission control devices on vehicles. Suppose that vehicle Q 
produces 1,000 units of pollutants, and vehicle R produces 500 units; 
but for technical reasons, installation of the control device will reduce 
Q's output by only 200 units, while the same device will reduce R's 
output by 400 units. Requiring R but not Q to install the device 
would satisfy criterion 1: the choice would be premised on effi-
ciency-attaining the greatest reduction in pollution per dollar. Re-
quiring Q but not R to install the device would satisfy criterion 2: the 
choice here would be premised on the arguable fairness of imposing 
classificatory accuracy, such as requiring the state to engage in a personal dialogue with the 
plaintiff before acting. See P. BREST, supra note 116, at 691-92; Tribe, Structural IJue Process, 
10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269 (1975). 
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the costs of the regulation on those who impose the greatest pollution 
costs on society.224 
Brest's analysis is impeccable and as a theoretical matter is irrec-
oncilable with the hypotheticals posed earlier: it clearly is cost-effi-
cient to concentrate resources on catching "low-cost" prisoners who 
do not keep Kosher and on helping only the less expensive welfare 
recipients.225 If we have divergent intuitions about pollution de-
vices and Kosher diets, it must be because we have implicitly bal-
anced in each case-e.g., the extra cost of Kosher diets hardly 
justifies not prosecuting a suspected felon. Nevertheless, this discus-
sion does indicate that application cost should be an element of the 
equal protection balance. 
3. Personal Interest 
Finally, classes may differ with respect to their personal interest 
in avoiding a burden. This differential is rarer than that of cost or 
harm, for we commonly assume that people have an equivalent in-
terest in freedom from restriction and that restrictions will burden 
that interest equivalently. The guilty value liberty as much as the 
innocent. But such differential interests can exist. Classifications 
limiting the rights and privileges of children may rest partly on the 
sense that the young do not expect equal treatment and are less con-
cerned when burdens are imposed. Similarly, some restrictions on 
the rights of aliens seem to be partially justified by their lesser "inter-
est" in full participation in the political community.226 
Differential personal interests can often be characterized as dif-
ferential needs which the state has an interest in recognizing. Thus, 
we allow police to exceed speed limits because they have a special 
"interest" in chasing suspects, which is simply to say that the state is 
pursuing both the goal of crime control and of highway safety.227 
Personal interest is more than merely an element of the minimum 
rationality constraint. Courts frequently weigh differential harm or 
cost according to the personal interest burdened without explicitly 
discussing the differential interest in avoiding the burden. Even 
224. P. BREST, supra note I 16, at 560. 
225. This assumes that meeting the full need of one person is "equivalent" to meeting the 
full need of another. But see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), discussed in text at 
notes 196-98 supra. 
226. Of course, this justification is unconvincing as applied to resident aliens who do all 
that is possible to become citizens. But as applied to nonresident aliens and aliens uninterested 
in citizenship, the argument has some force. See generally Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protec-
tion: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1110-11 (1977). 
227. In a more general sense, we can say that the government also has an interest in re-
specting individual liberty. See P. BREST, supra note 116, at 988 n.l. 
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though two classes have nominally the same personal interest, the 
nature and strength of that interest has equal protection importance 
simply when one class is burdened and the other is not. Dangerous 
and safe drivers may have the same interest in driving, but what is 
crucial in evaluating misfit is the importance of that interest; less 
misfit will be tolerated as the significance of that interest increases. 
The fundamental interest branch of strict scrutiny, the "adequate op-
portunity to present claims" limitation on the indigent's rights in the 
criminal appellate process, 228 the apparent limitation of irrebuttable 
presumption analysis to important personal liberties,229 and the spe-
cial protection which the new substantive due process affords privacy 
rights230 and family values, 231 all indicate that misfit is more "closely 
scrutinized" as the significance of the affected personal interest 
grows. A fuller description of how the courts should integrate per-
sonal interest into equal protection balancing appears later.232 
C. Types of Misfit 
I. .Due Process vs. Equal Protection 
As some commentators have noted, the analysis in substantive 
due process cases resembles that in equal protection cases.233 The 
irrebuttable presumption doctrine suggests that procedural due pro-
cess is also related to equal protection. This section attempts to ex-
pound the relationships between equal protection and the two forms 
of due process by identifying the relationship of misfit to each. 
The intimacy of substantive due process and equal protection is 
immediately apparent from the fact that the language of the tests 
applied is nearly identical. Under either doctrine, if a fundamental 
personal interest is infringed the state must show that its classifica-
tion is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; otherwise,234 
the classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest. This similarity is deceptive, however. Substantive due 
process straightforwardly balances state and personal interests to de-
termine what means the state may employ against anyone (and ev-
eryone) to achieve a goal. Equal protection, by contrast, balances 
only incidentally, to determine whether a given amount of inequality 
228. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
229. See text at notes 90-93 supra. 
230. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
231. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
232. Part VI infra. 
233. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 2, at 41-43; Linde, supra note 152, at 203-05; Perry, 
supra note 68, at 385. 
234. Of course, equal protection also applies the strict scrutiny test to suspect categories. 
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is justifiable-the premise, always, is that an "equal" deprivation 
would be valid. 235 
Both doctrines require that classes be compared, and to this ex-
tent both involve "misfit" analysis. But the classes relevant to each 
doctrine are different. Substantive due process speaks only to over-
breadth236 and therefore compares only two classes, the properly in-
cluded and the overincluded.237 Equal protection speaks to 
differential harm between the burdened and the unburdened and 
therefore compares four classes.238 Put another way, it compares 
two broad classes-the burdened and unburdened-and asks 
whether the former class threatens more harm than the latter. 
A plaintiff can often make both substantive due process and 
equal protection arguments. His due process claim is: "the state 
may not treat me the same way it treats him, since we are differ-
ent,"239 and his equal protection claim is: "the state must treat me 
235. The details of each kind of balance are described in Parts VI.B and VI.C iefra. 
236. As we will see, overinclusion must be specially defined for benefits-it must mean 
overinclusion with respect to the "burden" of excluding persons from a benefit. See text ac-
companying note 273 iefra. 
237. See note 37 supra. In terms of the model, substantive due process compares only A to 
C: 




238. Equal protection compares the ratio A/C to the ratio B/D. 
239. In terms of the model, the substantive due process claim emphasizes the difference in 
terms of harm or need. (f represents those who receive a burden or a benefit.) 
T T 
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the same way it treats him, since we are no different."240 The es-
sence of a due process claim is that equal treatment is unjustified; the 
essence of an equal protection claim is that dissimilar treatment is 
unjustified. _ 
Since different kinds of misfit are involved, a classification that 
creates excessive due process misfit does not necessarily create exces-
sive equal protection misfit, and vice versa. A few examples will 
illuminate these relationships. A situation presenting excessive due 
process misfit but not equal protection misfit is suggested by the "ze-
bra killer" incident in San Francisco.241 Knowing only that a sus-
pected killer was a black man of medium build, the police made 
sweeping detentions of blacks. Detaining blacks and not whites was 
not "irrational"- i.e. , this is not a case of equal protection mis-
fit-but the broad interference with the freedom of blacks may well 
have been too high a price to pay for the chance that one of them 
could be identified as the killer. 
The case of a misfit which violates equal protection but not due 
process is even more common: almost every recent decision that a 
law violated equal protection dealt with a law that would have easily 
passed due process scrutiny. Consider, for example, gender-based 
discriminations in benefit programs.242 Although a presumption of 
dependence for one sex and not the other might violate equal protec-
tion, surely the state may employ a presumption for both sexes or for 
neither. In fact, unless an equal protection violation is based upon a 
240. In terms of the model, the equal protection claim emphasizes the similarity in terms of 
harm or need. (f again represents those receiving a burden or a benefit.) 
T 'uT T 'vT 




241. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1974, at I, col. 6. The police questioned over 600 people dur-
ing a period of about one week, looking for a black man, in his 20s or 30s, of medium build, 
and 5 feet, 9 inches to 6 feet tall. Blacks complained that almost all young black men except 
the very tall and very fat were liable to be stopped and questioned. Id at 15, cols. 1-3. 
242. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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suspect classification, it would be unwise for a court to rest on equal 
protection a decision which could have been decided on substantive 
due process, since the state might in good faith respond to the deci-
sion by imposing the invalidated restriction uniformly. 
Finally, consider the old substantive due process case, Lochner v. 
New York,243 in which the Court discussed both kinds of misfit. 
The Court found "irrational" a statute forbidding employment in a 
bakery for more than sixty hours a week or ten hours a day. First, 
the Court asserted that other occupations were just as "unhealthy" as 
the trade of a baker but were not regulated.244 This is an equal pro-
tection argument, though the Court did not so denominate it. Sec-
ond, the Court in effect argued that the law was overbroad: that an 
occupation is not "perfectly healthy" does not justify a sweeping in-
fringement of freedom of contract.245 This is a due process argu-
ment. 
Of course, Lochner is not good law, for we now would reject both 
the equal protection argument (bakeries probably differ in kind from 
law offices, carpentry shops, etc.) and the due process argument 
( courts no longer value contract rights so dearly and they are prop-
erly quicker to accept legislative evaluations of the significance of 
social evils). Nonetheless, the case illustrates the differences be-
tween equal protection and substantive due process misfit. 
The independence of due process and equal protection misfit 
suggests a problem: should a classification that barely satisfies each 
type of rationality standard ever be invalidated because of its cumu-
lative "irrationality''? Yes, since each kind of misfit aggravates the 
general unfairness of a law.246 A detailed discussion of Craig v. 
243. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
244. 198 U.S. at 59. 
245. 198 U.S. at 59-60. 
246. Doctrinally, this might seem incorrect, for we would not invalidate a law which only 
barely satisfied any other independent constitutional provisions, such as the first amendment 
and the privilege against self-incrimination. However, a similar kind of misfit analysis is now 
conducted under the due process and equal protection clauses, and that analysis relies more on 
general reasoning about the requirements of equality and fairness than on textual exegesis of 
the Constitution. It would therefore be odd to ignore cumulative harms for such doctrinal 
reasons. q: United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508,517,518, 519 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (defending the irrebuttable presumption doctrine) (citations omit-
ted): 
It is a corollary of (the Equal Protection] requirement that, in order to determine 
whether persons are indeed similarly situated, "such procedural protections as the particu-
lar situation demands" must be provided . . . . [W]here the private interests affected are 
very important and the governmental interest can be promoted without much difficulty by 
a well-designed hearing procedure, the Due Process Clause requires the Government to 
act on an individualized basis, with general propositions serving only as rebuttable pre-
sumptions or other burden-shifting devices. 
1978] Equal Protection 835 
.Boren241 demonstrates the value of the cumulative approach. 
In Craig, the Supreme Court examined an Oklahoma statute that 
prohibited the sale of3.2% beer to males under 21 and females under 
18. The state defended the law by arguing that young males were 
more likely than young females to drive while drunk. A survey 
showed that 2% of males aged 18-20, but only .18% of females of that 
age, were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.248 The 
Court nevertheless invalidated the classification: "if maleness is to 
serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must 
be considered an unduly tenuous 'fit.' "249 Justice Rehnquist, dissent-
ing, deplored this use of the statistics, arguing that the only equal 
protection issue was whether the 2%/.18% differential justified the 
disparate treatment, and concluding that it did. 250 He maintained 
that the Court's reference to the 2% correlation was relevant not to 
equal protection, but to due process-"whether there are enough 
persons in the category who drive while drunk to justify a bar 
against purchases by all members of the group."251 If the Court's 
reasoning were correct, he continued, it would entail the absurd con-
sequence that the state could not validly bar 18-20 year olds, male or 
female, from purchasing beer, since only 1% (not even 2%) actually 
were arrested for driving while drunk. Justice Rehnquist balanced 
the state's interest in preventing drunk driving by young adults 
This analysis, of course, combines elements traditionally invoked in what are usually 
treated as distinct classes of cases, involving due process and equal protection. But the 
elements of fairness should not be so rigidly cabined. 
247. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 













The percentages 2% and 0.18% refer to the percentages ofT and of "'T, respectively. 
249. 429 U.S. at 201-02. 
250. 429 U.S. at 224, 226. 
25 l. 429 U.S. at 226. 
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against the injury to personal interests caused by any over- or under-
inclusiveness and concluded that due process was not violated.252 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent illuminates the distinction between 
differential harm (equal protection) and overbreadth (due process) 
misfit.253 His contention that as a due process issue a 1 % or 2% fit is 
adequate seems correct, given the relative insignificance of the in-
jured personal interests.254 But Craig might be a case in which a 
due process "fit" is satisfactory but is so weak that the classification 
must fail because of the cumulative misfit. If the elevenfold differen-
tial between men and women were maintained255 but the due process 
misfit were reduced-e.g., if 80% of young males were arrested for 
driving under the influence and 7 .2% of young females-the Court 
would uphold the classification. However, since the degree of equal 
protection misfit is unchanged, the difference in result must be due to 
the weakness of the due process fit in the actual case. Of course, the 
Court in Craig was strongly influenced by the fact that the line was 
drawn on the basis of sex, and the Court was remarkably skeptical of 
the state's statistical arguments. Nevertheless, the hypothetical sug-
gests that the due process misfit evaluation was necessary to the 
Craig result. 
Craig illustrates another point: fewer justifications will be avail-
able to explain overbreadth in a case presenting both equal protec-
tion and due process claims than in a case presenting only a due 
process claim. For the equal protection claim, overbreadth misfit 
will be evaluated with respect to an equal protection purpose, that is, 
a purpose invoked to justify d!fferentia! treatment and only indirectly 
invoked to justify the overinclusion. For the due process claim, the 
overbreadth will be evaluated with respect to a purpose that is di-
rectly invoked to justify the law. Another look at Craig shows why 
this distinction is important. More frequent drunk driving by males 
was cited as the equal protection justification for the law. While the 
purpose of reducing drunk driving perhaps adequately explained the 
differential treatment, the Court in effect invalidated the law because 
252. 429 U.S. at 226-27. 
253. See 429 U.S. at 225-26. 
254. Note that a contrary result might forbid any town from remaining dry, if the rate of 
arrests for drunkenness. at all ages were as low as 2%. 
255. Of course, one may question whether maintaining the same C/A:D/B ratio is 
equivalent to keeping the equal protection differential "constant." Some weight might also be 
given to the absolute size of the percentages. Thus, if l % of all boys and .5% of all girls drove 
while drunk, and if in another situation 100% of all boys and 50% of all girls caused or posed a 
certain mischief, we might find the latter misfit intolerable and not the former, even though the 
differential was "constant." 
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that purpose inadequately explained the due process overinclusion. 
Yet, had the state not been restricted to the kinds of arguments that 
would also justify gender-based discriminations, it could have mar-
shalled many additional arguments to justify a uniform age limit for 
both sexes. For example, the state could have argued a uniform age 
limit is sensible because young people can only handle liquor when 
they reach a certain level of maturity; because peer pressures among 
the young foster excessive drinking; or because beer-drinking young 
people are likely to form boisterous public crowds, litter streets, and 
annoy bystanders. Since none of these is likely to justify constitu-
tionally a sex differential-are girls sufficiently more mature than 
boys, less subject to peer pressure, or less likely to form public 
crowds?-they were unavailable to the state because they would 
have negated the equal protection defense. 
In short, we should not readily assume (with Justice Rehnquist) 
that if a law's overbreadth does not violate substantive due process, 
that overbreadth has no equal protection significance. As we have 
just seen, an equal protection claim may impel the state to adduce a 
justification that defeats that claim but which creates serious due 
process problems, even where a good due process justification would 
have been available but for the equal protection claim. Moreover, 
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion ignores the possibility of a cumula-
tive approach to due process and equal protection misfit. 
A final substantive due process issue should be noted. When we 
describe a law as overbroad, we usually mean that it burdens the 
innocent as well as the guilty or excludes the needy as well as the 
undeserving from a benefit. But courts have occasionally asked 
whether the burden imposed actually reduces the harm. Even if 
overbreadth passes the traditional test-even if the class the legisla-
ture chooses to burden is sufficiently harmful to justify treating the 
entire class uniformly-the law may still fail if the burden the state 
has imposed on the class barely reduces the perceived harm. In 
Lochner, for example, the Court made not only the traditional over-
breadth argument that there were too few unhealthy workers in bak-
eries to justify any health regulation. It also made this 
"effectiveness" argument: since New York health inspections already 
protected the health of bakery workers "so far as possible" the regu-
lation of working hours did not in fact ( or intention) reduce health 
problems in bakeries.2s6 
The Supreme Court has not confined the argument that a burden 
is ineffectual to old and discredited substantive due process cases. 
In Craig, for example, the Court concluded that forbidding young 
256. 198 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1905). 
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males to buy beer did not rationally serve the interest in reducing 
drunk driving. The Court reasoned that the statute did not forbid 
young males from drinking the beer purchased by young female 
friends or by older persons257 and that the statistics were generally 
"lacking in controls necessary for appraisal of the actual effective-
ness of the male 3.2% beer prohibition."258 
The effectiveness argument is perhaps the argument implicit in 
the test: "Does the means significantly promote the end?" If 
"means" only describes how much of the total harm is addressed by 
the law259 (in Craig, the proportion of all drunk driving by young 
adults that the regulation purported to reach), then the "promotion" 
test is incorrect. That males make up only 61 %, or even only 2%, of 
all drunk drivers is irrelevant-equal protection only demands that 
males be sufficiently more likely than females to drive while 
drunk.260 However, if the "promotion" test simply restates the effec-
257. 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
258. 429 U.S. at 202 n.14. The concurring opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens make 
the same argument. 429 U.S. at 211, 213 n.6. 
259. In terms of the model, the shaded portions (regions C and D) represent the total 
harm, and C/(C+D) represents the portion of the harm addressed by the law: 
T "'T 
'v M A B 
M 
260. In graphic terms, the location of the vertical line dividing T and "'Tis entirely irrele• 
vant to equal protection analysis, so long as the proportions C/A and D/B remain constant. 
T T l\.,T 
A B A B 
M M 
60% 35% 
The percentages represent the proportion of the vertical column that the lower segment consti• 
tutes. For example, C is 60% of C+A. 
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tiveness argument, then it is conceptually valid under both equal 
protection and due process. Had Oklahoma defended its regulation 
in Craig by asserting that the law reduced the incidence of rape, the 
Court's reaction is easy to imagine. Young males, of course, may 
pose the danger almost uniquely, and thus as an abstract matter the 
group singled out for special treatment is a proper subject for regula-
tion. But the burden imposed has no apparent relevance to the as-
serted harm. 
Although the effectiveness argument is conceptually sound, 
courts should use it sparingly. Where the burden chosen by the 
legislature might reasonably reduce the harm, the court should not 
ordinarily analyze its actual effectiveness, since that is a consum-
mately legislative task. If a harm exists and if the class selected is a 
reasonably good surrogate for that harm, then the method and vigor 
of the attack on the harm should usually be left to legislative choice. 
This approach respects legislative flexibility where respect is most 
warranted. 
The Court in Craig paid lip-service to this conception of institu-
tional roles. After noting the shortcomings of the statistical sample 
and asserting that neither the judiciary nor state officials should be 
expected to be adept in statistical techniques, the Court concluded 
that "this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological proposi-
tions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in 
tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Pro-
tection Clause."261 Underlying this statement is the important truth 
that ultimately the Court cannot test the effectiveness of a regulation 
or the seriousness of the harm which assertedly necessitates it. 
However, courts should not ignore evidence that the legislature's fac-
tual assumptions are valid, and the Court is incorrect if its statement 
suggests otherwise. On the other hand, the statement is quite right if 
it is only insisting that the Court, and not the statistics, ultimately 
decide normative equal protection questions. Even if it accepts the 
state's statistical proof, as it normally should, the Court must judge 
the significance of the facts proved. What personal interests are 
burdened by the law, and how much constitutional protection do 
they merit? How significant and legitimate are the state interests 
asserted? How much differential in harm will defeat an equal protec-
tion claim? How much overbreadth violates due process? What 
classificatory traits have stigmatizing effects which the Court should 
recognize? All these questions are independent of the validity of 
statistical proof, and all are questions that only a Court should an-
swer. 
The Supreme Court's standard for what procedural process is 
261. 429 U.S. at 204. 
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"due," like the substantive due process standard, bears a noticeable 
similarity to equal protection tests: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of [procedural] due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.262 
These factors determine whether a hearing is required, either before 
or after the deprivation of liberty or property,263 and how thorough 
that hearing should be.264 The substantive deprivation itself, of 
course, is not the subject of review. 
Procedural due process addresses not what the government may 
do, but how it may do it. Because purpose is not directly consid-
ered, misfit analysis might seem entirely inapposite. But the distinc-
tion between "what" and "how'.' is analogous to the substantive due 
process/ equal protection distinction between ends and means. In 
substantive due process and equal protection the courts are often less 
concerned with the state's ends than with whether the means fit 
them. Thus, conceptually, procedural due process might be seen as 
a lower tier of means-end misfit analysis in which the substantive 
"means" are treated as the procedural "end." Misfit analysis in the 
lower tier compares the procedural means to the procedural end, 
evaluating the extent to which the procedures used accurately select 
the class described in the statute. This contrasts with misfit analysis 
in the higher tier (of substantive due process/equal protection), 
which evaluates the extent to which the statutory class accurately re-
flects the class that would be picked out if the statute were to achieve 
its goal perfectly.26s 
262. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
263. See L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 543-50 (1978). 
264. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). 
265. In terms of the model, we may define a third class A, comprising those actually bur-
dened or benefitted by the government. We then simply have two misfit evaluations, one 
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Procedural due process, like substantive due process and equal 
protection, promotes more than accuracy. 266 Besides protecting 
classificatory accuracy, equal protection, through the doctrines of 
suspect categories and of illicit motivation, proscribes stigmatic and 
hostile treatment.267 Procedural due process allows individuals to 
present their claims to state officials and requires those officials to 
explain their actions, functions which have value even if they do not 
assure fewer erroneous decisions.268 Nevertheless, both procedural 
and substantive misfit are important elements of due process and 
equal protection analysis and can, as we have seen, be integrated 
into a generalized two-tiered test of classificatory fairness. 
Finally, we should briefly note the role misfit plays in the irrebut-
table presumption doctrine. Irrebuttable presumptions are usually 
substantive due process cases of a special kind, not disguised equal 
protection cases. When the Court held that Illinois could not take 
away Stanley's motherless children without letting him rebut the 
presumption that he was an unfit parent, 269 it did so not because 
fathers are generally as fit as mothers to be a family's only parent 
(they may well not be), but because many fathers will be fit parents. 
Whatever the talents of widows, widowers should have the chance to 
exercise the important personal interest in child-rearing, since a sig-
nificant number of men ( even if a minority) can exercise it well. 
Thus, to the extent that misfit analysis is relevant to the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine, substantive due process overbreadth misfit is 
the most apposite kind. 
Many irrebuttable presumption cases do resemble equal protec-
tion cases. A claim that the state irrebuttably presumed that Stanley 
was unlike the average widow sounds like an equal protection argu-
ment. As suggested above, however, widows' competence is proba-
bly irrelevant to the result in Stanley. The result would have been 
the same had the state automatically taken children away from a 
surviving parent of either sex. That irrebuttable presumptions are ac-
tually due process cases is confirmed by the difficulty of imagining 
an irrebuttable presumption describable only in equal protection 
terms. 
Procedural misfit, like substantive, can take the form of both overinclusion (e.g., a girl is mis-
takenly "burdened" and not allowed to buy beer, in Craig) and underinclusion (e.g., some 20-
year-old boys pass for 21). 
266. See generally the thoughtful analysis in L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 501-06. 
261. See generally Part I.A supra. 
268. See note 223 supra. 
269. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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This section concludes with a hypothetical case that illustrates 
the characteristics of the various forms of due process and equal pro-
tection. Assume that a city police department has a policy of dis-
missing from the force officers whom it discovers are practicing 
homosexuals, and that the plaintiff is dismissed for that reason. The 
constitutional arguments available to him will reflect concern with 
both legitimacy of purpose and degree of misfit,270 and can be sum-
marized as follows: 
(I) Procedural due process 
A hearing is required to determine whether the plaintiff is a practic-
ing homosexual, for existing departmental procedures do not reliably 
determine that fact. 
(2) Irrebuttable presumption 
The departmental policy is obviously designed to ensure public 
role-models who share the community's values and, more specifically, 
who will not encourage homosexuality. Although the plaintiff is a 
practicing homosexual, the department cannot automatically assume 
that he is a poor role-model. A hearing is required to determine 
whether his private life actually re.fleets upon his ability to uphold 
community values in public. 
(3) Substantive due process 
The departmental policy has an unlawful purpose, namely, prohib-
iting persons from exercising personal-privacy interests and prohibit-
ing them from expressing those privacy interests in public. 
Even if the end served is not illegitimate, the departmental policy is 
overbroad, for not all practicing homosexuals are poor role-models. 
There is a reasonable, less restrictive alternative: dismissing only those 
homosexual policemen who publicize their preferences. 
The plaintiff admits being a practicing homosexual. But because 
he does not publicize this fact, the departmental policy should be inval-
idated for its overbroad interference with his privacy. 
(4) Equal protection 
The departmental policy has an illegitimate purpose. But even if 
the end is not illegitimate, it is irrationally served here, for a similar 
proportion of nonhomosexuals as homosexuals are poor role-models. 
Furthermore, it is easy enough to identify those homosexuals who are 
a problem, by prohibiting all homosexuals from publicizing their sex-
ual preferences. Given the availability of this convenient, less restric-
tive alternative, the doubtful difference in harm posed by homosexuals 
compared to nonhomosexuals, and the law's substantial interference 
with the plaintiff's privacy, this law should be invalidated. 
270. Some of the arguments refer to the availability of less restrictive alternatives, an issue 
discussed in Part VI.B i'!fra. 
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2. Overinclusion and Underinclusion; Burdens and Benefits 
Courts and commentators occasionally suggest that equal protec-
tion should treat overinclusion differently from underinclusion,271 
and benefits differently from burdens.272 In light of the parallels 
between due process and equal protection misfit, these suggestions 
should be examined with respect to the due process clause as well. 
This section contends that no analytic distinction generally need be 
made between overinclusion and underinclusion or benefits and bur-
dens when evaluating misfit. The primary exception arises because 
of the due process "deprivation" requirement, but the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine helps restore the symmetry. 
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exclusion from exclusion from 






As this diagram suggests, we can interdefine burdens and benefits 
and overinclusion and underinclusion. Region X represents overin-
clusion with respect to a burden. But if we describe exclusion from 
a benefit as a burden, then X also represents underinclusion with 
respect to a benefit. For analogous reasons, Y represents either un-
derinclusion with respect to a burden or overinclusion with respect 
to a benefit.273 With these relationships in mind, we can consider in 
271. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 27, at 348-53; J)evelopments, supra note 1, at 
1084-87; note 284 i'!fra. 
272. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 
(1977), discussed in note 288 i'!fra. 
273. Under these definitions, the labels "harmful" and "needy" are imprecise, and the par-
enthetical labels "deserving burden" and "deserving benefit" are more accurate. 
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more detail first the relationship of overinclusion and underinclusion 
to misfit analysis and then the role of burdens and benefits. 
One commentator has recommended that courts approach over-
inclusion and underinclusion (with respect to a burden) with differ-
ent degrees of tolerance. Overinclusion is more offensive because it 
burdens the "innocent" while underinclusion merely fails to burden 
the "guilty," and because the need-for-experimentation rationale 
that partly justifies underinclusion274 is inapposite to overinclu-
sion.275 The commentator also notes that burden-overinclusion, 
while more objectionable when it does arise, is less common than 
underinclusion, "since the greater numbers who are adversely af-
fected by the action will bring political pressure to bear on the 
lawmakers."276 
This reasoning does not dictate any approach to underinclusion 
and overinclusion with respect to a benejit.277 In the case of benefits, 
overinclusion may seem less objectionable than underinclusion, 
since the latter fails to benefit the deserving, and the former benefits 
the undeserving.278 On the other hand, this "preference" for overin-
clusion is undercut by the experimentation rationale. Just as the 
advantages of legislative flexibility in dealing with the "harmful" 
may justify burden-underinclusion, so the wish to deal flexibly with 
the "needy" may justify benefit-underinclusion; in each case the 
state has decided to extend its efforts to only some of the "deserv-
ing." And again, underinclusion with respect to a benefit might be 
less likely to occur than overinclusion, since the deserving who are 
denied benefits may mobilize political pressure.279 
While there may be some good reasons for different judicial tol-
erances toward overinclusion and underinclusion (and for differenti-
ating further between benefits and burdens), this Note suggests a 
somewhat different analysis, the elements of which have already 
been introduced. Under this analysis, the proper judicial approach 
274. See text at note 339 infra. 
275. Developments, supra note I, at 1086. 
276. Id at 1086-87. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
277. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1086 n.47. 
278. Which of these is actually less objectionable is a question which can only be answered 
intuitively. While it seems clearly preferable to fail to burden a guilty person rather than to 
burden an innocent person, the correct preference is less obvious for benefits. It seems "bet-
ter," though debatably so, to benefit a non-needy person (we are only wasting our money) than 
to fail to benefit a needy person (we are allowing the need to continue unabated). In any 
event, these broad generalizations are of only limited value, for as will be suggested in the text 
at notes 280-87 infra, overinclusion and underinclusion can for the most part be similarly 
treated under the equal protection and due process clauses. 
279. Of course, as a practical matter, these people may lack political power. 
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is essentially as follows. If a court has evaluated a classification in 
terms of the minimum rationality constraint and the equal protection 
balance, then underinclusion (with respect to either a burden or de-
nial of a benefit) is of no further judicial concern. But the Court's 
concern with overinclusion goes beyond this equal protection analy-
sis. Judicial review of overinclusion is complete only when the 
classification has also been tested for due process overbreadth. 
Benefits and burdens are treated similarly under equal protection ex-
cept insofar as they affect the significance of the personal interest. 280 
But under due process, a special problem is posed by benefits in 
which the plaintiff does not have a property interest. Overinclusion 
analysis cannot, strictly speaking, apply to the denial of such bene-
fits, for those who are overinclusively denied the benefit have no due 
process claim to it. Although such claims may be reviewed under 
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, they are reviewed more defer-
entially than claims of overinclusion with respect either to burdens 
or to the denial of "property benefits." 
This proposed analysis follows directly from the earlier discus-
sion of due process and equal protection misfit. Simply to evaluate 
the "amount" of overinclusion or underinclusion is meaningless in 
equal protection analysis; the size of these classes is relevant only in 
comparison with the "properly fitted" classes of the properly in-
cluded and properly excluded.281 In equal protection analysis, the 
differential misfit approach compares the proportion of the irrcluded 
who are harmful to the proportion of the excluded who are harmful 
and validates the law if the comparison is both minimally rational 
(i.e., if there is some positive differential) and "on balance" fair (i.e., 
if the differential is sufficient in light of the governmental and per-
sonal interests involved).282 In contrast, substantive due process 
analysis asks whether the class of overincluded is "on balance" too 
large compared to the class of properly included.283 
Thus, insofar as underinclusion and overinclusion are both pro-
bative of differential misfit, courts should scrutinize them with equal 
tolerance. But since only overinclusion, not underinclusion, is rele-
vant to substantive due process, we might characterize judicial re-
view of misfit as less tolerant of overinclusion. As long as a 
classification creates a sufficient differential in harm, underinclusion 
needs no justification. If drivers under age 18 are sufficiently more 
likely to be drunk than older drivers, then they can be prohibited 
from purchasing alcohol, whether they are 15%, 5%, or only 1 % of all 
280. See text at notes 288-96 infra. 
281. See note 260 supra and accompanying text. 
282. The mechanics of equal protection balancing are discussed in Part VI infra. 
283. See Part VI.C infra. 
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drunk drivers. This feature of equal protection may have impelled 
courts to declare that the state may go "one step at a time" and may 
attack only "part of a harm."284 While this declaration is entirely 
sound, it should not be confused with the incorrect view that the 
state may attack only part of the harm regardless of the relative 
acuteness of the harms it has and has not addressed. 
It might appear, thus, that courts err in discussing underinclusion 
in any substantive due process cases285 and in many equal protection 
cases.286 But there is a rational motive for this judicial practice, 
though it may not be the actual motive. Underinclusion is indi-
rectly relevant to both types of misfit, for it helps define the signifi-
cance of the state interest actually served by the law. For example, 
if only 5% of all drunk drivers are under 18, then this underinclu-
siveness suggests that the state interest in "reducing drunk driving" 
should be discounted by 95% in any equal protection or substantive 
due process balance.287 Of course, a mathematical approach is im-
practical. Nevertheless, the Court may validly consider, with 
284. As the Court has rather broadly put it: "(M]ere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the 
validity of a law under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, even if the 
law disadvantages an individual or identifiable members of a group." Nixon v. Administrator 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 n.33 (1977) (citations omitted), See notes 59-65 supra and 
accompanying text. 
285. For an example of this judicial practice, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494 (1977). In arguing that the state interests asserted for a zoning ordinance were at best 
"marginally'' served, the plurality specifically pointed to the underinclusiveness of the ordi-
nance (as well as its overinclusiveness). For example, the ordinance was underinclusive in 
remedying traffic and parking congestion since some who deserved the burden were not bur-
dened: "the ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried 
children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his 
or her own car." 431 U.S. at 500 (opinion of Powell, J.). The mischief of overcrowding was 
also remedied underinclusively, since "(t]he ordinance would permit a grandmother to live 
with a single dependent son and children, even if his school-age children number a 
dozen .... " 431 U.S. at 500. 
286. For example, in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), the Court pointed to 
both the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of a statutory provision denying benefits to 
certain classes of illegitimate children of disabled claimants. 417 U.S. at 637. This Note sug-
gests that underinclusiveness is, strictly speaking, irrelevant. Here, the fact that the burden ( of 
being denied a benefit) was conferred underinclusively-ie., that some who did not deserve 
the benefit obtained it-is irrelevant to the due process overbreadth claim that many "inno-
cent" persons who deserved the benefit failed to obtain it. And it is not directly relevant to the 
equal protection claim that the excluded and included classes of illegitimates were equally 
deserving, and "the potential for spurious claims [was] exactly the same as to both subclasses," 
417 U.S. at 636, since the number of undeserving recipients is only of equal protection conse-
quence if it affects the extent of the differential in need between the excluded and the included. 
If that differential has already been evaluated, then the number of undeserving recipients is 
irrelevant. (What this Note describes as "underinclusion" with respect to the denial of a bene-
fit the Court describes as "overinclusion" with respect to a benefit. Though awkward, this 
terminology is necessary for a consistent interpretation ofunderinclusion for both benefits and 
burdens.) 
287. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), for example, the fact that the 
congestion and overcrowding problems were underinclusively remedied suggests that in any 
equal protection balance the state's interest in reducing these problems should be discounted, 
See note 285 supra. 
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whatever precision is possible, the extent to which a social interest is 
actually being served. 
Finally, the treatment of burdens and benefits under equal pro-
tection and due process must be explained. Equal protection 
presents few problems here, for benefits differ from burdens only to 
the extent that they implicate different personal interests, or impli-
cate them to a different degree, in particular cases.288 As a general 
288. A few co=ents about the relationship between personal interests and burdens or 
benefits are in order. One interesting question is whether an interest should be evaluated 
differently if the burden or benefit represents a change from the status quo. Is it worse to 
deprive a group of persons of welfare benefits they have been receiving than to exclude them 
from a program at its inception? Is it worse to impose a new criminal penalty on group A 
than to exempt all but A from an existing penalty? The answer in each case should be yes, 
because of the significant difference in personal expectations. Because of past reliance and the 
interruption of living patterns, statutes that impose a new burden or withdraw an old benefit 
should be subject to special scrutiny. 
This argument should not be taken too far, however. It certainly does not follow that 
because persons are only excluded from a new benefit, their interests in receiving the benefit 
are inconsequential However, the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), 
seemed to reason in that fashion. In upholding a state welfare program's exclusion of non-
therapeutic abortions from medical coverage (an exclusion best described as an "exclusion of a 
new benefit," since recipients had not been "receiving" it continuously), the Court reasoned in 
part: 
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the preg-
nant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers 
no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she contin-
ues as before to be dependent on private sources for the services she desires. 
432 U.S. at 474. But this argument proves too much; we would not say that women suffer "no 
disadvantage" if a state welfare program were initiated but its benefits were limited to men. 
After all, it is only relative disadvantage that the equal protection clause addresses. 
The above discussion does not necessarily imply that benefits and burdens generally re-
quire different treatment. Denial of even an existing benefit, e.g., a government transfer pay-
ment, might seem less onerous than imposition of a burden, e.g., a criminal sanction. Whether 
a benefit is conferred at all is a discretionary matter, while our intuition about burdens seems 
to be quite the contrary; we do not feel "privileged" whenever the government fails to punish 
our conduct. But to give judicial recognition to this vague intuition would threaten to resur-
rect the discredited "right/privilege" distinction. See generally Van Alstyne, The .Demise of the 
Right-Privilege .Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). If there is a 
difference between the proper valuation of benefits and burdens, it is that the personal interests 
and opportunities threatened by unequal treatment will often be greater for burdens than for 
benefits. Generally the burdens imposed by the criminal process are qualitatively more severe 
than other affirmative burdens (such as taxes) and than the government's failure to confer a 
benefit. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 475: 
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity 
and state em;:ouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. 
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of 
law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessar-
ily far broader. 
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court held that the employer's 
practice of denying accumulated seniority to a woman who had, as the employer required, 
taken a leave of absence during pregnancy violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 
(Supp. V 1975), but that the employer's practice of denying such a woman sick pay did not, per 
se, violate that law. The Court emphasized the distinction between benefits and burdens, 434 
U.S. at 142. Justice Stevens' concurrence convincingly argues that that distinction does not 
provide a meaningful test of discrimination. 434 U.S. at 154 n.4. The test this Note has 
suggested could nevertheless achieve the same result that the majority reached. Denying ac-
cumulated seniority under the facts of Salty is less tolerable than denying sick pay-but not 
because denial of seniority is a "burden" and denial of sick pay is not (how is a woman "bur-
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matter, since equal protection applies to all burdens and benefits, we 
can conveniently interdefine them and apply a uniform "underinclu-
sion" analysis to ordinary burdens and to the "burden" of exclusion 
from a benefit. 
It is more difficult to apply a uniform "overinclusion" analysis 
under substantive due process. Overinclusion probably applies to 
all affirmative government burdens, such as taxes or criminal penal-
ties, for the due process clause explicitly protects against deprivations 
of life, liberty, or property, and "liberty" has always been expan-
sively interpreted.289 But we cannot simply define exclusion from 
any government benefit as a burden in order to make the overinclu-
sion analysis complete. A plaintiff who has never received a govern-
ment benefit he deserves has no obvious substantive due process 
claim, for he must have been deprived of a property interest, not sim-
ply prevented from obtaining it.290 
Of course, substantive due process does protect against arbitrary 
or overbroad exclusions from benefits when the plaintiff already has 
a property interest in the benefit. Thus, for example, even the prop-
erty interest of a welfare recipient should be sufficient to raise a sub-
stantive due process claim if benefits were arbitrarily terminated or 
reduced for all recipients.291 And, of course, even where a plaintiff 
has no property interest, he may have a viable equal protection claim 
which would remedy some of the law's unfairness (aside from its 
overbreadth). Nevertheless, misfit analysis contains a serious asym-
metry: people who have been denied participation in a benefit pro-
gram in which they do not have a due process "property" interest 
cannot complain about overbroad criteria for their exclusion. For 
dened" by agreeing to take a job with limited seniority rights?). It is because the first denial is 
a more severe intrusion on the woman's employment interest and is less proportionate to any 
rational interests of the employer. 
Of course, there is a serious definitional problem with the majority's approach: excuse from 
any burden can be called a "benefit," and exclusion from any benefit can be called a "burden." 
The distinction is at best intuitive-any government action restricting our freedom or pleasure 
from what it would "naturally" be is a burden, and any action increasing it is a benefit. But 
the concept ofa "natural state" is itself vague. Fortunately, the Court can avoid these concep• 
tual problems simply by inquiring whether a personal interest is significantly infringed, 
289. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). But see Meachum v. Fano, 427 
U.S. 215, 228 (1976). 
290. One possible argument is that all citizens have a liberty interest in obtaining deserved 
government benefits, under the broad liberty definition of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(discussing procedural, not substantive, due process). However, such an argument seems to 
read "liberty'' too broadly, since the argument renders the fifth and fourteenth amendment 
language "of property'' superfluous. Justice Marshall's suggestion that a property interest can 
be anticipatory-that any applicant for a government job has a property interest in that job, 
408 U.S. at 588-has not been endorsed by other members of the Court. 
291. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring procedural due process protec-
tions before recipients are deprived of their welfare benefits). 
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example, although the policemen in Kelley v. Johnson 292 ultimately 
lost their due process argument that policemen may not be fired for 
having long hair, they could at least get into court. But a police-
force applicant would have no property interest in the denied benefit 
of government employment. 
Those who treasure conceptual completeness may bemoan this 
state of affairs, but they may call upon the irrebuttable presumption 
doctrine. That doctrine was earlier described as essentially a sub-
stantive due process doctrine under which overbreadth is partially 
remedied by affording plaintiff a chance to rebut the presumption of 
"desert" of a burden or "nondesert" of a benefit. The presumption 
of nondesert of a benefit is subject to this doctrine even if the plain-
tiff has no property interest in the benefit. For example, Mrs. Salfi 
claimed that the Social Security Administration could not irrebut-
tably presume from her husband's death soon after their marriage 
that she married him only to obtain benefits.293 Although the Court 
rejected her claim, it did consider its merits, and the opinion does not 
foreclose the possibility that a less rational law would fail. While 
the Court emphasized that hers was merely a noncontractual claim 
to funds from the public treasury,294 that emphasis goes only to the -
significance of the personal interest at stake, not to the cognizability 
of an irrebuttable presumption claim to benefits in which plaintiff 
lacked a property interest.295 
Of course, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine only partially 
restores symmetry to misfit analysis, since that doctrine applies only 
when a statute clearly purports to test for a quality with respect to 
which a plaintiff could off er more convincing proof at a hearing.296 
Nevertheless, it moves the law closer to the ideal of providing a rem-
edy for all forms of classificatory unfairness, whether premised upon 
overinclusion or underinclusion, burden or exclusion from a benefit. 
D. Multiple Goals 
The problem of multiple legislative goals, each importing a dis-
tinct mischief or need, deserves separate comment. Legislatures ob-
viously may and do pursue many objectives in a single law, and 
therefore a court should not judge classifications according only to 
their primary purpose.297 Of course, even if a law has multiple pur-
292. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
293. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 753 (1975). 
294. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). 
295. But see Note, The Conclusive Presumption .Doctrine: Equal Process or .Due Protection?, 
72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 816 (1974) (criticizing the Supreme Court for ignoring the "property" or 
"liberty" requirement in irrebuttable presumption cases). 
296. See text at notes 96-97 supra. 
297. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973). See Sandalow, supra note 7, at 
660; Note, supra note 6, at 132-37. 
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poses, any given classification within it will often be justifiable in 
terms of only one of these purposes. Because of the peculiar 
problems it presents for misfit analysis, we will discuss the special 
case of a single classification that serves a set of goals. For the sake 
of simplicity and without loss of generality we will discuss a classifi-
cation that serves two purposes. 
A classification can serve two goals in two different ways. First, 
the law might burden a group that poses two mischiefs ( or benefit a 
group that has two needs). For example, recidivist felons might be 
more severely punished than first-time felons and recividist misde-
meanants. Second, the law might excuse from a burden a group 
that would otherwise deserve it because the group also deserves a 
benefit or, conversely, excuse from a benefit a needy group because 
that group also poses a harm. For example, if an ordinance requires 
drivers to stop at red lights, but exempts police and firemen, the 
combined purpose is reducing the risk of accidents to the extent that 
this does not interfere with emergency fire and police services. 
The analysis of multiple purpose classifications might seem 
straightforward. In each of the cases just described, we could simply 
analyze misfit relative to the combined purpose class (the class of 
those possessing both mischiefs, or both needs, or the need despite 
the mischief, or the mischief despite the need). But why may we 
burden those who possess both harms, yet not burden those who pos-
sess only one? Justifications for doing so would require more than 
this simple misfit evaluation. 
In our traffic light hypothetical, for example, in determining the 
propriety of burdening only the combined purpose class of those 
who both lack a special need for haste and pose the harm of being a 
traffic hazard, we cannot simply ask whether the exemption for po-
lice and firemen fits these combined goals. That is, it is not suffi-
cient to conclude that enough of those who are burdened possess 
both harms-that enough drivers would jeopardize highway safety 
and would have no legitimate interest in speed-and thus that the 
misfit is tolerable. We must also ask why the state may exempt from 
this particular burden those who need to travel without interruption 
rather than excusing them from some other burden or providing 
them with some special benefit, such as faster vehicles or special 
roads. 
That additional inquiry is hardly troubling in this example, since 
the ha~ and the need addressed by the law are obviously interre-
lated-imposing on emergency vehicles the burden of stopping at 
red lights directly affects their ability to move rapidly and without 
interruption. The kind of interrelationship necessary to satisfy min-
imum rationality will be discussed below. But possession of com-
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pound mischiefs alone is not a sufficient reason for treating a class 
differently from a class which possesses only one mischief. If it were 
sufficient, then the "multiple goals" rationale could be subtly used to 
evade the minimum rationality constraint. An example should 
make this point clearer. 
Levy v. Louisiana298 invalidated a statute allowing legitimate but 
not illegitimate children to sue for the wrongful death of their 
mothers. The Supreme Court reasoned that both classes of children 
were similarly situated with respect to the loss and the "wrong" they 
suffered at a mother's death.299 But the statute may have had a sec-
ond purpose-to encourage the formalization of relationships be-
tween parents.300 One commentator301 has suggested that although 
neither purpose considered alone is adequately served by the classifi-
cation, it is rationally related to the following combined purpose: 
compensating children for the wrongful death of their mothers to the 
extent that such compensation does not encourage relationships that 
have never been legally formalized. 
This suggestion is intriguing, but it does not explain why the state 
may pursue its interest in marriage through the law of wrongful 
death. The situation would be different if a law denied illegitimate 
children all the rights of legitimate children or if there were a press-
ing need to formalize relationships that produced illegitimate off-
spring likely to sue for wrongful death. The absurdity of the latter 
possibility perhaps accounts for the Court's casual treatment of the 
interest in marriages. 
This discussion of the multiple purposes in Levy suggests that 
though it may be rational to pursue goal A by burdening class T* 
and rational to pursue goal B by burdening class T**, it is not neces-
sarily rational to pursue goals A and B by burdening only those per-
sons common to T* and T**. That invalid syllogism circumvents 
the minimum rationality constraint and would, for example, justify 
enforcing trespassing laws only against illegitimate children, or stim-
ulating music and shipbuilding by granting tax deductions only to 
musicians who buy yachts. 302 In effect, the syllogism rationalizes 
298. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
299. 391 U.S. at 72. 
300. 391 U.S. at 80 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
301. Note, supra note 6, at 131, 136-37. 
302. While the state might decide to subsidize musicians or to spur the yacht industry, the 
objectionable feature of this tax deduction is that it does neither fairly. However, the state 
could give a deduction to all musicians and a separate deduction to all yacht purchasers. Al-
though musicians who buy yachts now gain the greatest benefit, this is fair since all who de-
serve either kind of benefit receive it. 
A helpful analogy is the problem of how to "count" black women when assessing the suc-
cess of affirmative action programs designed to increase the numbers of blacks and of women. 
If the program is really designed to achieve both goals, then it is improper to double-count 
black women toward both the black and the female hiring goals, since under this procedure a 
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differential treatment of persons similarly situated with respect to 
one harm or need by reference not to that harm or need, but to an-
other harm. Yet differential treatment with respect to the second 
harm is justifiable only with reference to the first harm, and we thus 
have a vicious circle.303 
Despite cases like Levy, classifications by compound mischiefs 
can usually be justified. Four such justifications will now be dis-
cussed. 304 
The first such category of classifications consists of those cases in 
which the presence of one mischief is associated with a higher degree 
of another. For example, while some have questioned the propriety 
of selectively prosecuting for tax violations those suspected of other 
kinds of criminal activity, it might be contended that such suspects 
are more likely to have cheated on their taxes than law-abiding citi-
zens, and that devoting investigative resources to the former class is 
more efficient. It would be a different matter if the tax laws were less 
effective than ordinary sanctions, or if criminals were less likely to 
have cheated. 
In a sense, this first category does not involve multiple goals at 
all. Vigorous use of the tax laws against criminals could be ex-
plained not as serving the twin goals of (1) raising revenue and (2) 
pursuing criminals, but as serving the single goal of raising revenue 
efficiently, i.e., by concentrating on the class of criminals filing tax 
company could hire no black men or white women, but only black women. It is also improper 
either to count all black women once as blacks, or to count them once as women, since the 
result could again fall short of the goal: if all black women were counted as "black," then the 
company would hire more white women and fewer black men than was intended. The correct 
procedure, rather, is to establish separate hiring goals for black men, black women, and white 
women. Of course, if black women were found to have suffered more severe discrimination 
than either black men or white women, then "double-counting" would be more rational. But if 
the program has the broader two-fold purpose noted above, the purpose is disserved if only 
black women are hired. 
303. In Levy, distinguishing between legitimately and illegitimately conceived wrongful-
death plaintiffs is justified in terms of the state's interest in formalizing marriage relationships. 
However, distinguishing between penalizing illegitimate wrongful-death complainants and 
failing to penalize most other illegitimates ( or their parents) is justifiable, if at all, only in terms 
ofan interest such as the interest in discouraging wrongful-death suits. But we need an expla-
nation for burdening only illegitimates to serve that interest-the circle is complete. 
304. This Note does not disapprove of all multiple-goal justifications. In particular, it does 
not subscribe to the disturbing "divide and conquer'' technique which the Supreme Court has 
occasionally used to invalidate classification. Under this technique, the Court simply evalu-
ates misfit with respect to each of several goals in tum. Because when it is evaluating one goal 
it is ignoring the other goals, the Court inevitably finds the classification irrational with respect 
to each goal. For example, in Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), the Court invalidated a 
highway bond requirement that applied to all commercial carriers except agricultural or sea-
food carriers. The Court found the law irrational because the exempted carriers posed the 
same danger to public safety as other carriers. Other plausible purposes, such as a desire to 
subsidize the exempted industries or to encourage their use of the roads (see note 306 infta), 
were simply ignored by the Court. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1225-26. This technique was 
also used in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), a use effectively criticized in Note, supra 
note 6, at 124-28. 
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returns. In other words, the second goal need not be referred to at 
all if the burdened class more acutely poses the first harm. _Almost 
every law could be seen as having "multiple goals" in some trivial 
sense-e.g., we forbid the young from driving not because they are 
likely to be worse drivers, but because we are pursuing the goals of 
keeping unsafe drivers off the road and of restricting some privileges 
to the mature. Obviously, the first explanation is more realistic and 
more convincing.305 
In the second category of cases, multiple goals can be justified 
because the pursuit of one goal inevitably affects the pursuit of an-
other. Such goals are interdependent rather than independent. 
When goals are interdependent, the first goal will be furthered to a 
d!,fferent degree when the second goal is not pursued at all, than if 
the second goal is pursued fully, without exemptions. Some exam-
ples should make this distinction clearer. 
Cases presenting interdependent goals usually involve a goal 
which inhibits, rather than aids, the pursuit of another. An example 
of such a tradeoffhas already been discussed: permitting firemen and 
police to ignore traffice lights is rational because the state can only 
pursue its interest in fire and police protection at the expense of some 
loss in traffic safety. This tradeoff rationale is entirely distinct from 
the first justification for pursuing multiple goals (that a high degree 
of one harm implies a higher [or lower] degree of another), since the 
validity of the traffic light exemption does not depend on the possi-
bility that firemen and policemen are less hazardous than other mo-
torists who ignore traffic signals.306 
305. At first glance the "multiple goals" problem appears to be trivial, for ifwe define Mas 
M* and T as M**, then the question whether the state may pursue two goals (M* and M**) 
simultaneously seems identical to the question whether the classification contains too much 
misfit (between M and T). However, T refers to those who are in fact burdened; it should be 
compared to the class that should be burdened, which in the present context is the intersection 
of the two goals, M* and M**, and not simply M*. If indeed there is a legitimate state interest 
in simply burdening or benefitting members ofT, then this state interest will justify the classifi-
cation, and there is no need to engage in subtler "multiple goals" analysis. For example, our 
driving test hypothetical could be forced into the "multiple goals" mold by asserting that the 
state is pursuing both the goal of driver safety (M or M*) and the goal of burdening persons 
who fail driving tests (T or M**). But the second "goal" is artificial; if it were legitimate, then 
there would be no need even to refer to the first goal. 
306. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), might be another example of interdependent 
goals. The Supreme Court invalidated a highway bond requirement that exempted only carri-
ers of agricultural goods and certain seafoods, perhaps because it assumed that the law's only 
purpose was to improve traffic safety or perhaps because it considered highway bonds an inap-
propriate means through which to favor agriculture. See Note, supra note 6, at 134; Ely, supra 
note 26, at 1225-26. Indeed, under the interdependence analysis suggested in the text, such a 
compound purpose would be insufficient to justify the law. But if the state has a defensible 
interest in encouraging agricultural carriers to use the roads rather than other means of trans-
portation, e.g., to prevent products from perishing, then the classification might be justifiable, 
for the pursuit of this goal inevitably inhibits the goal of highway safety. In other words, the 
state should be permitted to make this tradeoff, since the two goals are interdependent. 
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This Note has also presented examples of purported tradeoffs 
which in fact do not involve interdependence. A law prohibiting 
only illegitimate children from maintaining wrongful death suits is 
described in "tradeofl'' terms if the purpose is said to be to compen-
sate children for the loss of a parent "to the extent that" this does not 
condone nonformalized relationships between the parents. How-
ever, these goals are independent, and the tradeoff is artificial, since 
the need for compensation is unrelated to any need for formal mar-
riage. More precisely, it would not affect the state's formalization 
interest if all children could sue for wrongful death, or if none could. 
By contrast, strict enforcement of traffic laws would inhibit the goal 
of efficient fire and police protection more than lax enforcement 
would.307 
If multiple goals are interdependent, then the state need not de-
fend its decision to pursue both goals simultaneously or to pursue 
one goal at the expense of the other. Such decisions about the 
proper tradeoff between legitimate goals are classically the responsi-
bility of the legislature.308 They require a balancing of incommen-
surables, a battle between competing values, and a court should 
therefore accede to the legislature's solution. Of course, a court still 
must evaluate the degree of fit between the combined-purpose class 
and the class actually burdened. For example, if a traffic signal ex-
emption for firemen is justified by their need for haste, then others 
with such a need-ambulances, or private motorists in a medical 
emergency-might assert that they are similarly situated with respect 
to the tradeoff between traffic safety and emergency needs. But the 
question whether the tradeoff itself is unwise or unfair (i.e., whether 
the need for safety outweighs the need for any exemptions) is for the 
legislature. 
The. third category in which classification by compound mischiefs 
is permissible consists of those instances in which one can infer, from 
the combination of mischiefs, a single need or harm properly served 
by the law. Of course, this combined purpose must be legitimate 
and the classification must satisfy the minimum rationality con-
straint. In this third category, the intersection of M* and M** de-
fines a class that is different in kind from both M* and M**. For 
307. Although it is less common for the pursuit of one goal inevitably to further another 
goal than for it to inhibit the second, some examples might be noted. If both a chronic food 
shortage (M*) and serious unemployment (M**) exist, the state might decide to offer public 
subsidies to agricultural workers. Neither goal is being pursued fully, since non-agricultural 
employment still exists and other means of aiding agriculture (besides a worker subsidy) are 
available. But one justification for this choice of multiple goals is that remedying unemploy-
ment here inevitably helps remedy the food shortage. 
By contrast, a prohibition of jaywalking by illegitimates exemplifies independent, rather 
than interdependent, "harms." (Again, these goals are at best mutually supportive, not mutu-
ally inhibiting.) Discouraging illegitimacy has nothing to do with discouraging jaywalking. 
308. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1240 n.110. 
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example, an affirmative action program giving blacks preference in 
admission to medical school might be characterized as serving the 
twin goals of compensating for past discrimination against blacks 
generally and making health care more accessible to blacks. If these 
two goals are interdependent, then the state is justified in combining 
them (assuming that they are legitimate goals); it is no objection that 
the law benefits no black victims of discrimination other than would-
be doctors, or that it benefits no white medical students who would 
treat blacks.309 But an even more straightforward justification than 
"interdependence" is the argument that encouraging blacks to be-
come doctors is itself a legitimate goal. To succeed, this argument 
must show that blacks have a sufficiently unique social experience 
and that doctors' social roles sufficiently differ from those of lawyers, 
businessmen, and others, that the goal differs in kind from the sepa-
rate goals. 
This form of argument can be abused- e.g., one could argue 
that the classification in Levy is justified by the state's special desire 
to discourage illegitimate children from filing wrongful death claims. 
But this potential danger is not unique to classifications involving 
multiple goals and can be avoided simply by enforcing the require-
ment that the goal be legitimate. 
Finally, classifying by compound mischiefs may be rational 
when it is part of a general policy of attacking one of the mischiefs in 
many or most of its manifestations. Thus, as suggested earlier,310 
the classification in Levy might have been rational were preventing 
illegitimates from bringing wrongful death suits just one part of a 
general scheme to deny illegitimates the rights generally accorded 
legitimate children. Similarly, another possible justification for us-
ing the tax laws against criminals is that there appears to be a gen-
eral policy of burdening criminals in any way possible. The more 
general the policy, the less the "misfit" between felons who fill out 
tax forms and felons who do not, or (in the case of a law excluding 
felons from certain occupations) between felons who would have 
pursued a now-prohibited line of work and those who still may pur-
sue their chosen occupation.311 Of course, under this fourth justifi-
cation for pursuing multiple goals, the "general policy" in question 
309. These two objections may be relevant to whether the law would satisfy equal protec-
tion. Although they are irrelevant to the propriety of pursuing the two goals together, these 
objections are quite relevant to the ultimate question whether T and M are sufficiently close 
fitting, for the latter inquiry will also consider the availability of less restrictive alternatives. 
310. See text after note 298 supra. 
311. It may be objected that a preference for a "more general" policy simply resurrects the 
impermissible "part of the harm" approach, see text at notes 59-65 supra. Strictly speaking, 
that objection is correct. However, this Note de.fines "general policy" to mean an attempt to 
get at a harm by whatever means are available. On this view, a "general policy'' approach 
satisfies the minimum rationality constraint (particularly its cost element). That is, there may 
be no feasible way to address the "harm" of non.filing felons who have illegal income, and it is 
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must still be legitimate. (It is unlikely that the purpose of either of 
the above hypotheticals is legitimate.) 
To conclude, classifications according to multiple legislative 
goals can ordinarily be justified under one of at least four arguments: 
that possession of one harm implies a higher degree of another; that 
pursuit of one goal inevitably aids or inhibits pursuit of a second; 
that a single legitimate purpose can be inf erred from the several pur-
poses; or that the classification represents part of a general policy of 
attacking one of the harms. Especially when the personal interest is 
less than fundamental and the benefitted or burdened class is not a 
suspect one, courts should construe these available justifications lib-
erally. But a bare compound mischief rationale is unsatisfactory; it 
is the classic argument that proves too much. It would justify con-
ferring any benefit on any class on the ground that to do so would 
encourage persons to join the class or would reward its members. 
Similarly, imposing any burden would discourage persons from join-
ing or remaining in the class or would penalize its members.312 Such 
reasoning would defeat the purpose of the minimum rationality con-
straint. 
A final cautionary note: satisfying one of the four justifications 
for pursuing multiple goals does not by itself satisfy the equal protec-
tion clause. This section has been exclusively concerned with the 
circumstances in which a state may burden those posing two harms 
without also burdening those posing only one of those harms. If the 
state may burden this "compound mischief' class exclusively, then 
that class should be designated as "M" and treated like any other 
single-purpose class-that is, it must satisfy the minimum rationality 
constraint, and it must fit class T adequately. The present section, in 
other words, simply defines the permissible contours of Min the con-
text of multiple legislative purposes. · 
V. EXCEPTIONS TO MISFIT ANALYSIS 
Misfit analysis cannot be applied to those legislative goals that 
inevitably describe the purpose class M only ambiguously.313 Such 
thus reasonable to pursue the filers. By contrast, there are many feasible (and more efficient) 
alternative means of subsidizing musicians besides tax deductions for purchases of yachts. 
312. See Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), in which the 
Court invalidated a Puerto Rican statute making American citizenship a prerequisite for a civil 
engineer's license. The Court rejected the justification that the law would raise the prevailing 
standard of living, reasoning, "To uphold the statute on the basis of broad economic justifica-
tion of this kind would permit any State to bar the employment of aliens in any lawful occupa-
tions." 426 U.S. at 605-06. 
313. If a goal is "legitimate," then it is unnecessary, rather than impossible, to analyze that 
goal's misfit with respect to a more general goal. Thus, although they are also "exceptions" to 
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goals are arbitrary in that different legislatures might reach different 
yet equally supportable conclusions as to which classification best 
served a given objective. Of course, even nonarbitrary goals may be 
equally well served by a number of different classifications that cre-
ate the same amount of misfit but impose the statutory burden or 
confer the statutory benefit on different persons. But with respect to 
arbitrary goals it is impossible to evaluate the legislature's claim that 
the means chosen furthers the goal as well as or better than any other 
means. For example, any number of different zoning plans "enhance 
the scenic beauty of a community" to significant, though incommen-
surable, degrees. 
Such inevitably arbitrary classifications raise a number of 
problems. What kinds of classifications are "inevitably arbitrary"? 
Can the amount of "misfit" created by such classifications be sensi-
bly measured? Do any considerations prescribe which of several 
equally arbitrary alternatives the state may choose? 
A taxonomy of "inevitably arbitrary" equal protection goals di-
vides them into (1) inherently imprecise goals, e.g., matters of taste, 
and (2) "neutral" goals, which are served as well by classifying one 
group as another, e.g., draft lotteries or budget reductions.314 By 
fleshing out each of these categories, we may determine the appro-
misfit analysis, legitimate goals are exceptions of a very different kind from the goals discussed 
in this Part. 
Misfit analysis is unnecessary for legitimate goals because, by definition, such goals limit 
the size of M. If a goal (say, encouraging farming) is legitimate, then no plaintiff outside M can 
make a cognizable equal protection claim (an oilman cannot complain that the state is not 
encouraging oil production). Suppose, for example, there were a subsidy to small farms (T). 
Large farm members (T*) could complain, if we assume that encouraging small farms is not a 
legitimate goal, while encouraging all farms is. But oilmen (f**) who argued that the "real" 
purpose was to aid the economy could not complain, for "encouraging farming" is legitimate. 
Thus any misfit must occur with respect to classes T and T*. The purpose class, M, simply does 
not extend to T**: 
T T* T** 
"'M I\, M 
M 
(fhe diagram realistically assumes that the law is overinclusive, i.e., that some farmers who 
receive the subsidy do not need encouragement.) 
314. While these two categories are fairly comprehensive, they are by no means mutually 
exclusive. 
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priate equal protection standard for each.315 Such a determination 
is important, for if some constraints are not placed upon these cate-
gories of goals, they would undermine equal protection review.316 
315. The analysis developed in the text departs significantly from Professor Ely's discus-
sion ofnonrational goals, supra note 26, at 1228-49. Ely explored this problem in the context 
of a general analysis of legislative motivation in constitutional law. Essentially he argues that 
a court should not look at motivation when the "disadvantageous distinction model" applies, 
i.e., when the simple fact that the law creates a distinction is enough to trigger the govern-
ment's burden of justification. Id at 1228-30. But where that model is inapplicable-in situa-
tions requiring discretionary, random, or partly random choice (in other words, where the 
choice is nonrational}-j:>roof of unconstitutional motivation would be required. Examples of 
random choice situations are the selection of jurors or draftees and the setting of voting district 
boundary lines. Discretionary choice situations are of two types: 
The first is the situation where the Court is prepared to credit as acceptable, along wit/1 
other relatively precise goals, one goal-such as the promotion of "good taste"-whose 
relation to various choices cannot be evaluated by a calculus of "rationality" and "irra-
tionality." The second is the situation where the Court is unprepared to restrict an area's 
class of acceptable goals to anything more precise than the promotion of the general wel-
fare. 
Id at 1237 (emphasis original). Aesthetic distinctions in a dress code are an example of the 
first situation. Decisions as to which industry to favor under the tax code, and how to vary 
punishment among crimes, exemplify goals that promote the "general welfare." 
The analysis in the main text clearly draws from Ely's categories, but it alters them in 
crucial respects. Ely's "random" choices will be discussed in this Note's category two, his "dis-
cretionary'' "nonrational goal" will be discussed in category one, and his "discretionary" "gen-
eral welfare" choices have been discussed in the section on legitimate goals, Part III.A.I supra. 
More important than differences in categorization is the fact that Ely's only constraint on non-
rational choices is the prohibition against unconstitutional motives. This Note's analysis, by 
contrast, attempts to indicate additional constraints appropriate to each category of nonratio-
nal goals. 
For further criticism of Ely's approach, see Brest, supra note 26, at 135-46. 
316. Another possible category of nonrational goals consists of those goals purporting to 
benefit or burden anyone a given process designates as deserving. We determine whether an 
individual has been "properly" treated not by reference to his actual characteristics, but only 
by reference to the fairness of the process leading to his selection. For example, a discretion-
ary decision to prosecute is fair unless the method of selection is "deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles, 
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). The defendant's characteristics are irrelevant, except for his mem-
bership in the large class of bona fide criminal suspects. Other examples of discretionary 
process goals might be the judge's choice of a criminal sentence within the statutory range, a 
municipality's decision as to the location of a new public facility, and a school board's choice 
of curriculum. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1245. Of course, such choices also may involve 
"aesthetic" goals, thus complicating judicial review. 
Since discretionary-process goals cannot be evaluated in terms of the class which the proc-
ess ultimately burdens, a strict misfit analysis is impossible. On the other hand, principles of 
administrative law do apply, for discretion may only be exercised in pursuit of goals which 
further the general purposes for which discretion was delegated. For instance, prosecutorial 
discretion exercised against farmers, or mothers, or tennis players would presumably be sub-
ject to review; we may assume that the legislature intended that the prosecutor have the flex-
ibility of selective enforcement based on such factors as the seriousness of the offense, public 
concern over a particular type of crime, and the like, but that strengthening the industrial 
sector (at the expense of agriculture) and discouraging births were not understood to be rele-
vant factors. A court's judgment will necessarily be impressionistic and deferential, but at 
least something like a weak "misfit" approach is appropriate. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun 
Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); discussion of it in L. TRIBE, supra note 100, at 286. In short, 
although a discretionary choice can be justified by any of a broad range of goals, it remains 
subject to judicial review when the goals are apparently irrelevant to the general purposes of 
the scheme or when the choice is relevant to none of the goals. 
A curious objection may be raised to this analysis. Since the legislature itself exercises the 
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A. Inherently Imprecise Goals 
The objectives of some classifications are inherently imprecise. 
If retribution is a proper aim of punishment, then the state may "ra-
tionally" prescribe longer sentences for rapists than armed robbers, 
or vice versa.317 This is not because we accept such classifications as 
legitimate or because we know what "immorality" is but cannot 
measure it.318 Rather, our concept of "immorality" is so imprecise 
that we do not even know whether a legislature's classification is 
"correct." 
Because of this imprecision, a legislature may be able to define 
social mischiefs as to which almost any specific regulation would be 
"rational." For example, in McGowan v. Mary!and,319 the Supreme 
Court upheld Sunday closing laws against claims that their numer-
ous exceptions violated equal protection.32o Among the items which 
discretion to choose between acceptable goals, ,:e., goals furthering the general welfare, is not 
any resulting piece oflegislation beyond judicial review? Is not the only question whether the 
process was fair? If the law serves a goal which furthers the general welfare and was not 
prompted by an illicit motive, is it not valid? 
This objection is not frivolous, but it can be answered. First, as a general matter existing 
political institutions are not examples of "pure procedural justice" in which an outcome is 
automatically accepted as fair simply because it is the result of a properly followed procedure. 
See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 86-89, 198 (1971). The equal protection clause would be 
largely gratuitous if we entertained such a conception of our political processes. Second, the 
rationale for accepting limited discretion does not extend to all situations. We allow a prose-
cutor to choose freely among several goals because we think flexibility is a value in itself and 
because his freedom is constrained by the terms and purposes of the statutes. By contrast, the 
constraint of "pursuing the general welfare" is hardly a constraint at all. And the desirability 
of allowing a rule to be flexibly enforced in accordance with one of its purposes has no coun-
terpart in the general legislative process. 
317. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1243-44; Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 586 (1958) 
(nothing in the Constitution "require[s] a State to fix or impose any particular penalty for any 
crime it may define or to impose the same or 'proportionate' sentences for separate and in-
dependent crimes"). 
318. This problem of uncertainty born of ignorance could be discussed as an independen! 
exception to misfit analysis. Sometimes, in other words, misfit analysis is impossible not be-
cause the subject matter lacks precise standards, but because we are ignorant of the dimensions 
of the class actually picked out by those standards (even though those standards are theoreti-
cally clear). For example, the government may surely ban cancer-causing drugs, but in any 
given case it may be unclear whether, or to what degree, a drug is in fact carcinogenic. In a 
word, the problem to be remedied is of uncertain scope. (For a discussion of the distinct 
question whether the remedy chosen will actually be effective in alleviating the evil, see text at 
notes 256-61 supra.) 
Of course, many classifications are in some sense grounded upon ignorance; if a legislature 
knew precisely how to pick out M, it would not create the presumptive classification T. Since 
M will generally have a rough and ambiguous boundary, courts should be tolerant. The legis-
lature can usually be trusted not to shoot in the dark against a culprit whom no one believes is 
there. The problem ofuncertainty born ofignorance is inherent in legislation and seems to be 
of controllable dimensions. 
319. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
320. The equal protection claim was unanimously and su=arily rejected by the Court, 
366 U.S. at 425-28. The more difficult issue was whether Sunday closing laws violated the 
establishment clause of the first amendment, 366 U.S. at 429-53. 
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could be sold despite the general prohibition were tobacco, confec-
tionaries, milk, bread, fruits, gasoline, and newspapers and periodi-
cals. In one county, beaches, bathhouses, dancing saloons, and 
amusement parks could remain open and sell their usual merchan-
dise. In the Court's words, 
a legislature could reasonably find that the Sunday sale of the ex-
empted commodities was necessary . . . for the enhancement of the 
recreational atmosphere of the day-that a family which takes a Sun-
day ride into the country will need gasoline for the automobile and 
may find pleasant a soft drink or fresh fruit; that those who go to the 
beach may wish ice cream or some other item normally sold there; that 
some people will prefer alcoholic beverages or games of chance to add 
to their relaxation ... _321 
If "enhancing the recreational atmosphere of the day" is the goal, a 
judgment as to rationality is no judgment at all. 322 Prohibiting rather 
than allowing the sale of gasoline would also serve that goal by al-
lowing gas station attendants a day off and encouraging families to 
stay home and engage in more private forms of recreation. Simi-
larly, many of the items plaintiffs were actually convicted for sell-
ing-a loose-leaf binder, a stapler, and a toy submarine-could 
rationally have been exempted. 
The inherently imprecise category of arbitrary goals is difficult to 
constrain. Courts might refuse to accept such goals as justifications 
for statutory classifications. But surely a court cannot simply dis-
miss all goals involving judgments of aesthetics,323 morality,324 
"good taste,"325 and so forth, because it cannot determine whether 
they have been rationally served. A later section326 will discuss one 
plausible constraint, namely, that infringement of significant per-
sonal interests must be justified by correspondingly significant state 
interests. Thus, a zoning law seriously restricting the associational 
rights of college students327 might demand a more persuasive justifi-
cation than that aggregations of young people are offensive, even 
321. 366 U.S. at 426. 
322. The Court does purport to use the rationality standard in stating, after the quoted 
paragraph, that the "record is barren of any indication that this apparently reasonable basis 
does not exist .... " 366 U.S. at 426. But one cannot take this argument seriously; the 
record is "barren" because recreational preferences are not subject to proof. How could plain-
tiffs demonstrate that families taking a Sunday drive do not find soft drinks and fresh fruit 
"pleasant"? 
323. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
324. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). As the dissent notes, the majority 
opinion barely discusses the "rationality" of the classification in promoting family life. 
325. See Ely, supra note 26, at 1239-40, 1242-45; cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) 
(upholding regulation of policeman's hair length and style, since similarity in appearance of 
police officers is desirable to facilitate public recognition or to inculcate esprit de corps within 
the police force). 
326. Part VI infra. 
327. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). 
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though the justification cannot by its own terms be refuted. Stu-
dents could not prove themselves less "offensive" than groups which 
are allowed to live together. 
A second method of constraining this category of goals is to find 
the goal impermissible. While this method will usually be unavaila-
ble, in a significant number of cases the goal might be impermissible 
in the sense that it must be rejected by the courts as a justification. 
Inculcating anti-homosexuality or enforcing a grooming standard for 
employees328 are examples of arbitrary goals within the inherently 
imprecise category that might be illegitimate. 
These two constraints apply to all goals, of course, but they apply 
with special force to inherently imprecise ones. Because this category 
of goals is difficult to evaluate under a rationality standard, the 
significance and permissibility of the goal should be meticulously 
scrutinized. Impermissible purposes are too easily redefined in 
more appealing, but imprecise, terms. Enforcing uniformity in hair 
length becomes encouraging esprit de corps.329 Thwarting young 
people's privacy right of access to contraceptives becomes expressing 
state disapproval of sexual promiscuity by the young. 330 To be sure, 
the state cannot be forbidden from pursuing certain goals simply l;>e-
cause they are imprecise; such reasoning might necessitate the invali-
dation of most of our criminal laws and many of our zoning 
ordinances. Nevertheless, courts should be sensitive in reviewing 
these goals to ensure that their imprecision does not conceal their 
unfairness. 
B. Neutral Goals 
The second category of arbitrary goals consists of those goals 
whose purpose is achieved by burdening or benefitting a limited 
class of persons indistinguishable from a larger331 class. Burdening 
one person within the broad class serves the goal as well as burden-
ing another. Because it is a matter of indifference which individuals 
are burdened, goals in this category are "neutral." Draft lotteries 
and jury selection procedures fall within this category, since the im-
plicit purpose is to draft a certain number of able-bodied men or to 
impanel a certain number of adult, unbiased jurors. Bona fide so-
cial experiments are also within this category, for their purpose is to 
328. But see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
329. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976). 
330. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), where the Court refused to 
uphold such an interest. 
33 l. A goal is within this category even if the class ultimately burdened is drawn from a 
subclass of humanity, so long as it is a matter of indifference which members of the subclass 
are chosen. A draft lottery is still random even though women, children, and the aged are 
excluded from the "venire." 
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burden or benefit an experimental group identical in all relevant332 
respects to a control group. Less obviously within this category are 
purposes such as reducing total administrative or program costs; ex-
cluding one person from the program presumably reduces its cost as 
much as excluding another. 333 
When the state invokes a neutral goal, the demand for rationality 
is often inapposite. But the opinion in Reed v. Reed334 suggests that 
the Supreme Court has not always recognized this. The statute in 
Reed established a preference for men rather than women in ad-
ministering an estate when competing claimants were otherwise 
equally qualified. Although the Court conceded that "the objective 
of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class 
of contestants is not without legitimacy," it reasoned that "[t]o give a 
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the 
other . . . is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice 
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."335 The Court failed to 
realize that if this purpose is legitimate, it demands an arbitrary 
choice; the point of the scheme is to avoid the expense and time of 
making rational distinctions between claimants.336 The result in 
Reed is surely correct but requires a more sophisticated analysis 
than the argument that neutral goals are invalid because they are 
arbitrary. 
Neutral goals present two important questions. First, when may 
the state pursue neutral goals? That is, when may it simply exclude 
some admittedly similarly situated persons from a benefit, rather 
than either proportionally diminish the benefit for all members of 
the class or seek rational distinctions among class members? Sec-
ond, assuming the state may pursue a neutral goal, what criterion 
may be used to limit the class of persons which the law will burden 
332. That is, the groups are identical with respect to those factors (other than the experi-
mental variable) which might affect the experimental result. I am assuming that the experi-
ment itself artificially imposes a variable condition. If it merely examines the behavior of two 
groups, only one of which "naturally" (i.e., without government intervention) possesses this 
condition, then the "experiment" is merely a social study and creates no special equal protec-
tion problems. 
333. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (dictum) (a state cannot reduce 
expenditures for education by banning indigents from attending school). In some circum-
stances, however, it would be permissible to exclude only the more expensive recipients. See 
text at notes 223-24 supra, discussing application cost. 
334. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
335. 404 U.S. at 76. 
336. The Court also discussed as a purpose the goal of avoiding intrafamily controversy, 
but it denied that the choice could "lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex." 404 U.S. 
at 77. But again, since that value is served only by avoiding a factual examination of the 
competence of spouses competing t(! be administrators, only an arbitrary choice furthers the 
goal. Thus, the mere fact that the classification was arbitrary cannot invalidate it; either the 
goal is never permissible, or there is something obnoxious about this kind of arbitrary choice 
(i.e., one based upon gender). The latter rationale is probably the more accurate, since the 
scheme would not be unconstitutional if the final candidates simply flipped a coin. 
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or benefit? More concretely, the first question asks when, for exam-
ple, government benefits may be eliminated for half the recipients 
instead of either being diminished by half for all the recipients337 or 
"rationally" allocated to the more deserving half of recipients. The 
second issue is whether a random method must be used to reduce the 
class. These two problems will be discussed in turn. 
The question whether the state can pursue a neutral goal can be 
answered only after considering the applicability of the minimum 
rationality constraint to this class of goals. Classifications furthering 
neutral goals neither satisfy nor fail to satisfy the constraint,338 for 
they extend a benefit to persons who deserve it no more and no less 
than persons not receiving it (since the two classes are, by hypothesis, 
similarly situated). This characteristic of neutral goals might seem 
to suggest that they should be evaluated like any classification that 
barely satisfies the minimum rationality constraint- i.e., as the fol-
lowing section of this Note outlines, a court would evaluate the fair-
ness of the law in terms of the closeness of fit and the comparative 
significance of state and personal interests, and it would investigate 
reasonable alternatives. But if this suggestion were correct, the state 
could seldom justify a neutral goal. Since the "closeness of fit" for 
neutral goals is always minimal, the state would suffer a built-in dis-
advantage in any equal protection balance and would always lose 
whenever the personal interest was significant or alternatives were 
available. 
The better approach is to recognize that neutral goals often pres-
ent a new kind of state interest, a special interest that can only be 
achieved by pursuing a goal "neutrally" rather than "rationally". 
This interest should be weighed along with the state's traditional, 
underlying interest in alleviating the harm. The extra weight may 
compensate for the loss of closeness of fit on the state's side of the 
equal protection balance. 
Bona fide social experiments339 are the best example of a special 
337. Of course, the example is oversimplified. Because of administrative overhead, 
neither excluding half the recipients nor reducing all benefit levels by one half would reduce 
costs by exactly half. 
338. In terms of the model presented in text preceding note 189 supra, the dividing line 
between M and 'vM has a slope of zero, and the law is neither "rational" nor "irrational". 
339. This is not to say that anything a legislature denominates a social experiment is one, 
nor that bona fide experiments are entirely immune from equal protection review. For reasons 
already noted, the broad view of experiments-that the state may always attack "part of a 
harm"-is unacceptable. However, bona fide social experiments can be appropriately defined 
without extending the "experimentation" rationale to every case of underinclusion. If an ex-
periment is bona fide, then the state's independent interest in gaining knowledge can properly 
be weighed in the equal protection balance. 
Even minimal requirements to ensure the legitimacy of social experiments should keep 
most underinclusive classifications exposed to judicial review. Such requirements might in-
clude a reasonable time limit; clearly designated control and experimental groups; a significant 
potential not simply of deriving knowledge for its own sake, but also of applying the experi-
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state interest in pursuing a goal neutrally. Although one purpose of 
mental treatment to all within the relevant class; and, perhaps most important, a limitation on 
the differences in treatment between the control and experimental groups. In some areas, 
especially criminal justice, we might even require that the experimental treatment not, in the 
broadest sense, be "worse" than the treatment of the control group. See Morris, lmpedime11/s 
lo Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. Rev. 627, 647-48 (1966) (suggesting a "less severity" principle 
as an ethical safeguard on experiments in the criminal justice field). The courts may justifia-
bly acknowledge that the burden of a harsher experimental treatment is usually a greater per-
sonal deprivation than the burden of excluding many persons from an experimental benefit. 
See note 288 supra.· 
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974), 
appears to be the only case examining whether a social experiment violates the equal protec-
tion clause. The case involved a New York work-relief plan which imposed on welfare recipi-
ents in selected counties certain conditions inconsistent with applicable federal standards. (The 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare approved the plan by waiving normal stand-
ards.) The court found that the differential treatment did not violate equal protection. 
Whatever the propriety of the result, the court's reasoning is disappointing. Chief Judge 
Friendly stated that determining how to impose the welfare system is as "legitimate" as any 
purpose can be and that social and economic experimentation is an acceptable means to that 
end. Citing a Brandeis dissent to the effect that due process should not prevent state experi-
mentation, he concluded that, by analogy, equal protection should not prevent experimenta-
tion by a state on less than a statewide basis. 473 F.2d at 1109. This analogy, of course, is 
imperfect, for to say that a policy can be imposed across a state is not to say that partial 
imposition comports with equal protection. Capron, Social Experimentation and the Law, in 
ETHICAL AND LEGAL Issues OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 127, 156-57 (A. Rivlin & P. 
Timpane eds. 1975). 
The court continued by rejecting Justice Jackson's argument against underinclusion (see 
note 276 supra) as 
inapposite to the selection, on a random but rational basis, of certain areas of the state to 
try out a program for the very purpose of determining whether it, or some variation of it 
should be made applicable to all. The Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a 
vise where its only choices in dealing with the problems of welfare are to do nothing or 
plunge into statewide action. 
473 F.2d at 1109-10. What is curious about the court's reasoning is that it sounds as if it were 
discussing and legitimizing any case ofunderinclusion. The very special nature of the instant 
government action-to wit, a carefully controlled bona fide social experiment-is only hinted 
at ("random but rational") by the court. Thus, the opinion offers no guidelines as to the 
permissible limits of social experiments. 
Social experiments should be subject to firm constraints. But forbidding less constrained 
forms of experimentation will not put the legislature to the uncomfortable "all-or-nothing" 
choice between an imperfect present and an uncertain future, see lJevelopmenls, supra note 1, 
at 1084-86. Governments can and do draw upon a vital source of "experimental" data other 
than their own projects-namely, the experience of other governments: "It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Of course, as Justice Brandeis' opinion assumes, interstate differences cannot be challenged 
under the equal protection clause (unless those differences are dictated by a federal program). 
Similarly, local governments (to whom the state has delegated legislative powers) may differ in 
their treatment of their own citizens; it is only intrastate variations imposed by a single sover-
eign, the state, that must be justified. The Supreme Court, however, seems not to have clearly 
understood the proposition that one sovereignty may treat its citizens differently from another 
sovereignty but must justify differential treatment of its own citizens. See Salsburg v. Mary-
land, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), and Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879), each of which upholds 
without serious examination intrastate variations imposed not by local sovereignties, but by 
the state. 
The Court in Salsburg argued that equal protection demands equality between persons, not 
places, 346 U.S. at 551-a claim which fails to address the question whether a given discrimi-
nation between persons in different places is justifiable. More sophisticated is the argument 
that since the state could grant each county home rule under which local option might create 
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an experiment is the usual state interest in attacking a social harm, 
another substantive purpose is to study the extent of social problems 
and the efficacy of various solutions. That study is impossible if all 
who pose the harm, or those who pose it most acutely, must be simi-
larly burdened, for most experiments need a similarly situated con-
trol group. Of course, not every bona fide social experiment satisfies 
the equal protection guarantee. For example, a court might not al-
low an experiment which forbad a randomly chosen group to con-
sume alcohol, even though a general prohibition is permissible; the 
experiment's possible informational benefits pale in comparison with 
the unfairness of imposing this significant burden on only a few 
drinkers. Insofar as the state is simply pursuing its traditional inter-
est, ie., attempting to reduce the evils of drinking, it should do so 
either "rationally," by penalizing the most problematic drinkers 
(e.g., drunk drivers), or "proportionally," by burdening all drinkers 
similarly. 
There are examples other than experiments of an independent 
state interest in pursuing a goal neutrally. Consider a draft lottery 
or a jury selection procedure. Like social experiments, these classifi-
cations may evidence a substantive purpose other than numerically 
diminishing a larger class-namely, placing a cross section of the 
community in the jury box or on the battlefield. Although "ra-
tional" distinctions would be possible-the draft could be limited 
(more than it has been) to the physically fittest, and the jury to the 
brightest and most conscientious-such distinctions would less effec-
tively promote citizenship than the neutral, cross-sectional scheme. 
Here, as in the case of experiments, the independent interest deserves 
special weight in the equal protection balance, since it is an interest 
which the alternative of rational classification will not further.340 
variation, the state can impose variant conditions directly. 346 U.S. at 552. Even this argu-
ment is troublesome without some showing of rational differences between the counties, as 
would be the analogous argument for different federal regulations for different states. 
340. Note, however, that the independent state interests in draft and jury classifications 
sometimes can be served by a proportional diminution of the benefit or burden. Although the 
"cross-sectional" interest is not furthered by rational classification, it is served by a propor-
tional diminution; if more persons enter military service or jury duty for a shorter time, the 
inculcation of citizenship values might be even more effective. Social experiments, by con-
trast, demand not simply a nonrational classification, but also a nonproportional approach, 
since in either case there can be no control group. 
The question naturally arises in this kind of case whether the state must burden proportion-
ally when it can do so without sacrificing an independent state interest. There is no simple 
answer. Since proportional diminution is fairer than random or semi-random exclusion, it 
will often be a reasonable, less-restrictive alternative, especially since its use does not compro-
mise the independent state interest. Of course, proportional diminution might entail consider-
ably more administrative expense-compare the costs of training 100,000 soldiers for two 
years of duty with the costs of training 200,000 for one year. Whether proportional diminu-
tion is required will thus depend on the details of the equal protection balance in any given 
case. 
A comparable problem arises with respect to neutral goals that do not serve an independ-
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However, not all neutral goals serve special interests of this sort. 
Attempts to reduce a program's costs and decisions that only part of 
a harm is worth alleviating, for instance, both reflect neutral goals. 
If it costs about as much to benefit or burden one individual as an-
other, 341 and if the program's budget must be cut by a certain per-
centage, then the state might simply exclude that percentage of the 
class from the program. But there is no independent state interest in 
excluding rather than rationally classifying here. Although it might 
well be cheaper to exclude beneficiaries randomly than to search for 
and apply a "rational" criterion (recall the procedure at issue in 
Reed), cost savings are not the kind of independent state interest 
previously described. Rather, they are already an element of the 
minimum rationality constraint and equal protection balance and 
will thus be considered by a court in any event. 
Classifications with neutral goals which do not further independ-
ent substantive state interests are especially vulnerable to equal pro-
tection criticism. If the classification imposes a discrete burden that 
cannot be proportionally expanded or diminished, the state will 
nonetheless have to show that a rational distribution of the burden 
or benefit would be difficult or costly, especially if the personal inter-
est is of any significance, or if the classifying trait is stigmatizing. In 
Reed, for example, the benefit of being appointed an administrator 
is "discrete" -only one person can effectively hold the position-yet 
the classification is invalid because the possible cost saved by auto-
matically preferring men does not justify stigmatizing women and 
imposing a financial burden on the losing claimant. By contrast, a 
court would rarely overturn a city's decision as to where to begin 
installing a sewer line (a discrete benefit, since the city cannot begin 
everywhere), for the decision probably stigmatizes no one and bur-
dens no significant personal interest. 
ent state interest and whose burdens or benefits can be proportionally diminished. See discus-
sion in text at notes 342-44 infra. 
341. If individual A costs more to benefit than does individual B, but A also has higher 
needs, is it more "rational" to exclude A from the program or to exclude Bl In theory, the 
answer would seem to depend on the cost-efficiency of benefitting each. Thus, if A has S 
"units" of need and costs $10 to benefit, while B has 3 "units" of need and costs $9 to benefit, 
the state should exclude B, despite his lower total cost (unless of course there is only $9 left to 
spend in the entire program). However, there are obvious practical and theoretical problems 
with this approach. A meaningful utilitarian calculus is often impossible because of the diffi-
culties of measurement; a ''unit" of need is only a social scientist's dream. Even the concept of 
need is disturbingly slippery. For example, if the state has $100 to spend, it might prefer 
benefitting 11 Bs to benefitting 10As, even though fewer ''units" of need were alleviated (only 
33 units, rather than SO), on the ground that it is more important to benefit more people than to 
alleviate a greater "amount" of need. 
If the benefits can be proportionally diminished, these complexities are multiplied, for one 
naturally asks, Proportional to what? To cost, or to need? If to need, how is need defined? 
For an interesting example of these problems, see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. S3S (1972), 
discussed in text at notes 196-99 supra. 
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If the classification does not further an independent state interest, 
but its benefit is such that it can be proportionally expanded or di-
minished, 342 then equal protection demands that it be conferred 
upon all persons whom the legislature has determined deserve it. 
Arbitrary exclusion, even by lot, is impermissible.343 By the state's 
own admission, these persons are similarly situated with respect to 
desert and must therefore be treated similarly.344 
To summarize, some persons may be excluded from a burden or 
benefit even though those included are similarly situated, provided 
that the "neutral" classification furthers a substantive purpose ( other 
than the mere numerical diminution of a larger class) which would 
not be served by rationally excluding some members of the class. If 
no such purpose exists, then the classification will be vulnerable to 
the criticism that a rational criterion of exclusion should have been 
342. The proportional-diminution problem is more general than first appears, for it also 
arises whenever a program is instituted or expanded. That is, funds for programs are often 
separately authorized and appropriated, and thus can either be insufficient or more than origi-
nally planned, necessitating a proportional diminution or expansion. (The term "diminution" 
has been used for the sake of simplicity.) Moreover, con.ceptually identical "diminution" 
problems occur when, instead of entirely extinguishing the burden or benefit for part of a class 
(i.e., "excluding" them), the state merely diminishes the burden or benefit for that part. See 
discussion of Jefferson v. Hackney in text at notes 196-99 supra. 
343. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971) (dictum) ("a State's interest in 
preserving the fiscal integrity of its welfare system by economically allocating limited AFDC 
resources may not be protected by the device of adopting eligibility requirements restricting 
the class of children made eligible by federal standards. That interest may be protected by the 
State's 'undisputed power to set the level of benefits. . . .' ") ( citation omitted). 
See also dictum in Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 493 
(1977), implying that if "rational" exclusion were not possible, random exclusion might raise 
an equal protection concern. The issue was whether workers whose unemployment was 
caused by labor disputes other than lockouts could be denied unemployment compensation 
benefits. 
It is clear that protection of the fiscal integrity of the fund is a legitimate concern of the 
State. We need not consider whether it would be "rational" for the State to protect the 
fund through a random means, such as elimination from coverage of all persons with an 
odd number of letters in their surnames. Here, the limitation of liability tracks the rea-
sons found rational above [namely, increasing employer contributions only when he locks 
employees out, and allowing pressure on the employer to settle only in that situation], and 
the need for such limitations unquestionably provides the legitimate state interest re-
quired by the equal protection equation. 
344. If the "random exclusion" approach were fully accepted, it would simply resurrect the 
"part of a harm" rationale for misfit criticized earlier and would violate the minimum rational-
ity constraint. True, the problem as now stated is slightly different, since here a budgetary 
constraint is explicit, and the exclusion method is random. But the situation is not signifi-
cantly different from that in which a legislature simply does not "choose" to attack all of a 
harm and uses a fairly neutral trait to limit the burdened class. 
In a sense, of course, limiting the class rather than diminishing the burden does comport 
with the principle of equal treatment for the similarly situated, for when the class is limited by 
lot, all are "treated equally" with respect to their chance to win the lottery. See Breit & 
Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Altitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 HAR.v. L. 
REv. 693, 707-08 (1973). But by similar reasoning, any law might be upheld as fair on the 
ground that all groups have a chance to win in the legislative halls. The proper approach is to 
define the fairness of treatment "rationally," that is, in terms of desert of the benefit or burden. 
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used. In addition, if the burden or benefit is not discrete, it must be 
proportionally diminished. 
Assuming that a neutral goal can be pursued and that the burden 
or benefit is discrete, we confront our second problem: what criterion 
may be used to limit the class of persons? Since the purpose in neu-
tral goal cases is served by benefitting or burdening a limited class of 
persons indistinguishable from a larger class, a random selection 
process is the most acceptable method. The most straightforward 
random selection method would be a lottery that selected in a single 
drawing recipients of the particular burden or benefit. 
A "natural" lottery might also be used which allocated burdens 
and benefits according to some adventitious characteristic randomly 
distributed across the entire population345-perhaps hair color or 
month ofbirth.346 A natural lottery is troublesome, however, for the 
public might improperly associate any personal trait, even a ran-
domly distributed one, with desert of the burden or benefit, and the 
''winners" of the lottery might be stigmatized because of their selec-
tion. Even if the trait did not promote a suspicion that the legisla-
ture intended to stigmatize an unrepresented minority, a natural 
lottery might have this undesirable e.ffect,347 especially were the trait 
objectively observable and socially significant.348 
Although ideally a "pure" lottery should be imposed on all neu-
tral legislative classifications involving discrete burdens or benefits, 
the cost would often be prohibitive. A rough balancing approach 
should be applied-departures from the ideal become more justifia-
ble as the burden or benefit becomes less significant-but the courts 
should be alert to stigmatizing effects, particularly where the depri-
vations imposed are great. Thus, filling the draft rolls with redheads 
should not be allowed. On the other hand, a court would sensibly 
ignore a complaint by a person with a high ZIP code number that 
the Postal Service first sorts letters with low ZIP code numbers in-
stead of sorting by lot. 
345. Sandalow, supra note 7, at 669 n.49. 
346. It is difficult to find a natural characteristic that is distributed across the population 
entirely randomly. Many natural traits, such as hair or eye color, height, and race, are influ-
enced, if not determined, by characteristics of the biological parents. Others, such as left-
handedness or date of birth, are controllable to some extent, at least in the long term, and 
could therefore only be used on a short-term basis. 
347. The danger oflegislative oppression of minorities is a significant reason for preferring 
a "non-natural" lottery, but stigma is an independent reason. Arguably an actual random 
selection of one of a large number of "natural" adventitious characteristics-"redheads," 
''women," "crooked noses," "ear-wigglers," and so forth-should still be considered suspect, 
especially when the burden or benefit to be conferred is significant. See text following note 
348 i'!fra. 
348. The trait is likely to have social significance when it is employed in a number of 
different classifications, for it then poses the risk of imposing cumulative disabilities. See San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973). 




Although only a few justices describe their analysis in such 
terms,349 the Supreme Court does "balance" in equal protection 
cases. For example, the Court balances at the margin where funda-
mental interests are only indirectly burdened,350 in analyzing ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine cases, and when it selects one of the 
three different tests employed in different equal protection cases. 
However,. this section neither demonstrates that the Court balances, 
nor justifies the basic propriety of doing so. Rather, it explores the 
relationship of misfit analysis to equal protection balancing and 
identifies some problems that a balancing test must address. 
As described by the commentators, the structure of a balancing 
test is basically the same whether the balance involves equal protec-
tion, substantive due process, or the first amendment.351 Tradition-
ally, four elements are balanced, two on the individual's side and 
two on the government's. On the individual's side are the personal 
interest (I) that is burdened by the regulation and the extent to which 
that interest is burdened (B); on the state's side are the governmental 
interest served by the regulation (G) and the extent to which that 
interest is served, ie., the means-end "fit" (F).352 Thus, a regulation 
fails the balancing test if the individual's interest, represented by I X 
349. See the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall discussed in note 66 supra; the concur-
ring opinion of Justice White in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,456 (1973); the concurrence of 
Justice Douglas to Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. I, 70 (1973); and the concurrence of Justice Brennan to Justice Marshall's 
dissent in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970). It is unclear from his mystical 
declaration that "[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause" whether Justice Stevens sub-
scribes to a flexible balancing approach. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976). And see 
429 U.S. at 210 n.l, where Justice Powell concedes that "[t]here are valid reasons for dissatis-
faction with the 'two-tier' approach." 
350. See text at notes 79-80 supra. 
351. See, e.g., P. BREST, supra note 116, at 988-90; Perry, supra note 68, at 388; Simson, 
supra note 5, at 678-81; Note, supra note 218, at 466-68. 
352. In terms of the traditional model, "fit" is generally considered to be represented by 
either the ratio C/(C+D) or the ratio (B+C)/(A+B+C+D). Equal protection "fit," by con-
trast, is indicated by the ratio A/C: B/D. 
T 
'vM A B 
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B, "outweighs" the governmental, represented by G X F, that is, if 
Ix B>G x F. Focussing on fit, F, we see that misfit is more tolerable 
(F can be less) the greater the governmental interest, G, and the 
lesser the individual interest, I, or the extent to which it is burdened, 
B.3s3 
Despite the surface plausibility of this model, it obscures several 
important elements of equal protection balancing. These elements 
may be isolated by examining the three tests the Court currently em-
ploys. In reviewing a classification, the Court asks whether it is 
(1) Rationally related to a legitimate state interest; 
(2) Substantially related to the achievement of important governmen-
tal objectives; or 
(3) Necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 
The third test applies to fundamental interests and suspect catego-
ries;354 the second to gender-based classifications355 (and perhaps to 
laws based on illegitimacy);356 the first, purportedly, to all other clas-
sifications. 357 
These three tests diverge from the simplified balancing model in 
several ways. To be sure, the progression from the first test to the 
third parallels the model in requiring closer fit and a greater govern-
ment interest as the personal interest becomes more fundamental. 
But the three levels of review differ in more than the closeness of the 
fit they demand. The first test asks for rationality, that is, at least a 
minimal relevant difference between those who are and are not bur-
dened by the law. The second test asks for "substantiality," which 
presumably includes rationality. But what must be substantial-the 
differential in harm between those who are and are not burdened, or 
the "accuracy" of the classification in selecting all and only those 
who are harmful? If the former, then substantiality is an equal pro-
tection standard; if the latter, then substantiality is essentially a sub-
stantive due process standard. These standards are of course quite 
different. The state interest is not "substantially served" in the due 
353. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 988. 
354. See .Developments, supra note I, at 1087-104. 
355. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
356. The intermediate test has not been explicitly applied to classifications based on illegit-
imacy. However, the Supreme Court has stressed that such classifications, while not judged 
under the strict scrutiny standard, are not judged under a "toothless" standard, Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976). A classification based on illegitimacy is examined to see 
whether it broadly discriminates between legitimates and illegitimates or is instead carefully 
tuned to alternative considerations. 427 U.S. at 513. Where "[t]he reach of the statute ex-
tends well beyond the asserted purposes,'' the statute may be invalidated. Trimble v. Gordon, 
430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977). 
351. See .Developments, supra note I, at 1077-87. 
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process sense if a law allows girls but not boys to buy beer when very 
few boys are drunk drivers. On the other hand, the interest is not 
"substantially" served in the equal protection sense if, although quite 
a few boys are drunk drivers, a similar proportion of girls are also 
drunk drivers. In short, the balancing model (and the test applied in 
Craig) is ambiguous as to the kind of fit that must be "close." 
A second problem with the model is suggested by the third stan-
dard of review (that where fundamental interests are involved, the 
means must be "necessary" to the end). "Necessity" denotes an ab-
sence of alternatives; it does not imply closeness of :fit.358 As we will 
see, there may be no alternatives to a loosely fitting law. Yet the 
"strict scrutiny" test simply assumes that "necessity" implies greater 
precision, and the traditional balancing model simply ignores the 
availability of alternatives.359 
With these two360 criticisms of the model in mind, we can more 
carefully analyze the relevance of "balancing" to the fairness of a 
law.361 The next two sections discuss separately equal protection 
and substantive due process balancing. A separate discussion is cru-
cial, for both the traditional balancing model ( comparing I and B to 
G and F) and the tripartite equal protection standard applied by the 
courts are misleadingly phrased and conceal the distinct functions of 
equal protection and substantive due process analysis. 
B. Equal Protection Balancing 
The first requirement of equal protection is that the minimum 
rationality constraint be satisfied.362 A law which satisfies this test 
should be subject to a second "balancing" test. This balancing proc-
ess assesses the relative importance of the various elements of the 
358. See P. BREST, supra note 116, at 990-93. 
359. The distinction between closeness of fit and availability of alternatives is obscured in 
the formulation given by Simson, supra note 5, at 679-80, in which he characterizes the means-
end fit as "necessary, significant, insignificant, or non-existent." Since a "necessary" relation 
may nevertheless create a considerable misfit, Simson's test might too easily validate overinclu-
sive or underinclusive laws. 
360. A third problem with the model is its potentially misleading treatment of the interplay 
between the factors on either side of the balance. The model is usually understood to mean 
that even a "perfectly rational" law may be invalid if the government interest is insubstantial 
in comparison with the significance of the personal interest (and the extent to which that inter-
est is burdened). Analogously, a law may be valid even though the personal interest is "com-
pletely" burdened, that is, extinguished, if that interest is insubstantial in comparison with the 
government interest (and the- extent to which it is achieved). See Part VI.B.3 infra. 
361. The first amendment overbreadth test, interestingly enough, is quite similar to the 
equal protection and due process balancing tests. A law may be invalidated for first amend-
ment overbreadth because the means-end "fit" is inadequate, because there are less restrictive 
alternatives despite close "fit," or because (whatever the alternative means) the state interest is 
insufficient to justify the restriction upon speech. Israel, E!fbrandt v. Russell· The .Demise of the 
Oath?, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 193, 217-18; see w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 819-22 (4th ed. 1975). 
362. See Part IV.A supra. 
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minimum rationality constraint. Three inquiries are relevant in this 
process. How different must the burdened and the unburdened be 
in the extent to which they pose the harm? When must the state 
seek less restrictive "reasonable" alternatives? When is perfect fit 
itself not enough? After a preliminary comment, these three ques-
tions will be examined in tum. 
Critics of equal protection balancing might argue that the mini-
mum rationality constraint, supplemented by substantive due proc-
ess balancing, guarantees all the "fairness" the equal protection 
clause demands. 363 This argument has some force, for a stronger 
interpretation of substantive due process does mitigate the need for 
an equal protection scrutiny beyond "minimum rationality," and the 
Supreme Court's reluctance to invoke substantive due process after 
the Lochner debacle has certainly spurred the development of equal 
protection "strict scrutiny."364 
This argument is ultimately unconvincing, however. A classifi-
cation may satisfy both the minimum rationality constraint and sub-
stantive due process and yet on balance be unfair, as where a large 
difference in treatment turns upon a trivial difference in social harm. 
For example, had the statistics in Craig indicated that 1.9% of girls 
drove drunk as compared to 2.0% of boys, the Court could have in-
validated the law despite its "rationality" and despite its satisfaction 
of substantive due process (the interest in purchasing beer is hardly 
fundamental).365 What is fair on balance depends, as we will see, 
upon the extent of the differential in harm and the availability of 
alternatives in light of the competing state and personal interests. 
1. The Extent of the .D!lferentia! in Harm 
A court's first task in equal protection balancing is to assess the 
extent of the differential in harm according to the significance of the 
personal and governmental interests, the severity of the burden, and 
the extent to which the government interest is served. The absolute 
amounts of overinclusion and underinclusion should not affect this 
balance ( except insofar as they reflect the degree of differential 
harm). Of course, a case of perfect fit describes the greatest possible 
differential in harm, and in this sense equal protection balancing fa-
vors an absolute reduction in misfit. But the balance may validate a 
lesser differential in harm, and then it is unsatisfactory simply to 
363. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 226-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Although 
Justice Rehnquist does not explicitly endorse a substantive due process approach, he concedes 
that the irrebuttable presumption/due process question "call[s] for a balance of the State's 
interest against the harm resulting from any overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness." 429 
U.S. at 226. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's approach is similar to the argument presented in the 
text. 
364. See .Developments, supra note I, at I 131-32. 
365. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 227 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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point to the absolute amounts of misfit to demonstrate the "irration-
ality" (or insufficient rationality) of a law. 
Turner v. Fouche366 illustrates the distinction between the abso-
lute amount of misfit and the differential in harm. The Supreme 
Court in Turner held that a statute limiting county school board 
membership to property owners failed even the weakest equal pro-
tection test. 
It cannot be seriously urged that a citizen in all other respects quali-
fied to sit on a school board must also own real property if he is to 
participate responsibly in educational decisions, without regard to 
whether he is a parent with children in the local schools, a lessee who 
effectively pays the property taxes of his lessor as part of his rent, or a 
state and federal taxpayer contributing to the . . . annual school 
budget.367 
This argument only points to the underinclusiveness of the classifica-
tion. It does not demonstrate that there is no greater likelihood that 
property owners, as a class, will participate responsibly in educa-
tional decisions than nonproperty owners. In the portion of the 
opinion concerning the state's interest in ensuring that board mem-
bers have an "attachment to the community and its educational val-
ues," the Court more usefully describes its reasoning: 
However reasonable the assumption that those who own realty do 
possess such an attachment, Georgia may not rationally presume that 
that quality is necessarily wanting in all citizens of the county whose 
estates are less than freehold. Whatever objectives Georgia seeks to 
obtain by its "freeholder'' requirement must be secured, in this in-
stance at least, by means more finely tailored to achieve the desired 
goal.368 
Here the Court concedes a possible differential in "harm" and thus 
must be implicitly balancing what it perceives to be a small differen-
tial against the interest of nonfreeholders in school board member-
ship. 
Determining how great the differential must be between the bur-
dened and the unburdened requires that the personal interest and 
the extent to which it is burdened be balanced against the govern-
ment interest and the extent to which it is served. But this balance 
should occur only at the margin:369 the question is not whether the 
personal interest at issue is in the abstract more important than the 
state interest, but whether a particular law's infringement of personal 
liberty outweighs its utility in serving its social end. Measuring the 
actual infringement is conceptually simple-a court merely asks how 
many persons have been burdened and what interests are to what 
366. 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
367. 396 U.S. at 363-64. 
368. 396 U.S. at 364 (footnotes omitted). 
369. See Note, supra note 218, at 467-68. 
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extent impaired. Evaluating how well the classification serves the 
social end is more complicated. Of course, the social end is not to 
eradicate the social harm, since a law usually diminishes only part of 
a harm. In Craig, for example, the government's side of the balance 
cannot contain the undifferentiated interest in eliminating drunk 
driving by eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. The interest relates only 
to eighteen- to twenty-year-old males and reducing their drunk driv-
ing, since the regulation will not be fully effective. The Court 
should weigh only that portion of the harm which the law actually 
alleviates.370 However wise it may be to presume that a law usually 
achieves what it purports to,371 evidence that the burden is ineffica-
cious should be weighed in the equal protection balance.372 Thus, 
the Court in Craig was properly influenced by· the fact that boys 
could easily obtain beer despite the regulation. 
Unfortunately, scholarly discussion of the extent to which means 
serve ends has often missed the distinction between absolute amount 
of misfit and differential harm. Professor Gunther, for example, has 
spoken generally about the need to scrutinize the means-end fit in 
equal protection cases, and he seems to assume that simply adding 
the absolute amounts of overinclusion and underinclusion tells us 
whether the fit is justifiable.373 But the issue should not be whether, 
370. One benefit of this analysis is that it makes narrowly contrived purposes self-defeat-
ing. A narrow purpose reduces misfit only at the expense of narrowing the state interest in 
imposing the burden. Conversely, a more general purpose has a greater social value but re-
sults in a greater degree of misfit. A natural equilibrium is achieved in which the stale is 
allowed significant leeway in defining purposes but is forced to accept the natural conse-
quences of that definition. 
For instance, if the purpose of the prohibition against carriers advertising the wares of 
others in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), was to minimize traffic 
hazards, as the Court hypothesized, this significant public interest would be included in a 
calculus of misfit which would probably show that the classification was both grossly overin-
clusive and underinclusive. If, instead, the purpose was merely to protect existing carriers 
against an influx of carriers supported by large advertisers, a more precisely tailored classifica-
tion would be accomplished at the expense of a lesser (or less obviously permissible) stale 
interest. Of course, if economic discriminations are to be afforded minimal review, the 
classification might withstand analysis under either interpretation. The example nevertheless 
illustrates that this approach lessens the problem of the state reducing the effective degree of 
scrutiny by narrowly articulating its purpose. 
371. See text accompanying notes 256-61 supra. Although the effectualness argument is 
discussed there in terms of due process, the discussion applies to equal protection as well. 
372. If a burden is ineffective, both the state interest in imposing the burden and the per-
sonal interest in avoiding it are less than they would be if the burden were completely effective. 
Thus, the Court in Craig might have observed that the ease with which the prohibition could 
be circumvented made plaintiffs' complaint less appealing. Whether these effects cancel each 
other perfectly in an equal protection balance is an intriguing question. (Arguably equal pro-
tection complainants suffer some injury simply in being targeted as members of a class appro-
priately burdened, even if the arrows go astray. But a parallel argument can be offered for the 
state: many laws have a symbolic or "propaganda" value even if they are not enforced. See 
text at notes 149-50 supra.) 
373. Gunther, supra note 2, at 47-48. In add{tion, see Simson, supra note 5, at 679-80, 
who apparently makes the same assumption. 
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in the abstract, some persons who are included should be left out or 
whether some persons who are left out should be included.374 
Rather, it is whether those who are included are "sufficiently" differ-
ent from those who are left out, where sufficiency is judged accord-
ing to the weight of the personal interests actually infringed and the 
weight of the social harm that the law actually alleviates. 
2. Prima Facie Fairness and Reasonable Alternatives 
This section asks when a court should concern itself with possible 
alternative means of accomplishing a law's purp!)se, and how the 
reasonableness of alternatives should be determined. In balancing 
with respect to differential harm, a court should make a prima facie 
determination of fairness before considering alternatives. The court 
may find that a certain differential is, "on balance," either fair or 
unfair regardless of the existence of reasonable alternatives. The 
driving test illustration employed in this Note is probably an exam-
ple of a law that is fair irrespective of alternatives, if we can assume 
that the classification presents some differential in harm. Even if 
every other state in the nation had a less costly, more accurate test 
for screening dangerous drivers, no court would invalidate this 
state's test, given the relative unimportance of the individual interest 
in driving and the significance of the social interest in safe highways. 
In contrast, while denying food stamps to members of unrelated 
households might be the only feasible safeguard against households 
formed only to obtain them,375 a court could well find the law "on 
balance" unfair.376 
A court which concludes that a law's fairness can be judged with-
out evaluating alternatives has in effect concluded that the law 
presents an extreme case under the balancing test. That is, it has 
found the law unmistakably fair or unfair. Greater precision as to 
the standards for "prima facie fairness" is probably unattainable, for 
374. The Supreme Court often analyzes misfit in these terms and infers irrationality from 
the mere fact that the classification creates some overinclusion or underinclusion, without 
pausing to examine the degree of differential between T and "'T(equal protection misfit) or of 
due process overbreadth. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974), and 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) ( equal protection); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality opinion) (due process). 
375. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
376. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the Court struck down a legis-
lative attempt to reduce drunk driving by means of an alcohol purchase limitation-even 
though there may be "no apparent way to single out persons likely to drink and drive," 429 
U.S. at 227 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
In one sense, of course, United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), 
and Craig are not laws which are unfair "regardless" of alternatives, but cases in which the 
Court will only accept the "alternative" of invalidation. But this is not a sensible characteriza-
tion; the Court is holding that it is unsatisfied with the fairness of the law, not that it is satisfied 
with the reasonableness of the alternative. 
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those standards will reflect the premises with which a court ap-
proaches balancing. 
A court which cannot make a prima facie judgment about a law's 
fairness must examine the reasonableness of its possible alternatives. 
The Supreme Court purports to look at alternatives only under the 
compelling state interest test,377 but its analyses under the irrebut-
table presumption doctrine and rational basis test reveal its interest 
in alternatives. The Court nominally considers only those alterna-
tives that are at least equally effective in achieving the state's goal378 
(and also, of course, less restrictive). Nevertheless, under the com-
pelling state interest test the Court does not in fact demand "equal 
e.ffectiveness,"379 and under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine it 
is openly undisturbed by the additional administrative costs of the 
alternative it imposes.380 This divergence between theory and prac-
tice can be cured by formulating an explicit standard for evaluating 
alternatives under equal protection balancing. Simply stated, the 
reasonableness of an alternative should depend on the prima facie 
fairness of the law, on the social costs of the alternative, and on how 
much less.restrictive the alternative is. This standard requires some 
elaboration. 
The strict scrutiny "necessity" requirement has classically meant 
that there must be (a) no less restrictive means which (b) serves the 
government interest equally well.381 The second element of this 
definition must be treated skeptically, for few alternative means 
serve an end just as well as the existing means. As Professor Brest 
has remarked,382 the presence of such an alternative would demon-
strate that the law was not Pareto optimal383 and thus that its restric-
tiveness could be alleviated at no cost384 even though the law was 
377.- See JJevelopments, supra note 1, at 1102-03, 1122. 
378. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (''the Constitution does not require the 
State to choose ineffectual means to achieve its aims"); American Party ofTexas v. White, 415 
U.S. 767, 781 (1974). 
379. For example, in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), the Court stressed that more 
precise tests were available to determine the bona fide residency of servicemen and ser-
vicewomen who moved to the state, and it invalidated the broad denial of the right to vote to 
all such residents. It is obvious, however, that some additional administrative costs would be 
incurred by replacing the presumption with the more precise tests. 
380. See cases cited in note 203 supra. 
381. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-35, 637 (1969). The second element of 
the requirement, equal effectiveness, is often stated less explicitly than the first. See note 378 
supra. 
382. P. BREST, supra note 116, at 991-92. 
383. The Pareto criterion states: "Any change which harms no one and which makes some 
people better off (in their own estimation) must be considered to be an improvement." W. 
BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 527 (4th ed. 1977). Here, if the 
alternative means is just as effective as the existing means and burdens personal interests less, 
then the existing means is not Pareto optimal, since a change in the alternative would not 
undermine the state interest (it would "harm no one") and would make some people better off. 
384. See also Note, supra note 218, at 469. 
1978] Equal Protection 877 
"rational" in the sense of satisfying the minimum rationality con-
straint. Only a government with a bizarre or Spartan desire to mini-
mize the happiness of its citizens, or, more plausibly, a government 
hostile to those citizens burdened by the law under review,385 would 
fail to seek Pareto optimality. No court should give any weight to 
these government interests. Even if thoughtlessness or ignorance 
rather than malice motivated the irrationality, courts should require 
the "efficient" solution. 
The Court applies, as it must, the "less restrictive means" test 
even where the state interest is less well served by the alternative 
means. Of course, the effectiveness of the available alternatives 
should be considered, but they need not be as effective as the chal-
lenged means. Before turning to the question of how "reasonable" 
the alternative means must be, we should briefly consider the other 
element of the classic test-the "less restrictive" requirement. 
A ''less restrictive" means is an alternative that either creates less 
misfit or imposes a lighter burden, or both. The "less misfit" inter-
pretation is relatively uncomplicated.386 It is the approach in ir-
rebuttable presumption cases, in which the Court allows the 
legislature to confer the same benefits as the law under attack, but 
requires that they be conferred on a larger class. It is also the ap-
proach most often used in fundamental interest cases, in which the 
385. See id. at 469 n.27; Nimmer, Tire Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29, 41-42 (1973). 
386. The kind of misfit which a less drastic alternative reduces is usually overinclusion (or, 
in the case of a benefit, underinclusion), for that kind of alternative directly aids the plaintiff; 
he will no longer be burdened despite his innocence or excluded from the benefit despite his 
need. But a means which creates less underinclusion with respect to a burden (or 
overinclusion with respect to a benefit) might also be considered less restrictive. For example, 
if in Craig the state could have easily reduced drunk driving by the alternative means of edu-
cation and stronger penalties, then the law's underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness might 
have been lessened: girls who could buy beer previously and would have been drunk drivers 
would be discouraged from driving wljle drunk, and boys who were safe drivers before but 
could not buy beer could do so. 
But reducing the burden-underinclusiveness (or benefit-overinclusiveness) of a law is less 
restrictive only in the sense that the alternative is fairer than the original, not in the sense that 
the alternative burdens personal interests less severely. (In the above example, boys would 
not be more lightly burdened simply because the girls who posed a harm under the original 
law would not under the alternative.) Courts usually employ "less restrictive alternative" in 
its second sense, possibly because the phrase "less restrictive" suggests the meaning "burden-
ing plaintiffs less" or because a trivial alternative can always be found which is less restrictive 
in the first sense. (In Craig, girls would be forbidden from purchasing beer.) Nevertheless, to 
the extent that an alternative reduces underinclusion courts should consider it less restrictive, 
since if it were adopted, the plaintiff would be less "burdened" in the sense of having a weaker 
equal protection claim: he has less reason to complain that the similarly situated are not 
treated equally. 
It might be objected that in an equal protection case, courts should never characterize a less 
overinclusive alternative as less restrictive, since overinclusion (with respect to a burden) is 
essentially a due process problem. But the objection fails to note that a less overinclusive 
classification will necessarily produce a greater differential in harm and thus a lesser equal 
protection misfit. It also fails to note that a less overinclusive alternative burdens personal 
interests less, thus increasing the state's comparative position in the equal protection balance. 
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Court often notes how easily the legislature could achieve its goals 
by better fitting means.387 
The lesser burden388 interpretation of "less drastic means" ap-
pears less often. Its rationale is clear enough: even if an alternative 
means burdens the same class of persons, the means may be less re-
strictive if the burden it imposes on those persons is lighter, for the 
burden may implicate different and less important personal interests 
or may infringe the same interests less seriously. For example, one 
justification offered for the welfare residency requirement in Shapiro 
v. Thompson 389 was that it would prevent the fraudulent receipt of 
benefits from more than one state. But the Court noted: "Since 
double payments can be prevented by a letter or a telephone call, it 
is unreasonable to accomplish this objective by the blunderbuss 
method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers for an entire 
year."390 That is, the alternative would have imposed only a mild 
"burden," namely, a check on whether they received welfare benefits 
from another state. Although the same class of persons-all welfare 
recipients who arrived in the state within a year-would be bur-
dened by this alternative, the enormous reduction in burden would 
make it much less restrictive. 
With these explanations of "less restrictive" and "equally eff ec-
tive" in mind, we may tum to the merits of the problem: how do we 
determine whether an alternative is "reasonable"? "Reasonable-
ness," of course, is not a static notion. If a law is almost prima facie 
unfair regardless of alternatives, then even the presence of a some-
what costlier alternative might invalidate the law. If the law was 
almost invalid even had there been no other means to achieve the 
end, then it would be anomalous to uphold the law simply because 
the alternative that does exist imposes more than nominal costs. In 
the converse situation, in which the law is almost prima facie fair, an 
alternative that imposes almost any significant costs on the state may 
be "unreasonable," for similar reasons. 
The "reasonableness" of an alternative should depend not only 
on the prima facie fairness of the law, but also on the social costs of 
the alternative and how much less restrictive the alternative is. That 
is, the more ''unfair'' the law, the less restrictive the alternative, and 
the less the costs imposed by that alternative, the more willing courts 
387. See note 379 supra. 
388. "Burden" also refers to denial of a benefit. The "lesser burden" interpretation, as 
applied to benefits, means that the alternative does not completely deny benefits to underin-
cluded would-be recipients; it gives a lesser benefit, or the same benefit subject to conditions 
not applied to other recipients. The remedy ordered in an irrebuttable presumption case is 
generally less restrictive in this sense, since it does not grant the benefit to plaintiff, but only 
allows him to rebut the presumption that he does not deserve it. 
389. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
390. 394 U.S. at 637. 
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should be to invalidate the law for failing to employ a less drastic 
means. In essence, we are simply comparing the general fairness of 
the law with the general fairness of an alternative391 and asking 
whether the additional fairness achieved by the latter justifies some 
increase in social costs. 
The social costs incurred by an alternative will mainly be of two 
kinds. One cost may be the decreased effectiveness of the alterna-
tive means. Vlandis v. K!ine,392 though nominally an irrebuttable 
presumption case, illustrates such a cost.393 The Court found consti-
tutionally infirm the statutory irrebuttable presumption that certain 
applicants for in-state tuition at a university were nonresidents. Spe-
cifically, married students who had legally resided outside the state 
when they had applied and unmarried students who had lived 
outside the state during the preceding year were deemed to be "non-
residents" for their stay at the university. The Court believed that a 
more refined test of residence was practicable. The Court carefully 
noted that it was not forbidding reasonable durational residence re-
quirements that could be met while one was a student.394 The alter-
native of, say, a one-year residence test,395 even if it used the same 
presumptions as the statute in V!qndis, might increase social costs. 
Although the original four-year presumption was too overinclusive, 
it did screen out some nonresidents who would not have been 
screened out by a one-year presumption (assuming that after a year 
students can more easily qualify as residents). The alternative of a 
one-year presumption therefore alleviates somewhat less effectively 
the perceived "harm" of granting in-state tuition to nonresidents. 
A second social cost an alternative can incur is its additional ad-
ministrative cost. In Vlandis the alternative of requiring hearings at 
which individuals could rebut the presumption of nonresidence 
would not be significantly less effective in limiting in-state rates to 
bona fide residents. The state in Vlandis objected to this alternative 
mainly because of the second kind of social cost: the hearings man-
dated by the Court were more expensive than the presumption.396 
39 l. The term "general" is significant, for the less restrictive alternative approach should 
not require the state to choose alternative B over existing means A if A and B are "equally" 
restrictive, even if the actual plaintiff is burdened by means A but not by means B. Giving 
this plaintiff a remedy would only create a new and equivalently "burdened" class of persons 
discriminated against. 
392. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
393. Similar principles apply to "necessity'' problems in equal protection and in due pro-
cess/irrebuttable presumption cases; the only difference is in the kind of misfit to be remedied 
(i.e., differential harm vs. overbreadth). 
394. 412 U.S. at 452. 
395. See Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), ajfd mem., 401 U.S. 985 
(1971). 
396. The two kinds of social cost created by an alternative are often interrelated, for an 
alternative that less effectively promotes the state's goal can usually be made more precise if 
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(This, of course, is the usual objection to the alternative of allowing a 
presumption to be rebutted.) As was suggested earlier,397 the cost of 
hearings can be significant and should not be dismissed as blithely as 
it has been in many sex discrimination and irrebuttable presumption 
cases.398 
Alternatives, it is clear, are not easily evaluated. Simple stan-
dards for evaluating alternatives that lower courts could readily and 
correctly apply are elusive (though this is a problem endemic to any 
refined, case-sensitive balancing test).399 And such standards are 
necessarily difficult to apply because the actual effectiveness of alter-
natives can usually not be predicted. When a court evaluates the 
prima facie fairness of a law, it may have a legislative record, or at 
least detailed justifications by government counsel, describing the 
law's probable effect. In some cases the court may even have evi-
dence of the law's actual effectiveness. But evaluations of alterna-
tives that the court may have conceived sua sponte and that may 
never have been evaluated in the legislature must often rest on un-
warranted factual assumptions. In these cases the dangers of judicial 
legislation loom large. 
Nevertheless, a court which doubts its competence to judge alter-
natives and which fears it is arrogating the legislative function may 
rest its decisions simply on the prima facie fairness or unfairness of 
the law without engaging in a more detailed balancing. Moreover, 
some ·difficulties may be eased by shifting burdens of proof. One 
commentator has suggested that critics of a government regulation 
have the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that a 
less restrictive alternative exists.400 In sharp contrast, the funda-
the state is willing to shoulder the extra administrative cost. Of course, this relationship does 
not invariably hold; the state may sometimes be forced to accept a less effective classification 
even when it cannot be made more precise. In other words, sometimes the state just may not 
have the second alternative of retaining the classification's level of effectiveness by increasing 
administrative cost. 
397. See Part IV.B.2 supra. 
398. Administrative cost includes not only the additional out-of-pocket expenses-hiring 
hearing examiners, evaluating more detailed and "individualized" categories of proof-but 
also less tangible costs-loss of predictability, possible delay in imposing the benefit or burden, 
and greater opportunity for abuse of discretion-which jeopardize both classificatory accuracy 
and individual freedom. Where a hearing is already provided to some and the alternative 
only requires that it be more complete or detailed or that it be extended to others, the burden 
to the government is not as great as when new administrative machinery must be established. 
These and other factors affect the significance which should be attached to the administrative 
cost of conducting hearings. 
399. Consider, for example, the unhappy experience under the fifth amendment "volunta-
riness" test for confessions, a test ultimately rejected in favor of the per se rule of Miranda v, 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See w. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J, CHOPER, CONSTITU• 
TIONAL LAW 655-57 (4th ed. 1975). 
400. Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Altemative Principle and Economic .Due Process, 80 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1463, 1471 (1967). For a general discussion of burdens of proof under the 
minimum rationality standard, see P. BREST, supra note 116, at 1005-10. 
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mental interest test apparently requires the government to prove that 
there are no less restrictive means.401 This approach cannot be 
taken too literally since a party cannot reasonably be asked to antici-
pate and refute every possible challenge to its position. But if the 
government is asked only to disprove plausible alternatives proffered 
by the plaintiff or the court, burden of proof will have been reason-
ably allocated in cases where an important personal interest is 
significantly infringed or where the classification is almost prima 
facie unfair. Where lesser personal interests are infringed, it is sen-
sible to require plaintiffs to prove that a less restrictive alternative , 
exists. 
3. When Peifect Fit Is Not Enough 
Under an equal protection balancing test with "bite," perfect fit 
might not be enough to validate a law if the state interest "perfectly" 
served is insufficiently important compared to the burden on per-
sonal interests. The Supreme Court's existing tests do appear to 
transcend perfect fit, for while most classifications need only relate to 
a "legitimate" state interest, a gender-based classification must serve 
an "important" goal, and classifications touching fundamental inter-
ests (or employing suspect traits) must be necessitated by a "compel-
ling" interest, irrespective of fit with a lesser goal. A good example 
of this ''transcendental" technique was the Court's decision that once 
a state grants criminal defendants an appeal as of right, it must also 
appoint counsel for the indigent to ensure that the poor as well as the 
rich may have a meaningful appeal.402 The state could have ar-
gued403 that its failure to furnish free counsel was "perfectly" related 
to the interest of having defendants pay their own way in the crimi-
nal justice system. But such an interest is too slight to justify differ-
ential treatment with respect to the important personal right at issue, 
namely, the meaningful chance to avoid the severe consequences of 
conviction. 404 
The view that perfect fit with respect to a non-compelling interest 
may not be enough to satisfy equal protection has been criticized as a 
401. See .Developments, supra note 1, at 1122. 
402. Douglas v, California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
403. There is no indication in the opinion that this argument was in fact made. But a 
similar argument was propounded by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 
U.S. 305, 311 (1966). The majority had held that a state could not recoup the cost of trial 
transcripts furnished to indigent incarcerated prisoners yet decline to seek such reimbursement 
from indigents who are not imprisoned. Harlan reasoned in dissent: 
Surely the State might reasonably choose to reimburse itself for such transcript costs out 
of prison allowances, but deem it not worth the added time and trouble, or even advisable, 
to attempt to extract such charges from a convict not in prison who must support himself 
on his own resources. 
384 U.S. at 311 (emphasis added). 
404. See Simson, supra note 5, at 691-94. 
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barely disguised return to substantive due process.405 This criticism 
is not strictly accurate, since equal protection may properly employ 
this transcendental method, but it is true that that method is usually 
more appropriate in due process cases. A sensitive understanding of 
substantive due process, of equal protection balancing, and of the 
definition of "legitimate" discriminations, makes less necessary any 
resort to the radical notion that "perfect fit is not enough." 
An insufficiently developed equal protection balancing test partly 
accounts for the hierarchy of purposes-from legitimate, to impor-
tant, to compelling-in the current equal protection tests. Almost all 
classifications create some misfit under the model presented in this 
Note. That is, most laws are not, on their face, self-justifying. Fur-
ther analysis is required to find a classificatory purpose that is "legiti-
mate," and there will then ordinarily be some misfit to evaluate. 
The question whether that misfit is justifiable is, as we have seen, 
answered through a balancing test that weighs the differential in 
harm between the included and the excluded according to the 
strength of the government and personal interests.406 Thus, when 
the government's interest is insignificant, the differential in harm 
may be insufficient to validate the law, and there may be no need to 
move up the hierarchy and examine misfit only with respect to a 
more important purpose. 
One important reason why the Court has used this "more than 
perfect fit" approach is that the Court misconceives saving adminis-
trative costs as the same kind of government interest as the substan-
tive purpose of the statute. If saving cost is described as the purpose 
of a classification, then it is easy to describe "the purpose" as 
insignificant irrespective of the closeness of the fit. Yet laws are usu-
ally not passed in order to save money but in order to do something, 
subject to a cost constraint. Cost constraints are not unimportant, 
but every law costs something, and costs will always affect the evalu-
ation of the reasonableness of alternatives. Perhaps the Court re-
quires an "important" interest in gender-based classifications to 
underscore its view that administrative cost is an insufficient ration-
ale. But all of the gender cases reaching the Supreme Court have 
involved concededly inaccurate generalizations with respect to the 
substantive goal of the statute; since the means invariably did not 
perfectly fit the goal, the "more than perfect fit" approach in these 
cases has been unnecessary. 
As this discussion suggests, courts may also have resorted to 
"more than perfect fit" because of their tendency to ascribe a narrow 
and not "legitimate" purpose to a statute. In .Douglas, for example, if 
405. See lJevelopments, supra note 1, at 1132. 
406. Also relevant, of course, are the extent to which the government interest is served and 
the extent to which the personal interest is burdened. 
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the purpose is described as the desire to save the money that provid-
ing free counsel would cost, the purpose is not legitimate.407 The 
Court must reach a higher or more generalized level of purpose 
before evaluating misfit-not because "perfect fit is not enough" at 
this level, but simply because there is no reason to credit a purpose 
that is not obviously legitimate. (It would not be proper to define 
the purpose of our driving test as screening from the road people 
who fail driving tests and then to analyze that purpose as insignifi-
cant.) In short, the requirement that misfit be evaluated only with 
respect to legitimate goals largely serves the function courts believe 
the "perfect fit" approach performs. 
Despite these observations, the "more than perfect fit" approach 
is significant when even a legitimate purpose is too insubstantial. 
This approach is also important when the goal is "inevitably arbi-
trary" in the special sense discussed above,408 for such goals by defi-
nition cannot sensibly be evaluated under a balancing test, one of 
whose elements is misfit-their misfit cannot even be measured. 
Thus, such goals should be treated as though the classificatory fit 
were perfect and should be invalidated only when perfect fit is not 
enough.409 If, for example, a school principal decided that physical 
segregation of student protesters wearing black armbands410 was aes-
thetically pleasing, this inevitably arbitrary discrimination could 
only be invalidated on the ground that the speech and privacy inter-
ests of the students required that a more important interest be in-
voked. It would be futile to dispute the aesthetic pleasure the 
principal derived from the scheme; the closeness of fit is un-
measurable. 
When equal protection demands more than perfect fit, the bal-
ance resembles straightforward substantive due process balancing. 
But, in theory and occasionally in practice, the tests are distinct. 
They diverge when an equal burdening of a fundamental or impor-
tant interest does not quite violate substantive due process, but a dif-
ferential burden does violate equal protection. For example, the 
Supreme Court in .Douglas only held that an indigent should have 
the same "meaningful" access to the courts that the state afforded a 
wealthy defendant. It did not hold that "meaningful" access is a 
407. The purpose is not legitimate because it does not explain why the costs of an indi-
gent's appeal should be imposed on the indigent rather than on society generally. 
408. See Part V supra. 
409. In the case of laws with neutral goals (such as social experiments), this statement 
should be qualified: the law should be invalidated only when the combination of perfect fit 
toward the substantive goal and the independent state interest in classifying neutrally (e.g., the 
interest in obtaining knowledge from an experiment) are insufficient to outweigh the individ-
ual's side of the equal protection balance. See text at notes 339-42 supra. 
410. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Co=unity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(recognizing free speech right of high school students to wear black armbands in nondisruptive 
antiwar protest). 
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substantive requirement, and it thus apparently did not forbid the 
state to deny the use of transcripts on appeal to rich and poor 
alik.e.411 Similarly, in Shapiro v. Thompson412 the Court purported 
to strike down a residency requirement for welfare benefits only be-
cause the fundamental right to travel was d!fferentially infringed. 
The Court presumably would have upheld the requirement had the 
state also imposed qualitatively similar burdens on new residents 
other than potential welfare applicants.413 
As these cases illustrate, the theoretical distinction between equal 
protection and substantive due process in this area often lacks practi-
cal substance. A more equal infringement of the right to travel than 
occurred in Shapiro would probably not be constitutional. And the 
Court's frequent assertion that there is no constitutional right to ap-
peal a criminal conviction414 can probably not be taken at face value. 
Even if that assertion is correct, a state which has granted an appeal 
as of right may probably not encumber it to the extent of denying 
defendants the use of trial transcripts. But in some areas, such as 
voting rights, the due process/equal protection distinction415 does 
seem to have practical as well as theoretical meaning. Many state 
offices can be appointive, but once the state makes them elective it 
may not restrict any group's interest in voting in elections for those 
offices, absent a compelling state interest.416 
Despite these objections, the notion that equal protection may 
require more than perfect fit is sometimes of practical consequence. 
How should this notion be expressed in an actual balancing test? 
One possibility would be to establish a finely graded continuum in 
411. Support for this observation is perhaps to be found in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189 (1971), which required that an indigent defendant be furnished with a sufficiently 
complete trial record to permit proper consideration of his claims even though the conviction 
was punishable by fine only-and even though the right to counsel (a substantive right) has 
not yet been extended to such convictions. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) 
(noting that the question has yet to be decided). 
412. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
413. Although these cases did not involve perfect fit, the Court's analysis in effect assumed 
that the fit was perfect. 
414. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974), citing with approval McKane v. 
Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
415. The distinction might be further refined to the following: substantive rights/due proc-
ess/equal protection. Even though a citizen may have no substantive right (e.g., under the 
first or sixth amendment) to obtain a certain benefit, it might be a denial of (substantive) due 
process or equal protection to condition the grant of the benefit in certain ways, for instance by 
invading substantive due process interests or by distinguishing on the basis of race or wealth. 
Notice that substantive due process can sometimes be the source of a right to the particular 
benefit as well as the source of a right not to have the benefit conditioned upon the non-
assertion of protected interests. For example, as just noted, due process might plausibly sup-
port both a constitutional right to a criminal appeal and a constitutional right not to be penal-
ized for the assertion of a statutory appeal right, see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
725 (1969) (''vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first con-
viction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial"). 
416. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628-30 (1969). 
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which any increase in the significance of the personal interest ( or the 
extent to which it is burdened) would require a more significant 
"threshold" state interest below which even perfect fit would not val-
idate the law. Of course such a continuum would not be judicially 
manageable, and the Court should require only a small number of 
intervals. (The present test has three intervals,417 "legitimate," "im-
portant," and "compelling," though the middle interval is applied 
not to intermediate-level interests but to an intermediately "suspect" 
classificatory trait, sex.) A two-, three-, or four-tiered test is perhaps 
appropriate here-but unlike the present tiers, these tiers would de-
scribe only the importance of the requisite government interest and 
not the required closeness of fit or the availability of alternatives. 
Within any single tier, a careful means-end analysis would still be 
necessary. 
In establishing these thresholds, care should be taken not to re-
quire too compelling a purpose at the upper tier lest equal protection 
mandate pervasive equality. Under the present strict scrutiny test, 
for example, the compelling state interest requirement is nearly im-
possible to satisfy.418 The state must treat similarly all who are exer-
cising their fundamental interests in voting, travelling, seeking access 
to the criminal justice process, entering marriage, and perhaps 
procreating, and it may not draw merely "rational" distinctions 
based on wealth or other criteria. Such enforced equality differs 
from the most invigorated rational basis test; it requires that, in addi-
tion to all its other goals, the government attempt to ensure that 
everyone realizes fundamental interests equally. As this approach 
more absolutely protects certain rights, it not only increasingly re-
sembles a due process approach, but eventually approximates the de-
gree of scrutiny accorded explicit substantive constitutional 
provisions such as the first amendment. 
In sum, courts should employ the equal protection "perfect fit is 
not enough" approach cautiously. There are probably few interests 
unimportant enough that they may constitutionally be infringed 
equally yet important enough that unequal infringement violates 
equal protection regardless of the rationality of the classification in 
other respects. Courts should be more willing to use either substan-
tive due process or a rational basis test which evaluates misfit to in-
validate classifications they now strike down on "fundamental 
interest" grounds. This franker technique would probably not pro-
417. Simson, supra note 5, at 679, also suggests a three-tiered test, one which distinguishes 
between compelling, significant, and insignificant state interests. His fourth category of state 
interest, "unlawful," is not really a fourth ''tier," for it describes a tier at which the individual 
always wins. Id at 680 n.95. 
418. The compelling interest requirement has been satisfied only in two cases, each of 
which involved wartime necessity: Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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duce greatly different results, since a court more closely scrutinizing 
purposes by the method suggested above will almost invariably find 
some misfit to weigh against the purported governmental purpose. 
This technique would also encourage meaningful case-by-case re-
view. Under current equal protection analysis, the Court is some-
times paralyzed when it feels it cannot accept the consequences of 
another "fundamental interest" baptism,419 and it has been embar-
rassed by its resort to tortured reasoning to sustain laws that affect 
fundamental interests indirectly.420 Under the proposed balancing 
test, perfectly tailored classifications would seldom be invalidated 
solely because they infringe important personal interests. The test 
provides a sensitive and logically consistent solution to the problem 
of protecting lesser personal liberties against discriminatory en-
croachment. 
C. Substantive JJue Process Balancing 
A reasonable formula for substantive due process balancing may 
be inferred from the preceding section. Due process balances the 
personal interests implicated and the extent to which they are bur-
dened, against the state interest actually served by the means em-
ployed. The balance is that expressed by the equation earlier 
noted.421 It is a direct balance in which differential harm, or indeed 
any reference to an unclassified group, is irrelevant.422 
Many of the same concepts used to analyze ~qual protection dif-
ferential treatment apply directly to due process overbreadth. Simi-
larly, under substantive due process as well as under equal 
protection, "perfect fit" may not be enough to validate a law. Indeed, 
419. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
420. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); 
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). 
421. See text at note 353 supra. 
422. Such a reference is relevant to a limited extent, namely, to determine how much of the 





See text at notes 369-71 supra. 
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requiring more than perfect fit is more often a sensible mode of anal-
ysis in the former case than in the latter.423 
Due process overbreadth analytically resembles equal protection 
differential treatment. First, a court evaluates the extent of the over-
breadth and estimates its legitimacy in light of the personal interests 
burdened and the state interests achieved. At the "extremes" of le-
gitimacy, the law is either upheld or invalidated, whatever the possi-
ble alternatives. Between those extremes, the court investigates 
reasonable alternatives, testing reasonableness according to the 
prima facie fairness424 of the law, the social costs of its alternatives, 
and the restrictiveness of the alternatives. 
Despite these formal similarities between equal protection and 
due process balancing, weights assigned the balanced interests may 
differ in the two cases, since the consequence of a due process viola-
tion is more severe than that of an equal protection violation. 
Ceteris paribus425 the personal interest should have to be more im-
portant (or more heavily burdened) in a due process than in an equal 
protection case to constitute a violation. By the same token, the 
state interest should have to be more compelling ( or better furthered) 
in a due process than in an equal protection case to justify what 
would otherwise be a violation. Were this not so, the equal protec-
tion clause would be gratuitous, since a liberal due process clause 
would invalidate even a uniform infringement of a right, and there 
would be no need to examine differential infringement. But preci-
sion as to how different the weighting of the interests should be in the 
two kinds of balance is elusive; the difference ultimately depends 
upon the relative strength with which the Court wishes to read the 
due process and equal protection clauses. Nevertheless, the Court 
needs to be sensitive to these relationships between due process and 
equal protection and the different functions which they perform. 
Finally, as the last section suggests, in due process even more 
than in equal protection perfect fit might not be enough-in due 
process personal interests of a given level of significance must be jus-
tified in terms of state interests of a corresponding threshold signifi-
cance, even if a lesser state interest is adequately, even perfectly, 
423. Strictly speaking, "perfect fit" has a different meaning in the two cases. In due pro-
cess, it only means the absence of any overbreadth, regardless of the amount of underinclu-
sion. In equal protection, it means the greatest possible differential in harm between the bur-
dened and those not burdened. This amounts to "perfect fit" as normally understood, for all 
and only the harmful are burdened, and there is no overinclusion or underinclusion. 
424. In due process cases, a law is prima facie fair if the degree of overbreadth is not 
excessive; in equal protection cases, if the degree of differential harm is sufficient. 
425. Of course, "comparing" the degree of overbreadth with the degree of differential 
harm is difficult. But the intuitive idea is that if these are roughly equivalent, then the rela-
tionships stated in the text i,!fra should hold. 
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served. This straightforward balancing makes more sense under 
due process than under equal protection, for due process tends to 
protect personal interests more absolutely. Indeed, the uneven con-
tinuum of equal protection, substantive due process, and explicit 
constitutional guarantees such as the first amendment,426 suggests 
that a direct balance of the relevant interests is more justifiable as the 
personal interest comes to deserve more absolute protection. An in-
fringement of anyone's free speech rights demands an extraordinary 
justification. An intrusion into the autonomy of the family, by con-
trast, might be valid if the state could adduce a compelling interest, 
but it is otherwise invalid, even if there is no overbreadth.427 An 
invasion of a mere equal protection interest, such as the right to pro-
create, deserves little absolute protection; the plaintiff probably has 
to show that the invasion was accomplished discriminatorily.428 
Because due process demands more than perfect fit much more 
often than equal protection, misfit analysis is often less important in 
a substantive due process case. The Court will demand a "compel-
ling" justification and will ignore less substantial state interests or 
will be more critical of the misfit created by lesser interests than 
under equal protection. Thus, to the extent that the Note's emphasis 
on misfit analysis suggests that due process invariably requires a 
judgment about overbreadth, this Note is misleading.429 Neverthe-
less, a more active use of the due process clause to protect lesser 
personal interests would require a much closer attention to over-
breadth analysis.430 Both because of this possibility and because due 
process misfit analysis offers an instructive contrast to equal protec-
tion, overbreadth analysis is valuable. 
426. See the taxonomy in P. BREST, supra note 116, at 805-06. This Note would interpose 
a substantive due process tier between his category 1 ("substantive constitutional rights") and 
his category 2 ("rights to fair and rational treatment"), which recognizes certain substantive 
rights of lesser constitutional significance than many of his category 1 rights, but of greater 
significance than his category 2 rights. 
427. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating such a law by 
a simple analysis of overbreadth). Significantly, the Court did not find any compelling state 
interest to justify the discrimination. 
428. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a maximum grant limita-
tion on welfare benefits irrespective of family size, even though effect of statute may have been 
to deter procreation); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a compulsory 
sterilization law which arbitrarily distinguished between, inter a/ia, larceners and embezzlers; 
but upholding the general constitutionality of compulsory sterilization by its approving refer-
ence to Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) 
(citing Buck in support of the proposition that one does not have "an unlimited right to do 
with one's body as one pleases"). 
429. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is a good example of a substantive due process case 
in which overbreadth analysis was irrelevant. The crucial analysis involved a direct balancing 
of interests to determine when each interest became "compelling" enough to outweigh the 
others. 410 U.S. at 162-64. 
430. The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is, of course, an example of such activism. 
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Vil. CONCLUSION: THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
This Note does not address in any detail the judiciary's proper 
role in enforcing the equal protection guarantee. This Note does 
attempt to construct a general analytic framework for a moderately 
activist court, a framework amenable to a broad spectrum of judicial 
views. The Note's "balancing" terminology should not be misinter-
preted as requiring an activist approach to equal protection; it is 
meant to explain what the existing tests actually do and to further 
conceptual coherence. Courts may differ as to which interests de-
serve special solicitude and as to how much solicitude they de-
serve.431 Courts may differ as to the relative usefulness and propriety 
of equal protection and substantive due process rationality tests. 
They may differ as to the propriety ( or necessity) of examining a 
legislature's motive. They may differ, most fundamentally, as to the 
relative importance of "hostile" and "unfair'' discriminations. But 
the proposed model should be able to accommodate these differ-
ences. 
"Closer scrutiny" is not reducible to a simple formula. A court 
which is seriously evaluating the fairness of a law must assess the 
differences between classes with respect to the harm posed, the inter-
ests aggrieved, and the costs incurred. The courts cannot hope for 
mathematical nicety432 in these judgments, especially where classifi-
cations legitimately and inevitably reflect arbitrary choices. Never-
theless, the judgment can be a judgment rather than an idle 
invocation of slogans. 
A revivified case-by-case approach to equal protection promises 
more genuine review; it also poses a danger of unprincipled deci-
sions. This danger is often overdrawn, however. More exacting 
equal protection review should inspire not ad hoc decisions, but a 
body of standards applicable to different legislative subjects, per-
sonal interests, and classificatory traits-standards formulated in 
light of the considerations this Note has set forth. For example, dis-
crimination against women is now treated under an "intermediate" 
standard: the classification must be "substantially" related to achiev-
ing "important" government objectives.433 Such a standard, unless 
431. Compare the majority opinion with Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio In-
dependent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973). Commentators differ as to the 
central values to be protected under the equal protection clause. See e.g., Karst, The 
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 
HARV. L. Rev. I (1977); Perry, supra note 68 (distinguishing several forms of fairness rooted in 
"conventional morality"); Sandalow, supra note 7, at 670 (one such value is "to facilitate each 
individual's opportunity to pursue a personal conception of the good life"); Wilkinson, supra 
note 3, at 954-56 ( distinguishing rights of political participation, equality of opportunity, and 
economic equality). 
432. See note 55 supra. 
433. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
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rigidly and unthinkingly applied, is not inconsistent with the view 
that there is in principle only one equal protection standard,434 since 
the Court has concluded that sex discriminations are as a rule so 
unreliable that they must be justified by more than a merely conceiv-
able set of facts.435 And finally, however difficult it may be to fash-· 
ion equal protection rules that are not only principled but also plain 
and workable, the present two-tiered test can no longer be re-
tained-the methods it prescribes are not those the Court actually 
uses.436 
The nagging concern that the equal protection clause raises ques-
tions courts are ill-equipped to answer perhaps explains why existing 
equal protection tests are mechanical and result-oriented. This con-
cern has also been overdrawn. The Court's most important task is 
not to gauge numerical misfit; it is to estimate misfit roughly accord-
ing to the Court's sense of how important or contrived the competing 
interests are. The Court can defer to the fact-finding competence of 
the legislature, and it can assign the plaintiff the burden of showing 
that a social ill does not exist, or would not be effectively remedied 
by the means chosen, or could be effectively remedied by a less re-
strictive alternative. And thus courts can answer the objection that 
judicial review of a law's fairness substitutes a court's understanding 
of the costs and benefits of social issues for the legislature's.437 
Uneasiness about judicial legislation has also been fueled by the 
fear that judicial review will hamper legislative flexibility and free-
dom. That fear is hardly confined to the equal protection clause but 
may be particularly discomfiting in relation to it, since the values to 
be "protected equally" are not described in the fourteenth amend-
ment.438 But a principled theory for determining those values439 is 
surely preferable to judicial abdication. 
Moreover, the concern for legislative flexibility will be exagger-
ated if the limits of equal protection balancing are not appreciated. 
A court employing this Note's framework would usually defer to the 
state's finding that an evil exists and that the state's means alleviates 
it.440 A state is entirely free to pursue any "legitimate,, goals441 ex-
cept in those rare cases in which the law infringes an important per-
434. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
435. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("(a) statutory discrimination 
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it"). 
436. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). 
437. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 784 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
438. See Professor Sandalow's discussion of "material principles," supra note 7, at 654-63. 
439. See Sandalow, supra note 7, at 660-63. 
440. See text at notes 256-61 supra. 
441. See Part 111.A.1 supra. 
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sonal liberty and must therefore be justified by a significant goal.442 
And if the goal is legitimate, the state may deploy any of the means 
of reaching that goal which are "accurate" enough to satisfy the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny. Finally, as Justice Jackson wrote, equal 
protection does not prevent the government fro.m acting but only re-
quires that its actions be even-handed.443 Though the statute may 
have been partly intended to avoid even-handedness, Justice Jackson 
does remind us that equal protection interferes with substantive leg-
islative choices less than due process and many more explicit consti-
tutional constraints do, since it examines only the justification for 
unequally pursuing a goal. 
Reasonable persons differ over the question whether the equal 
protection clause prohibits only totally "irrational" classifications 
and discrimination against suspect groups. But if the Court wishes to 
subject laws to closer scrutiny than the traditional rational basis test 
requires, there are principled and practical ways of doing so. The 
Court's own decisions indicate its interest in a strengthened stan-
dard. There is no reason not to proceed. 
442. See Parts VI.B.3 and VI.C supra. 
443. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). 

